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Preliminary Print Volume 605 U. S. Part 2 Pages 460–494 Official Reports of the Supreme Court June 18, 2025 Rebecca A. Womeldorf Reporter of Decisions Page Proof Pending Publication Notice: This Preliminary Print Is Subject to Formal Revision Before the Bound Volume Is Published. Users Are Requested to Notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of Any Typographical or Other Formal Errors. Page Proof Pending Publication 460 October Term, 2024 Syllabus Perttu v. Richards Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit No. 23–1324 Argued February 25, 2025—Decided June 18, 2025 the Prison Litigation Reform Act (Plra) Requires Prisoners With Complaints About Prison Conditions to Exhaust Available Grievance Procedures Before Fling Suit in Federal Court. 42 U. S. C. § 1997E(A). But “Exhaustion Is Not Required” When a Prison Administrator “Threaten[S] Individual Inmates So As to Prevent Their Use of Otherwise Proper procedures.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. 632, 644. “Such Interference With an Inmate'S Pursuit of Relief Renders the Administrative Process Unavailable,” So “§1997E(A) Poses No Bar” to Suit. Ibid. the Question Presented Is Whether a Party Has a Right to a Jury Trial on Plra Exhaustion When That Dispute Is Intertwined With the Merits of the Underlying Suit. in This Case, Inmate Kyle Richards Alleges That Thomas Perttu, a Prison Employee, Sexually Harassed Richards and Other Inmates. Richards Also Alleges That, When He Attempted to Fle Grievance Documents About the Abuse, Perttu Destroyed Them and “Retaliated Against” Him for Attempting to Fle Them. Richards Sued Perttu Under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for Violating His Constitutional Rights, Including His First Amendment Right to Fle Grievances. Perttu Moved for Summary Judgment, Arguing That the Plaintiffs Had Failed to Exhaust Available Grievance Procedures As Required by the Plra. the Magistrate Judge Concluded That There Was “A Genuine Issue of Fact As to Whether Plaintiffs Were Excused From Properly Exhausting Their Claims Due to Interference by Perttu” and That the Issue Was “Appropriate for Resolution During an Evidentiary hearing.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 86A. at That Hearing, the Magistrate Judge Concluded That Richards'S Witnesses Regarding Perttu'S Alleged Destruction of Grievance Forms “Lacked credibility.” the Magistrate Judge Recommended Dismissal Without Prejudice for Failure to Exhaust, and the District Court Adopted That Recommendation. the Sixth Circuit Reversed. It Stated That There Was “No Doubt That a Judge May Otherwise Resolve Factual Disputes Regarding Exhaustion Under the Plra,” But It Held That “The Seventh Amendment Requires a Jury Trial When the Resolution of the Exhaustion Issue Under the Plra Would Also Resolve a Genuine Dispute of Material Fact Regarding the Merits of the Plaintiff 'S Substantive case.” 96 F. 4Th 911, 917, 923. That Decision Conficted With Seventh Circuit Precedent. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 461 Syllabus Held: Parties Are Entitled to a Jury Trial on Plra Exhaustion When That Issue Is Intertwined With the Merits of a Claim That Requires a Jury Trial Under the Seventh Amendment. PP. 467–479. (A) Before Reaching Richards'S Arguments for Why His Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial Has Been Violated, the Court Must FRST Determine Whether a Construction of the Plra Is “Fairly Possible” by Which the Constitutional Question May Be Avoided. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, LTD., 526 U. S. 687, 707. Such a Construction Is Possible Here. Because the Court Construes the Plra to Require a Jury Trial in Richards'S Case, the Court Need Not Address Whether Congress Could Have Required Otherwise in the Plra Without Violating the Seventh Amendment. Plra Exhaustion Is a Standard Affirmative Defense Subject to “The Usual Practice” Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jones v. Bock, 549 U. S. 199, 212. the Usual Practice Is That Factual Disputes Regarding Legal Claims Go to the Jury, Even If That Means a Judge Must Let a Jury Decide Questions He Could Ordinarily Resolve on His Own. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500, 510–511. That Usual Practice Matters for Interpreting the Plra Because “Congress Is Understood to Legislate Against a Background of Common-Law Adjudicatory Principles . . . With an Expectation That the Principle[S] Will Apply Except `When a Statutory Purpose to the Contrary Is evident.' ” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108 (Quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U. S. 779, 783). No Such Contrary Purpose Is Evident in the Plra. the Plra Is “Silent” on Whether Judges or Juries Should Resolve Exhaustion Disputes, and That Silence Is “Strong Evidence That the Usual Practice Should Be followed.” Jones, 549 U. S., at 212. PP. 467–470. (B) at the Time the Plra Was Enacted, It Was Well Established That Factual Disputes Intertwined With Claims That Fall Under the Seventh Amendment Should Go to a Jury. the Court Has Held in Various Contexts That, in Cases of Intertwinement, District Courts Should Structure Their Order of Operations to Preserve the Jury Trial Right. PP. 470–474. (1) One Prominent Line of Cases Involves Suits That Contain Both Legal and Equitable Claims. Ordinarily, Judges Resolve Equitable Claims and Juries Resolve Legal Claims. in Beacon Theatres, This Court Held That Judges May Not Resolve Equitable Claims FRST If Doing So Could Prevent Legal Claims From Getting to the Jury. in That Case, Both the Legal and Equitable Claims Hinged on the “Common Issue” Whether There Was an Antitrust Violation. 359 U. S. 500, 503. the Court Emphasized That in That Situation, Judicial “Discretion Is Very Narrowly Limited and Must, Wherever Possible, Be Exercised to Preserve Jury trial.” Id., at 510. Because Resolving the Equitable Claims Could “Prevent a Full Jury Trial” Page Proof Pending Publication 462 Perttu v. Richards Syllabus on the Legal Claims, the Legal Claims FRST Needed to Be Resolved by a Jury. Id., at 505, 508. in This Case, the Parties Agree That the Exhaustion and First Amendment Questions Depend on Common Factual Issues, and Beacon Theatres Teaches That a Trial Court Must Preserve the Jury Trial in Such a Situation Whenever Possible. Nothing in the Plra Prevents Holding a Jury Trial Here. PP. 471–472. (2) Cases Involving Subject Matter Jurisdiction Are Also Instructive. Ordinarily, Judges May Resolve Factual Disputes When Determining Subject Matter Jurisdiction. But Courts May Not Do So When the Factual Disputes Are Intertwined With the Merits. in Smithers v. Smith, 204 U. S. 632, the Court Held That Judicial Authority to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction “Obviously Is Not Unlimited,” for That Would Risk Summarily Determining the Merits “Without the Ordinary Incidents of a Trial, Including the Right to a jury.” Id., at 645. in Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, the Court Found That Land Was “The Type of Case Where the Question of Jurisdiction Is Dependent on Decision of the Merits” and Thus Held the District Court Should Have “Proceed[Ed] to a Decision on the merits.” Id., at 735, 738–739. in Its Decision Below, the Sixth Circuit Relied on Its Precedent Applying Land, Reasoning That If “Certain Cases [Must] Be Heard and Determined on the Merits Even When Constitutionally Implicated Jurisdictional Disputes” Are at Play, Then “The Result Should Be the Same When the Lesser Concern of an Affirmative Defense, Such As the Plra'S Requirement to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, Implicates the Merits of a claim.” 