Wolford et al. v. Lopez, Attorney General of Hawaii
No. 24-1046 · Decided June 25, 2026 · reversed and remanded
Does a Hawaii law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the owner's express authorization violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments? Hawaii’s law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the property owner’s express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
Vote & lineup6–3 on the judgment. Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett (6). Dissent(s): Kagan; Jackson (joined by Sotomayor). Concurrence(s): Barrett (joined by Thomas, Gorsuch).
The question
Does a Hawaii law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the owner's express authorization violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments? Specifically, the Court must determine if this "default rule" is consistent with the historical understanding of the right to bear arms. The case asks whether the state may flip the common-law default—where entry is generally permitted unless prohibited—to a rule where armed entry is prohibited unless expressly permitted.
Petitioner's argument
- The law imposes a severe and new burden on the right to carry handguns for self-defense as recognized in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*.
- The restriction effectively bars law-abiding citizens from routinely visited places like gas stations and grocery stores unless they obtain prior permission.
- The law was enacted as an end-run around the *Bruen* decision to achieve the same restrictive results as Hawaii's previous licensing regime.
- The state's proffered historical analogues are not "relevantly similar" to the modern restriction.
Respondent's argument
- The law is consistent with the "right to exclude," a fundamental principle of property law.
- Hawaii's unique customs and laws, including a long history of restricting firearms, support the state's new default rule.
- Colonial and early state laws, such as anti-poaching statutes, provide historical analogues for requiring owner consent before carrying firearms on private land.
- The law merely codifies the state's customary implied license for entry.
The decision
- The Court held that Hawaii's law violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
- Applying the two-step test from *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*, the Court first found the law falls within the "plain text" of the Second Amendment because it restricts "the people" from "bear[ing] Arms."
- Because it falls within the plain text, the law is "presumptively unconstitutional," shifting the burden to the state to show it is consistent with the historical understanding of the right.
- The Court rejected the argument that the Second Amendment's meaning varies by locale (e.g., the "spirit of Aloha"), citing *McDonald v. Chicago* for the principle that the Amendment embodies a uniform national standard.
- The Court found that colonial anti-poaching laws—including a 1721 Pennsylvania law, 1722 New Jersey statute, 1728 Maryland statute, 1763 New York law, and 1771 New Jersey law—are not relevant analogues because they targeted unauthorized hunting on game-bearing land, not daily activities in retail establishments.
- The Court dismissed an 1893 Oregon law as being too late in history and unclear as to whether it applied to commercial establishments.
- The Court rejected a 1865 Louisiana statute because it was part of the "Black Codes" designed to disarm blacks, a history the Court noted in *McDonald v. Chicago* as being contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose.
- The Court concluded that the "gap" between the state's historical analogues and the modern rule is too wide to support the law's constitutionality.
Separate opinions
Barrett, concurring (joined by Thomas, Gorsuch)
- Argues that the law triggers Second Amendment scrutiny because it is state action regulating arms-bearing conduct, regardless of the property owner's right to exclude.
- Contends that anti-poaching laws fail as analogues because they targeted specific "abuses" in specific places, whereas Hawaii's law targets a general disapproval of firearms.
- Notes that the Louisiana Black Code analogue is invalid because its "why" (subordinating freed slaves) is not analogous to Hawaii's stated interests.
Kagan, dissenting
- Argues the law is a modern analogue of colonial laws that prohibited carrying firearms on private property without affirmative consent.
- Contends the "how" is identical and the "why" (preventing harms on another's property) is sufficiently close to the historical tradition.
Jackson, dissenting (joined by Sotomayor)
- Argues the case is about property rights (the right to exclude) and that the Second Amendment does not protect a right to enter private property without consent.
- Claims the law does not pass the first step of the *Bruen* test because the conduct (armed entry without consent) is not part of the "pre-existing right."
- Asserts that if the law is analyzed under step two, the historical record (including the Black Codes) shows a tradition of requiring express consent for armed entry.