Does a Hawaii law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the owner's express authorization violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments? The Court must determine if this "default rule" is consistent with the historical understanding of the right to bear arms. Specifically, it asks if the state may flip the common-law rule of implied license to require affirmative consent for armed entry.

Petitioners, including residents of Maui County with concealed-carry permits, seek an injunction against the enforcement of the law. They argue that the requirement for express authorization imposes a severe and unconstitutional burden on their right to carry handguns for self-defense in the course of their daily lives. They further contend that the law was enacted specifically to undermine the holding in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*.

The State of Hawaii seeks to uphold the law, arguing that the Second Amendment does not encompass a right to armed entry onto private property without the owner's consent. Respondent contends that the law is consistent with Hawaii's particular customs and a long history of restricting firearms. Furthermore, the State argues that colonial and early state laws prohibiting unauthorized armed entry provide sufficient historical analogues to justify the current default rule.

The Court held that Hawaii’s law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Applying the two-step framework from *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*, the Court first found the law falls within the Second Amendment's plain text because it restricts "the people" from "bear[ing]" "Arms." Consequently, the law is presumptively unconstitutional, shifting the burden to the State to prove it is consistent with the historical understanding of the right. The Court rejected the State's argument that local customs or the "spirit of Aloha" could alter the uniform national standard established in *McDonald v. Chicago*. Regarding historical analogues, the Court found that 18th-century laws from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and New York were "anti-poaching" rules targeting unauthorized hunting, not retail establishments. These analogues were not "relevantly similar" in "how" or "why" they restricted arms, as they aimed to prevent the theft of game and risks of firing guns. The Court also dismissed an 1893 Oregon law as a lone statute that sheds little light on the original meaning of the right. Finally, the Court rejected a 1865 Louisiana statute because it was part of the "Black Codes" designed to disarm blacks and leave them defenseless. The Court concluded that the law severely hampers the fundamental right of self-defense recognized in *District of Columbia v. Heller*.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, argued that the case concerns property rights and the "right to exclude" rather than Second Amendment rights. She contended that the Second Amendment does not dictate the form of consent required for entry, and that state law and custom should govern whether consent is implied or express. Justice Jackson further asserted that the historical analogues provided by Hawaii demonstrate a tradition of requiring affirmative consent for armed entry onto private property.