96 F. 4Th, at 923. the Court FNDS This Reasoning Persuasive. After All, When the Plra Was Enacted, Many Lower Court Decisions and Treatises Had Extended the Intertwinement Principle to Other Threshold Questions, Like Personal Jurisdiction and Venue. the Court Expresses No View Today on Whether Lower Courts Have Been Correct to Extend the Intertwinement Principle to These Other Issues, But Simply Notes That These Cases—Along With Beacon Theatres and Smithers—Show That When the Plra Was Enacted, the Usual Practice in the Federal Courts Across a Variety of Contexts Was to Resolve Factual Disputes That Are Intertwined With the Merits at the Merits Stage. PP. 472–474. (C) Perttu'S Counterarguments Are Unpersuasive. Perttu Argues That Beacon Theatres Is Inapplicable, But His Argument Relies on the Questionable Assumption That Judicial Factual Fndings Concerning Exhaustion Have No Estoppel Effect in Later Jury Trials. Regardless, Even If Perttu Is Correct About Estoppel, Beacon Theatres Still Applies When Judicial Resolution Might Prevent a Full Jury Trial for Other Reasons. Here, Richards'S Claim Is Being Dismissed Entirely Rather Than Just Estopped, and It Is Usually Impossible for Prisoners to Go Back and Exhaust Then Fle Suit Again, Because Grievance Deadlines Will Have Long Since Passed. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 463 Syllabus Perttu'S Argument That Jury Trials Confict With the Plra'S Purpose of Conserving Judicial Resources Also Fails, Because the Plra Contemplates That Merits Claims Will Be Resolved by a Jury and Is Silent About Exhaustion. the Usual Federal Court Practice in Cases of Intertwinement Is to Send Common Issues to the Jury, and Nothing in the Plra Suggests Congress Intended to Depart From That Practice. PP. 474–478. 96 F. 4Th 911, Affirmed. Roberts, C. J., Delivered the Opinion of the Court, in Which Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson, JJ., Joined. Barrett, J., Filed a Dissenting Opinion, in Which Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh, JJ., Joined, Post, P. 479. Ann M. Sherman, Solicitor General of Michigan, Argued the Cause for Petitioner. With Her on the Briefs Were Kyla L. Barranco, Assistant Solicitor General, and Joshua S. Smith, Assistant Attorney General. Lori Alvino Mcgill Argued the Cause for Respondent. With Her on the Brief Was J. Scott Ballenger.* *Briefs of Amici Curiae Urging Reversal Were Fled for the State of Ohio et al. by Dave Yost, Attorney General of Ohio, T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Zachery P. Keller, Deputy Solicitor General, and Daniel Mckitrick and Brandon Kennedy, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for Their Respective Jurisdictions As Follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, William Tong of Connecticut, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Ashley Moody of Florida, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Raúl R. Labrador of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris Kobach of Kansas, Russell Coleman of Kentucky, Elizabeth B. Murrill of Louisiana, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Peter F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty Jackley of South Dakota, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, and Sean D. Reyes of Utah; for the International Municipal Lawyers Association et al. by F. Andrew Hessick, Richard A. Simpson, Amanda Karras, and Erich Eiselt; and for the National Sheriffs' Association et al. by Gregory C. Champagne and Maurice E. Bostick. Briefs of Amici Curiae Urging Affirmance Were Fled for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Jennifer A. Wedekind, Cecillia D. Wang, and Daniel S. Korobkin; for the Cato Institute by Clark M. Neily Iii and Matthew Cavedon; and for Law Professors by Kevin K. Russell. 464 Perttu v. Richards Opinion of the Court Chief Justice Roberts Delivered the Opinion of the Court. the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Plra) Requires Prisoners With Complaints About Prison Conditions to Exhaust Available Grievance Procedures Before Bringing Suit in Federal Court. 42 U. S. C. § 1997E(A). in Some Cases the Question Whether a Prisoner Has Exhausted Those Procedures Is Intertwined With the Merits of the Prisoner'S Lawsuit. Respondent Kyle Richards Is a Prisoner in Michigan. He Alleges That He Was Sexually Abused by Petitioner Thomas Perttu, a Prison Employee. He Also Alleges That When He Tried to Fle Grievance Forms About the Abuse, Perttu Destroyed Them and Threatened to Kill Him If He Fled More. Richards Sued Perttu for Violating His Constitutional Rights, Including His First Amendment Right to Fle Grievances. Perttu Responded That Richards Had Failed to Exhaust Available Grievance Procedures As Required by the Plra. the Parties Agree That the Exhaustion and First Amendment Issues Are Intertwined, Because Both Depend on Whether Perttu Did in Fact Destroy Richards'S Grievances and Retaliate Against Him. the Question Presented Is Whether a Party Has a Right to a Jury Trial on Plra Exhaustion When That Dispute Is Intertwined With the Merits of the Underlying Suit. I a “Our Legal System [Is] Committed to Guaranteeing That Prisoner Claims of Illegal Conduct by Their Custodians Are Fairly Handled According to law.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U. S. 199, 203 (2007). “The Challenge,” However, “Lies in Ensuring That the Food of Nonmeritorious Claims Does Not Submerge and Effectively Preclude Consideration of the Allegations With merit.” Ibid. to Address That Challenge, Congress Enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 110 Stat. 1321–71, As Amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1997E, Which Aims to “Reduce the Quantity and Impage Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 465 Opinion of the Court Prove the Quality of Prisoner suits.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U. S. 516, 524 (2002). a “Centerpiece” of the Plra Is Its Exhaustion Provision. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U. S. 81, 84 (2006). It Provides: “No Action Shall Be Brought With Respect to Prison Conditions Under [42 U. S. C. § 1983], or Any Other Federal Law, by a Prisoner Confned in Any Jail, Prison, or Other Correctional Facility Until Such Administrative Remedies As Are Available Are exhausted.” § 1997E(A). We Have Held That This Provision “Requires Proper Exhaustion” of Available Prison Grievance Procedures, Meaning a Prisoner “Must Complete the Administrative Review Process in Accordance With the Applicable Procedural Rules . . . As a Precondition to Bringing Suit in Federal court.” Woodford, 548 U. S., at 88, 93. But “Exhaustion Is Not Required” When a Prison Administrator “Threaten[S] Individual Inmates So As to Prevent Their Use of Otherwise Proper procedures.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. 632, 644 (2016). As We Have Explained, “Such Interference With an Inmate'S Pursuit of Relief Renders the Administrative Process Unavailable,” So “§ 1997E(A) Poses No Bar” to Suit. Ibid. B in 2020, Richards and Two Other Prisoners Fled This Suit Against Perttu Under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. the Complaint Alleged That, Over the Prior Year, Perttu Had “Engaged in a Pattern of Prolifc and Repetitive Sexual Abuse, Against at Least a Dozen Inmates,” in Violation of Their Constitutional Rights. App. 2–3. the Complaint Also Alleged That the Plaintiffs Had “Attempted to Exhaust Remedies to the Best of [Their] Ability” But Had Been “Threatened and Retaliated Against” for Doing So. Id., at 2, 13. the Complaint Listed Specifc Incidents in Which Perttu Allegedly Ripped Up the Plaintiffs' Grievance Forms, Threw Them Away, and Threatened to Kill the Plaintiffs If They Fled More. Id., at 13–18. the Plaintiffs Also Alleged They Were Being “Wrongfully Held in Page Proof Pending Publication 466 Perttu v. Richards Opinion of the Court Administrative Segregation in Retaliation for Fling Grievances” and That Perttu Was Retaliating Against Them in Other Ways, All in Violation of Their First Amendment Rights. Id., at 18–27. Perttu Moved for Summary Judgment, Arguing That the Plaintiffs Had Failed to Exhaust Available Grievance Procedures As Required by the Plra. to Support His Motion, Perttu Submitted an Affdavit From a Prison Grievance Coordinator Attesting That There Was No Record Evidence of the Plaintiffs Fling Grievances About Sexual Abuse by Perttu in 2019 or 2020. the Plaintiffs Responded by Reiterating That Perttu Had Intercepted and Destroyed Those Grievances and Had Warned Them Not to Fle More. the Magistrate Judge Concluded That There Was “A Genuine Issue of Fact As to Whether Plaintiffs Were Excused From Properly Exhausting Their Claims Due to Interference by Perttu” and That the Issue Was “Appropriate for Resolution During an Evidentiary hearing.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 86A. the Magistrate Judge Held the Evidentiary Hearing by Video Conference in November 2021. App. 88. Richards, Representing Himself, Conducted Direct Examinations of Multiple Witnesses Who Testifed That They Had Seen Perttu Destroy Richards'S Grievance Forms and Retaliate Against Him for Fling Them. See, e.g., Id., at 210–214, 230, 234–238, 250– 255. Perttu Denied Doing So. Id., at 339–341. the Magistrate Judge Concluded That Richards'S Witnesses “Lacked Credibility” Because Their Testimony “Was Either Substantially Guided by Richards'S Manner of Questioning or Wholly conclusory.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 69A. the Magistrate Judge Therefore Recommended the Case Be Dismissed Without Prejudice for Failure to Exhaust. Id., at 76A. the District Court Adopted the Recommendation. Id., at 28A–29A. C Richards Appealed to the Sixth Circuit. Still Representing Himself, He Argued That Resolving Exhaustion Through “A Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 467 Opinion of the Court Bench Trial”—One Before a Judge Without a Jury—Is “Not Permissible Where It Would Essentially Be Resolving a Claim itself.” Brief for Appellant in No. 22–1298, P. 1. After Appointing Counsel for Richards and Requesting Supplemental Briefng, the Sixth Circuit Reversed. It Acknowledged That, Under Circuit Precedent, There Was “No Doubt That a Judge May Otherwise Resolve Factual Disputes Regarding Exhaustion Under the PLRA.” 96 F. 4Th 911, 917 (2024) (Citing Lee v. Willey, 789 F. 3D 673, 677 (Ca6 2015)). But the Court Held That “The Seventh Amendment Requires a Jury Trial When the Resolution of the Exhaustion Issue Under the Plra Would Also Resolve a Genuine Dispute of Material Fact Regarding the Merits of the Plaintiff'S Substantive case.” 96 F. 4Th, at 923. That Decision Conficted With a Contrary Holding on the Same Question From the Seventh Circuit, See Pavey v. Conley, 544 F. 3D 739, 742 (2008), and We Granted Certiorari to Resolve the Split. 603 U. S. 949 (2024). Ii “The Right to Trial by Jury Is `Of Such Importance and Occupies So FRM a Place in Our History and Jurisprudence That Any Seeming Curtailment of the Right' Has Always Been and `Should Be Scrutinized With the Utmost care.' ” SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U. S. 109, 121 (2024) (Quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 486 (1935)). Richards Makes Two Arguments for Why His Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial Has Been Violated Here. First, He Argues That the Dispute Over Exhaustion in This Case Is Intertwined With a Claim That Falls Squarely Under the Seventh Amendment—His First Amendment Retaliation Claim for Damages Under § 1983—And That Factual Questions Related to That Claim Must Be Resolved by a Jury. See Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, LTD., 526 U. S. 687, 709, 720–721 (1999) (Holding That “A § 1983 Suit Seeking Legal Relief Is an Action at Law Within the Meaning of the Seventh Amendment” and That a “Predominantly Factual Question” in Such an Action Is “For the Jury”). Secpage Proof Pending Publication 468 Perttu v. Richards Opinion of the Court Ond, Richards Makes a Broader Argument That, Based on the Historical Test in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 517 U. S. 370 (1996), the Seventh Amendment Requires a Jury Trial for All Factual Disputes Related to Plra Exhaustion, Even Those Not Intertwined With the Merits. Our Precedents Make Clear That “[B]Efore Inquiring Into the Applicability of the Seventh Amendment, We Must `Frst Ascertain Whether a Construction of the Statute Is Fairly Possible by Which the [Constitutional] Question May Be avoided.' ” Del Monte Dunes, 526 U. S., at 707 (Quoting Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. 523 U. S. 340, 345 (1998)). Such a Construction Is Possible Here. Plra Exhaustion Is an Affirmative Defense Subject to “The Usual Practice Under the Federal Rules [Of Civil Procedure].” Jones, 549 U. S., at 212. the Usual Practice Is That Factual Disputes Regarding the Merits of a Legal Claim Go to the Jury, Even If That Means a Judge Must Let a Jury Decide Questions He Could Ordinarily Decide on His Own. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500, 510–511 (1959). That Usual Practice Matters for Interpreting the Statute Because “Congress Is Understood to Legislate Against a Background of Common-Law Adjudicatory Principles . . . With an Expectation That the Principle[S] Will Apply Except `When a Statutory Purpose to the Contrary Is evident.' ” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108 (1991) (Quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U. S. 779, 783 (1952)). No Such Contrary Purpose Is Evident in the Plra. for Those Reasons, We Hold As a Matter of Statutory Interpretation That Parties Have a Right to a Jury Trial on Plra Exhaustion When That Issue Is Intertwined With the Merits of a Claim That Falls Under the Seventh Amendment. in Light of This Holding, We Express No View Today on Whether Congress Could Have Required Otherwise in the Plra Without Violating a Party'S Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc. 356 U. S. 525, 537, and N. 10 (1958) (Holding That Affirmative Depage Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 469 Opinion of the Court Fense Should Go to Jury Due to “The Manner in Which [The Federal System] Distributes Trial Functions Between Judge and Jury,” Making It “Unnecessary” to Consider “The Constitutional question”).1 a We Begin With a Settled Premise: Plra Exhaustion Is a Standard Affirmative Defense. Jones, 549 U. S., at 216. As We Said in Woodford, 548 U. S., at 101, Plra Exhaustion Is “Not Jurisdictional,” Which Is Why “A District Court [Is Allowed] to Dismiss Plainly Meritless Claims Without FRST Addressing” the Often “More Complex Question” of Exhaustion. and As We Said in Jones, 549 U. S., at 216, Plra Exhaustion Is Not a “Pleading Requirement,” Which Is Why “Inmates Are Not Required to Specially Plead or Demonstrate Exhaustion in Their complaints.” Rather, Plra Exhaustion Is an “Affirmative Defense” Subject to “The Usual Practice Under the Federal Rules.” Id., at 212. and That Usual Practice Applies, Jones Explained, Even Though the Plra Is “Silent on the Issue,” Because That Silence Is Itself “Strong Evidence That the Usual Practice Should Be followed.” Ibid. the Plra Is Similarly “Silent on the Issue” Whether Judges or Juries Should Resolve Factual Disputes Related to Exhaustion. the Exhaustion Provision States Simply That “[N]O Action Shall Be Brought With Respect to Prison Condi1 the Dissent Criticizes US for Asking Whether We Can Avoid the Constitutional Question by Answering the Statutory One. Post, at 484–486, and N. 3 (Barrett, J., Dissenting). But We Have Described Doing Exactly That As a “Cardinal principle.” Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412, 417, N. 3 (1987). the Dissent Suggests the Principle Does Not Apply Here Because the Parties Did Not Raise It and the Courts Below Did Not Address It. But the Same Was True in Tull, Yet We Still Began by Asking Whether It Was Possible to Read the Statute to Avoid the Constitutional Question, and Moved on Only After Concluding the Answer Was No. Surely We Should Not Deviate From That Principle Simply Because Our Answer This Time Is Yes. and in This Case, the Statutory Question Has Been Fully Briefed by Amici and Involves the Same Precedents Relied on by the Parties. See Brief for Law Professors As Amici Curiae 8–15. Page Proof Pending Publication 470 Perttu v. Richards Opinion of the Court Tions . . . Until Such Administrative Remedies As Are Available Are exhausted.” 42 U. S. C. § 1997E(A). Perttu Does Not Argue That This Provision Requires That Exhaustion Disputes Be Resolved by Judges. and Rightly So. As We Noted in Jones, the Phrase “[N]O Action Shall Be Brought” Is “Boilerplate Language” Often Used for Other Affirmative Defenses, Like Statutes of Limitations, 549 U. S., at 220, That Routinely Go to the Jury. and “Failure to Exhaust Was Notably Not Added” to the Plra'S Screening Provisions, Which Require Judges to Dismiss Cases on Specifed Grounds. Id., at 214. Just Like in Jones, Then, the Statutory Silence on the Question Before US “Is Strong Evidence That the Usual Practice Should Be followed.” Id., at 212; See Also Dixon v. United States, 548 U. S. 1, 17 (2006) (“In Light of Congress' Silence on the Issue . . . It Is Up to the Federal Courts to Effectuate the Affirmative Defense . . . As Congress May Have Contemplated It . . . Given the Long-Established Common-Law rule.” (Internal Quotation Marks Omitted)). We Therefore Look to the Usual Practice for Resolving Factual Disputes Intertwined With the merits.2 B the Plra Was Enacted in 1996. by That Time, It Was Well Established That When a Factual Dispute Is Intertwined With the Merits of a Claim That Falls Under the Seventh Amendment, That Dispute Should Go to a Jury, Even If That Requires Judges to Defer Determinations They Would Ordinarily Make on Their Own. We Have Accordingly Held in Various Contexts 2 the Dissent Thinks This Should Be an Even “Easier Case” Than Tull and Others Where We Concluded That a Statute Did Not Confer a Jury Trial Right. Post, at 488. But Our Analysis in This Case Is That “The Usual Practice Should Be Followed,” Jones v. Bock, 549 U. S. 199, 212 (2007), and That the Usual Practice in Cases of Intertwinement Is to Send the Question to the Jury, See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500, 510–511 (1959); See Also Post, at 490 (Recognizing That Beacon Theatres Establishes a “General Prudential Rule”). Tull and the Other Cases Did Not Implicate a Practice or Rule Like Beacon Theatres That Itself Calls for a Jury Trial. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 471 Opinion of the Court That, in Cases of Intertwinement, District Courts Should Structure Their Order of Operations to Preserve the Jury Trial Right. 1 One Prominent Line of Cases Involves Suits That Contain Both Legal and Equitable Claims. Ordinarily, Judges Resolve Equitable Claims and Juries Resolve Legal Claims. But in Beacon Theatres, 359 U. S., at 510–511, We Held That Judges May Not Resolve Equitable Claims FRST If Doing So Could Prevent Legal Claims From Getting to the Jury. Beacon Theatres Involved an Antitrust Dispute Between Two Movie Theater Companies. One Company Brought an Equitable Claim for a Declaratory Judgment That It Had Not Violated Antitrust Laws. the Other Company Brought a Legal Claim for Money Damages Alleging That the FRST Company Had Violated Antitrust Laws. Both the Equitable and Legal Claims Therefore Hinged on the “Common Issue” Whether There Was an Antitrust Violation. Id., at 503. Faced With This Dilemma, We Emphasized That, While Judges Ordinarily Have “Discretion in Deciding Whether the Legal or Equitable Cause Should Be Tried Frst,” “That Discretion Is Very Narrowly Limited and Must, Wherever Possible, Be Exercised to Preserve Jury trial.” Id., at 510; See Also Id., at 510–511 (“[O]Nly Under the Most Imperative Circumstances, Circumstances Which in View of the Fexible Procedures of the Federal Rules We Cannot Now Anticipate, Can the Right to a Jury Trial of Legal Issues Be Lost Through Prior Determination of Equitable claims.” (Footnote Omitted)). the Consequence in That Case Was Clear: Because Resolving the Equitable Claims Could “Prevent a Full Jury Trial” on the Legal Claims, the Legal Claims Needed to Be Resolved by a Jury FRST. Id., at 505, 508. the District Court'S Decision to Instead Resolve the Equitable Claims FRST Was Therefore “Not permissible.” Id., at 508. Later Cases Confrm That Beacon Theatres Should Be Read “Expansively,” Applying to Any Claim Triable by a Jury Even “In a Suit in Which the Basic Relief Sought Is equitable.” 9 C. Page Proof Pending Publication 472 Perttu v. Richards Opinion of the Court Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2302.1, PP. 33–34 (4Th Ed. 2020). for Example, in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469, 473, 475 (1962), the Plaintiff Alleged That the Defendant Had Breached a Contract for Use of the Trademark “Dairy Queen,” and the Plaintiff Sought Both Legal and Equitable Relief. We Observed That the Legal and Equitable Claims Therefore Depended on “Common” “Factual Issues Related to the Question of Whether There [Had] Been a Breach of contract.” Id., at 479. for That Reason, the Consequence Was Again Clear: “[T]He District Judge Erred in Refusing to Grant Petitioner'S Demand for a Trial by jury.” Ibid. in This Case, the Parties Agree That the Exhaustion and First Amendment Questions Depend on Common Factual Issues. and Beacon Theatres Teaches That a Trial Court'S Discretion in Such a Situation Is “Very Narrowly Limited and Must, Wherever Possible, Be Exercised to Preserve Jury trial.” 359 U. S., at 510. Nothing in the Plra Prevents Holding a Jury Trial Here. 2 Our Cases Involving Subject Matter Jurisdiction Are Also Instructive. Ordinarily, Judges May Resolve Factual Disputes in the Course of Determining Whether Subject Matter Jurisdiction Is Proper. See Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U. S. 115, 120–121 (1898). But We Have Long Held That a Court May Not Do So When the Factual Disputes Are Intertwined With the Merits. for Example, in Smithers v. Smith, 204 U. S. 632, 641–642 (1907), the District Court Concluded That It Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Because the Case Did Not Meet the $2,000 Amount-In-Controversy Requirement. the District Court Did So, However, by Fnding That Even If the Defendants Had Each Taken a Part of the Plaintiff 'S Land—As the Plaintiff Alleged— the Defendants Had Not Acted Jointly, and So the Aggregate Amount in Controversy Did Not Exceed $2,000. Id., at 645– 646. We Reversed Because We Found That, in Arriving at This Conclusion, the District Court Had Decided a Factual Question That Was “An Essential Element of the Merits of the Dispute”— Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 473 Opinion of the Court Whether the Defendants Had Acted Jointly—And So Had “In Effect, Decided the Controversy Between the Parties Upon the merits.” Id., at 646. We Acknowledged That Judges Ordinarily Have “The Authority to Dismiss [An] Action [For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction] Without Trial by jury.” Id., at 644–645. But We Held That This Authority “Obviously Is Not Unlimited,” “Lest Under the Guise of Determining Jurisdiction the Merits of the Controversy Between the Parties Be Summarily Decided Without the Ordinary Incidents of a Trial, Including the Right to a jury.” Id., at 645. We Applied Similar Analysis in Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947). There the District Court Concluded That It Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Due to Sovereign Immunity, Because the Suit for Unlawful Possession of Stock Shares by Federal Offcials Was in Fact a Suit “Against the United States.” Id., at 734. We Recognized That “As a General Rule the District Court Would Have Authority to Consider Questions of jurisdiction.” Id., at 735. But We Found That Land Was “The Type of Case Where the Question of Jurisdiction Is Dependent on Decision of the Merits,” Because Both Questions Hinged on the Plaintiffs' Claims That “The Shares of Stock Never Were Property of the United States.” Id., at 735, 738. We Therefore Held That the District Court Should Have “Proceed[Ed] to a Decision on the Merits” Rather Than Resolve the Jurisdictional Issue at a Preliminary Stage. Id., at 739. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co. 419 U. S. 186, 203, N. 19 (1974) (Acknowledging Practice of “Reserving the Jurisdictional Issues” When There Is “An Identity Between the `Jurisdictional' Issues and Certain Issues on the Merits”); See Also 8 J. Moore, D. Coquillette, G. Joseph, G. Vairo, & C. Varner, Moore'S Federal Practice § 38.34[1][c][i], P. 38–154 (3D Ed. 2024) (Moore); 5B C. Wright, A. Miller, & A. Spencer, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350, PP. 224–226 (4Th Ed. 2024). in Its Decision Below, the Sixth Circuit Relied on Its Circuit Precedent Applying Land, Reasoning That If “Certain Cases [Must] Be Heard and Determined on the Merits Even When Page Proof Pending Publication 474 Perttu v. Richards Opinion of the Court Constitutionally Implicated Jurisdictional Disputes” Are at Play, Then “The Result Should Be the Same When the Lesser Concern of an Affirmative Defense, Such As the Plra'S Requirement to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, Implicates the Merits of a claim.” 96 F. 4Th, at 923 (Citing Fireman'S Fund Ins. Co. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 253 F. 2D 780, 784 (Ca6 1958)). We FND That Reasoning Persuasive. After All, When the Plra Was Enacted, Many Lower Court Decisions and Treatises Had Extended the Intertwinement Principle to Other Threshold Questions, Including Personal Jurisdiction, Venue, Choice of Law, and Forum Non Conveniens. See, E. G., 5 J. Moore et al. Moore'S Federal Practice ¶38.36[3], P. 38–341 (2D Ed. 1996) (“[T]O Determine That the Alleged Acts Did Not Take Place . . . on Motion to Dismiss for Want of Proper Venue Would Be to Deny the Plaintiff a Jury Trial on the merits.”); See Also 8 Moore §§ 38.34[1][e], [2], [3] (3D Ed. 2024). We Express No View Today on Whether Lower Courts Have Been Correct to Extend the Intertwinement Principle to These Other Issues. We Simply Note That These Cases—Along With Beacon Theatres and Smithers—Show That When the Plra Was Enacted, the Usual Practice in the Federal Courts Across a Variety of Contexts Was to Resolve Factual Disputes That Are Intertwined With the Merits at the Merits Stage. the Plra'S Complete Silence on That Question Is Therefore “Strong Evidence” That This “Usual Practice Should Be followed.” Jones, 549 U. S., at 212. C Perttu Offers Important Counterarguments, But We Are Ultimately Not Persuaded. First, Perttu Argues That Beacon Theatres Is Inapplicable Here. According to Perttu, the Concern in Beacon Theatres Was That Judicial Resolution of the Equitable Claims Would Have Had Collateral Estoppel Effect on the Legal Claims. But Here, Perttu Says, the Judge'S Factual Fndings Related to Exhaustion Would Have No Such Effect in a Later Jury Trial. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 475 Opinion of the Court Two Circuits Have Suggested They Agree With Perttu That Factual Fndings Related to Exhaustion Have No Estoppel Effect, But With Little Analysis and in Cases That Did Not Squarely Present an Estoppel Issue. See Pavey, 544 F. 3D, at 742; Albino v. Baca, 747 F. 3D 1162, 1171 (Ca9 2014). Legal Treatises, on the Other Hand, Provide Support for the Proposition That Factual Determinations in a FRST Action Can Have Direct Estoppel Effect in a Second Action on the Same Claim. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, Comment B, Illustration 3, Comment D, PP. 251–255 (1980); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4418, PP. 505–506 (3D Ed. 2016). the Restatement Gives an Example Analogous to the Situation Before US: If a Court Dismisses a Case for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Based on a Particular Factual Fnding, That Factual Fnding Has Preclusive Effect in a Subsequent Action on Issues Beyond Just Personal Jurisdiction. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, Illustration 3, P. 252.3 Perttu Also Overlooks the Fact That, If the Judge Below Had Ruled That Perttu Did Destroy Richards'S Grievances, Then Perttu Himself May Have Been Precluded From Relitigating That Issue Before the Jury Under Law of the Case. See 18B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478.5, P. 773 (3D Ed. 2019). We Therefore Cannot Reject the Possibility That a Judicial Ruling on Plra Exhaustion Might Have Estoppel Effect in a Later Jury Trial. and Beacon Theatres Shows That the Proper Path in That Situation Is to Hold the Jury Trial, Not to Change the Estoppel Rules. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 333 (1979) (“Recognition That an Equitable Determination Could Have Collateral-Estoppel Effect in a 3 See Also, E. G., Carr v. Tillery, 591 F. 3D 909, 917 (Ca7 2010) (“[A] Dismissal Can Be Without Prejudice Yet Have Preclusive effect.”); Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F. 2D 1361, 1364 (Ca9 1987) (“It Matters Not That the Prior Action Resulted in a Dismissal Without Prejudice, So Long As the Determination Being Accorded Preclusive Effect Was Essential to the dismissal.”). Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication 476 Perttu v. Richards Opinion of the Court Subsequent Legal Action Was the Major Premise of This Court'S Decision in Beacon Theatres.”).4 Regardless, Even If Perttu Is Right That Factual Fndings Concerning Exhaustion Have No Estoppel Effect in a Later Jury Trial, We Decline to Limit Beacon Theatres Artifcially to Cases Involving Estoppel. the Problem in Beacon Theatres Was That Judicial Resolution of a “Common Issue” Might Have “Prevent[Ed] a Full Jury Trial” on the Legal Claims. 359 U. S., at 503, 505, 508. Estoppel Was Simply the Reason Why a “Full Jury Trial” Might Have Been “Prevent[Ed]” in That Case. Id., at 505 (“[T]O Try the Equitable Cause FRST . . . Might, Through Collateral Estoppel, Prevent a Full Jury trial.” (Emphasis Added)). the Principle of Beacon Theatres Still Applies When Judicial Resolution of a Common Issue Might “Prevent a Full Jury Trial” for Some Reason Other Than Estoppel. and Here, That Other Reason Is Clear. Instead of Just Being Estopped, Richards'S Claim Is Being Dismissed Entirely. We Therefore Agree With the Sixth Circuit'S Reasoning: Even Assuming Perttu Is Right That a Jury May “Reexamine the Judge'S Factual Fndings,” That “Rationale” “Rings Hollow If the Prisoner'S Case Is Dismissed for Failure to Exhaust,” Because “[I]N Such an Instance, a Jury Would Never Be Assembled to Resolve the Factual disputes.” 96 F. 4Th, at 921. It Is No Answer, in Our View, to Say That a Prisoner Might Someday Get a Jury by Starting Over, Exhausting the Grievance Procedures, Then Refling His Lawsuit. After All, That Path Is Impossible in Most Cases. As Perttu Acknowledged at Oral Argument, “The Time Frames for . . . Grievances Are Very Short”— on the Order of Days. TR. of Oral Arg. 35; See, 4 the Dissent Reads This “Major Premise” Language From Parklane As Suggesting That Beacon Theatres Is All About Estoppel. Post, at 491. But the Question in Parklane Was Whether a Prior Equitable Ruling Could Have Estoppel Effect in a Subsequent Legal Action, and Parklane Simply Pointed Out That Beacon Theatres Believed It could—i.e., That Beacon Theatres Took That Fact As a “Major Premise” Then Reasoned From There. That Logic Does Not Imply That Beacon Theatres Is Limited to Cases Involving Estoppel. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 477 Opinion of the Court E. G., Jones, 549 U. S., at 207 (Grievance Deadlines of 2 to 5 Days); Woodford, 548 U. S., at 95–96 (Grievance Deadlines of 14 to 30 Days). by the Time a Case Is Dismissed for Failure to Exhaust, Grievance Deadlines Will Have Long Since Passed. But Perttu Makes No Argument That Such Deadlines Are Tolled in These Situations. Instead, He Points to the Fact That Prison Administrators in Some (But Not All) Jurisdictions Have Discretion to Excuse Missed Grievance Deadlines, With No Evidence of How Often Administrators Actually Exercise That Discretion, Let Alone in Cases Where—As Here—Doing So Would Foreseeably Set Up a Second Lawsuit. and Though Perttu Makes a Different Argument for Why Richards Could Exhaust and Refle in This Case,5 He Does Not Argue That Courts Should Treat Individual Cases of Intertwinement Differently Based on Whether a Particular Party in a Given Case Might One Day Get to a Jury. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U. S., at 504 (Concern at 5 Perttu Argues That Richards Remains Able to Exhaust Because His Allegations Fall Under the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (Prea), 117 Stat. 972, 34 U. S. C. § 30301 Et Seq., and Federal Regulations Prevent Prisons From Imposing Deadlines on Prea Grievances Regarding Sexual Abuse. Reply Brief 14 (Citing 28 CFR § 115.52(b)(1) (2024)). Accordingly, Perttu Says, the Prea Policy Applicable in the State of Michigan When Richards Fled Suit Did Not Bar Him From Fling New Grievances. See App. 75 (“A Prisoner May Fle a Prea Grievance at Any time.”). Richards, However, Says “[T]His Is the FRST Time in This Fve Years of Litigation That [Perttu] Has Represented That . . . All of [Richards'S] Claims Might Be Able to Be exhausted.” TR. of Oral Arg. 51. Richards Also Says That His “First Amendment Claim . . . Is Not Protected by the Prea policy.” Id., at 51–52; See Also App. 76 (“Any Prea Grievance Containing Multiple Issues, Which Include Sexual Abuse and Non-Sexual Abuse Issues, Shall Be Processed . . . to Address the Allegations of Sexual Abuse only.”). We Take No Position on This Dispute. Perttu Also Notes That the Michigan Department of Corrections Has Since Amended Its Prea Policy to “Eliminat[E] the Administrative Grievance Procedure for Addressing Prisoner Grievances Regarding Sexual abuse.” Reply Brief 14, N. 3. We Take No Position on Whether This New Policy Covers Richards'S First Amendment Claim or Whether There Are Other Administrative Remedies That Richards Would Need to Exhaust Before Fling a Subsequent Action. 478 Perttu v. Richards Opinion of the Court Issue Arises When Prior Determination by Judge “Might” Deprive Party of Jury Trial); Id., at 505 (Same). Finally, Perttu Argues That Requiring a Jury Trial Here Would Confict With the Purpose of Plra Exhaustion, Which Is to Conserve Judicial Resources by Preventing Unexhausted Claims From Going to Trial. for Support, Perttu Cites Our Decision in Katchen v. Landy, 382 U. S. 323 (1966). There We Held That a Bankruptcy Court Could Proceed to Decide an Equitable Claim—Even If Similar Issues Might One Day Arise Before a Jury on a Legal Claim—Because to Prevent the Equitable Claim From Being “Tried in the Bankruptcy Court in the Normal Manner” Would Be “To Dismember a Scheme Which Congress Has prescribed.” Id., at 339. But Katchen Is Clearly Far Afeld. That Case Involved a “Specifc Statutory Scheme”—Bankruptcy—“Contemplating the Prompt Trial of a Disputed Claim Without the Intervention of a Jury” in a Special Set of Courts Created for That Purpose. Ibid. the Equivalent “Statutory Scheme” Here—The Plra—Contemplates That Richards'S First Amendment Claim Will Be Resolved by a Jury and Is Silent About Whether a Jury Should Resolve Exhaustion. Perttu Responds That Holding a Jury Trial on Exhaustion Nonetheless Conficts With Congressional Intent Because the Point of Plra Exhaustion Is to Ensure That Only Exhausted Claims Go to Trial. But That Objection Would Apply With Even Greater Force in Smithers and Land, Because—By the Same Logic—Holding a Trial on Subject Matter Jurisdiction Would Confict With the Purpose of Ensuring That Trials Happen Only Where Jurisdiction Is Proper. See Ex Parte Mccardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869) (“Without Jurisdiction the Court Cannot Proceed at All in Any cause.”). Yet Smithers and Land Show That, in Cases of Intertwinement, the Proper Practice Is Indeed to Go to Trial. We Therefore Cannot Agree With Perttu That the Plra'S General Interest in Conserving Judicial Resources Shows That Congress Clearly Intended for Judges to Resolve Exhaustion Disputes in This Unique Circumstance. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 479 Barrett, J., Dissenting * * * If Congress Had Expressly Provided in the Plra That Exhaustion Disputes Must Be Resolved by Judges, Then We Would Have Been Required to Consider Today Whether Such a Provision Violates the Seventh Amendment. But It Is a “Cardinal Principle” That We Not Address Such a Constitutional Question Unless Necessary. Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412, 417, N. 3 (1987). Meanwhile, As We Have Shown, the Usual Practice of the Federal Courts in Cases of Intertwinement Is to Send Common Issues to the Jury. Because Nothing in the Plra Suggests Congress Intended to Depart From That Practice Here, We Hold That Parties Are Entitled to a Jury Trial on Plra Exhaustion When That Issue Is Intertwined With the Merits of a Claim Protected by the Seventh Amendment. the Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Is Affirmed. It Is So Ordered. Justice Barrett, With Whom Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and Justice Kavanaugh Join, Dissenting. the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Plra) Requires Prisoners Suing Under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 to FRST Exhaust the Administrative Remedies That Are “Available” to Them. § 1997E(A). in the Decision Below, the Sixth Circuit Held That Even If Prisoners Are Not Ordinarily Entitled to a Jury Trial to Resolve This Threshold Question, the Seventh Amendment Requires a Jury When Exhaustion Is Intertwined With the Merits. I Would Reverse. the Jury Right Conferred by the Seventh Amendment Does Not Depend on the Degree of Factual Overlap Between a Threshold Issue and the Merits of the Plaintiff'S Claim. the Court Takes a Different Path. Instead of Resolving the Constitutional Question That the Parties Brought to US, the Court Holds That the Plra Itself Requires a Jury Trial Whenever an Issue Is Common to Exhaustion and the Merits. No Matter, the Court Says, That the Plra Is Silent on the Page Proof Pending Publication 480 Perttu v. Richards Barrett, J., Dissenting Subject. No Matter That This Statutory Argument Was Not Briefed Before US. and No Matter That It Was Not Passed on by the Courts Below. Having Taken This Detour, the Court Ends Up in the Wrong Place. Reading the Plra'S Silence to Implicitly Confer a Right to a Jury Trial Contravenes Not Only Basic Principles of Statutory Interpretation, But Also Several of This Court'S Precedents. I Respectfully Dissent. I Kyle Richards, a State Prisoner, Sued Thomas Perttu, a Prison Employee, for Damages Under § 1983. Richards Alleged Two Bases for Relief: First, He Alleged That Perttu Had Sexually Harassed Several Inmates, Including Richards. and Second, Richards Alleged That When He Had Attempted to Fle Grievances Reporting the Harassment, Perttu Had Retaliated in Several Ways, Including by Destroying Richards'S Grievance Forms. See Ante, at 465–466. Richards Claimed That Perttu'S Initial Harassment and Subsequent Retaliation Violated the Eighth and First Amendments, Respectively. See App. 18. Because a Damages Suit Under § 1983 Is a “Sui[T] at Common Law,” All Agree That the Seventh Amendment Entitles Richards to a Jury Trial on the Merits of His Claims. U. S. Const., Amdt. 7 (“In Suits at Common Law, Where the Value in Controversy Shall Exceed Twenty Dollars, the Right of Trial by Jury Shall Be Preserved”); See Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, LTD., 526 U. S. 687, 720–721 (1999). to Litigate the Merits, However, the Plra Requires Richards to Establish That He Exhausted “Such Administrative Remedies As Are Available” to Him. § 1997E(A). Whether Richards Did So Turns on a Factual Dispute About the Availability of His Administrative Remedies. According to Richards, Perttu'S Destruction of Richards'S Grievances Rendered the Prison Grievance System “Unavailable” for Purposes of the Plra. Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. 632, 644 (2016). Perttu, for His Part, Inpage Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 481 Barrett, J., Dissenting Sists That He Did Not Destroy Richards'S Grievances; Thus, He Says, the System Was Available to Richards and Richards'S Failure to Fle Grievances Dooms His § 1983 Claims. See § 1997E(A). This Dispute About the Facts Engendered Another About the Law—And More Specifcally, About the Role of the Jury. the Plra Itself Says Nothing About the Right to a Jury Trial on the Question of Exhaustion. and All the Circuits to Have Considered the Question Hold That the Seventh Amendment Does Not Require One. So the Consensus Rule in the Courts of Appeals Has Been That Plra Exhaustion Can Be Resolved Through a Bench trial.1 Although the Sixth Circuit Has Long Embraced This Rule, See Lee v. Willey, 789 F. 3D 673, 678 (2015), Richards Argued That His Case Was Special—And the Sixth Circuit Agreed. an Exception Applies, It Held, “When the Resolution of the Exhaustion Issue . . . Would Also Resolve a Genuine Dispute of Material Fact Regarding the Merits of the Plaintiff'S Substantive case.” 96 F. 4Th 911, 923 (2024). in Such Cases, the Sixth Circuit Held, the Seventh Amendment Entitles the Parties to a Jury. That Holding Broke With the Decisions of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, Both of Which Have Rejected a Factualoverlap Exception. See Pavey v. Conley, 544 F. 3D 739, 742 (Ca7 2008); Albino v. Baca, 747 F. 3D 1162, 1171 (Ca9 2014) (En Banc) (Agreeing With Pavey in Dicta). Ii Having Granted Certiorari to Resolve This Split, I Would Reverse. the Jury-Trial Right Conferred by the Seventh Amendment Does Not Turn on the Degree of Factual Overlap 1 See Messa v. Goord, 652 F. 3D 305, 308–310 (Ca2 2011) (Per Curiam); Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F. 3D 265, 269–271 (Ca3 2013); Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F. 3D 260, 271 (Ca5 2010); Lee v. Willey, 789 F. 3D 673, 677–678 (Ca6 2015); Pavey v. Conley, 544 F. 3D 739, 741–742 (Ca7 2008); Albino v. Baca, 747 F. 3D 1162, 1170–1171 (Ca9 2014) (En Banc); Bryant v. Rich, 530 F. 3D 1368, 1373–1377 (Ca11 2008). 482 Perttu v. Richards Barrett, J., Dissenting Between a Threshold Question and the Merits of the Plaintiff 'S Claim. Because the Seventh Amendment Provides That the “ `Right of Trial by Jury Shall Be Preserved,' ” It Protects “ `The Right Which Existed Under the English Common Law When the Amendment Was adopted.' ” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 517 U. S. 370, 376 (1996). in Actions That Would Have Been Tried at Law at the Founding, Such As This One, the Question Is Whether the “Particular Trial Decision” at Issue “Must Fall to the Jury in Order to Preserve the Substance of the Common-Law Right As It Existed in 1791.” Ibid. the Parties Devote Much of Their Time to Debating the Best Founding-Era Analogue to the Exhaustion Defense. According to Richards, Exhaustion Is Analogous to Common-Law Defenses That Would Have Been Raised Through a Plea in bar.2 Under the Common-Law Pleading System, Richards Argues, the Parties' Dueling Pleas Would Isolate Disputed Points of Law and Fact, With the Former Allocated to a Judge and the Latter Allocated to a Jury. See H. Stephen, Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions 59–61 (1882); B. Shipman, Handbook of Common-Law Pleading § 15, P. 32 (3D Ed. 1923). Perttu, on the Other Hand, Grounds Exhaustion in Traditional Equitable Practice. in His View, an Exhaustion Defense Most Closely Resembles a Defensive Equitable Action to Enjoin a Lawsuit—An Action That Would Have Been Heard by the Chancellor, Not a Jury. Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, 260 U. S. 235, 242–243 (1922). the Court Does Not Get Into This Back-And-Forth—And Here, I Agree With the Court. We Did Not Take This Case to Determine Whether the Seventh Amendment Requires Jury Trials for All Disputes About Exhaustion. There Is No Circuit Split on That Question, and the Court Below Did Not Address It. 2 Richards Relies Primarily on the Plea in Discharge, a Type of Plea in Bar That Applies When the Plaintiff 'S Cause of Action Has Been “Discharged by Some Matter Subsequent, Either of Fact or of law.” B. Shipman, Handbook of Common-Law Pleading § 198B, P. 348 (3D Ed. 1923). Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 483 Barrett, J., Dissenting (Recall That Under Binding Sixth Circuit Precedent, There Is Generally No Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial for Exhaustion Disputes. See Lee, 789 F. 3D, at 678.) the Question, Moreover, Might Be Very Diffcult. Neither Party Identifes an Obvious Analogue to Exhaustion, a Defense That Developed Long After the Founding. See R. Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 Yale L. J. 981, and N. 1 (1939). Resolving the Dispute Would Therefore Require US to Confront Challenging Historical and Methodological Questions: Did the Seventh Amendment Constitutionalize Common-Law Pleading Rules? Does Congress Have the Authority, After the Merger of Law and Equity, to Fashion Novel Defenses As “Equitable”? What Presumption Applies When the Historical Evidence Is Ambiguous? It Would Be Unwise to Address These Questions Before the Lower Courts Have Seriously Considered Them. Answering the Question Presented, However, Would Not Have Required US to Resolve These Knotty Issues. We Granted Certiorari to Decide the Same Limited Issue That the Sixth Circuit Decided: Whether a Special Seventh Amendment Rule Applies When a Factual Dispute About Exhaustion Is Intertwined With the Merits. and on This Question, the Historical Record Is Much Clearer. Richards Has Presented No Evidence That Intertwinement With the Merits Was Relevant to the Jury-Trial Right. Instead, He Simply Repeats His Broader Historical Argument: That Factual Disputes Raised Through Pleas Were Heard by Juries. But This Was True Regardless of Whether the Dispute Overlapped With the Merits. See, E. G., Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U. S. 115, 120–123 (1898) (Describing “Trial[S] Had With a Jury” Over Subject-Matter Jurisdiction). Likewise, Perttu'S Account Does Not Implicate Intertwinement. All Equitable Defenses Were Heard by “The Judge As a Chancellor” Because They Were Freestanding Equitable Actions. Liberty Oil, 260 U. S., at 242–243; See W. Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 Yale L. J. 645, 650–652 (1922–1923). the Upshot Is That There Is No Historical Support for a Special Intertwinement Rule. Mere Factual Overlap With the Page Proof Pending Publication 484 Perttu v. Richards Barrett, J., Dissenting Merits Does Not Transform a Collateral Issue Ordinarily Resolved by a Court Into One Necessarily Resolved by a Jury. We Could Have Corrected That Constitutional Error and Saved the Broader, More Complicated Debate for Another Day. Iii Remarkably, in This Seventh Amendment Case, the Court Has Nothing to Say About the Seventh Amendment. in Fact, the Court Sets the Constitution Entirely Aside, “Express[Ing] No View” on How or When It Demands That a Jury Resolve Intertwined Factual Disputes. Ante, at 468–469. Left With Nothing Else to Interpret, the Court Pivots to the Plra. True, the Court Acknowledges, the Plra Says Nothing About the Role of the Jury—And Certainly Nothing About the Role of the Jury in Resolving Disputes About Exhaustion. But As a Matter of Statutory Interpretation and “ `Common-Law Adjudicatory Principles,' ” the Court Holds That the Plra Nonetheless Requires a Jury Trial When a Dispute About Exhaustion Is “Intertwined With the Merits” of the Plaintiff 'S Claim. Ante, at 468. This Is Wrong Several Times Over. Richards Did Not Present This Statutory Theory to US or Any Other Court; the Plra Does Not Confer a Jury Right Through Its Silence; and the Court Plucks Its Purported “Common-Law Adjudicatory Principle” Out of Thin Air. I Take Each Point in Turn. a to Begin, the Court Spins a Statutory Theory That Richards Has Never Even Mentioned, Much Less developed.3 Before US, 3 the Avoidance Canon Permits a Court to Choose a Less Plausible Interpretation of a Statute When the Most Natural One Would Provoke a “ `Serious' ” Constitutional Question. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 689 (2001). Though the Court Invokes the Canon in This Case, It Is Unwilling to Say That Interpreting the Plra to Permit a Court to Resolve Richards'S Exhaustion Defense Would Pose a “Serious” Constitutional Question. This Reticence Is Presumably Attributable to the Scant Historical Support for Richards'S Proposed Intertwinement Rule. Even If the Canon Applied, Moreover, the Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 485 Barrett, J., Dissenting Richards Argues Only That He Has a Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial. Both His Brief in Opposition and His Merits Brief Focus Exclusively on the Seventh Amendment. See Brief for Respondent 3 (“[T]He Seventh Amendment Clearly Protects Respondent'S Right to Jury Resolution of Disputed Historical Facts Central to the Merits of His Legal Claim”); Brief in Opposition 1 (“The Sixth Circuit Correctly Held That [The District Court'S] Process Violated the Seventh Amendment”). the Same Was True Below. in the District Court, Richards'S Argument Turned on the Proper Application of Circuit Precedent—Precedent That Has Everything to Do With the Seventh Amendment and Nothing to Do With the Plra. See Objections and Request for Review in No. 2:20–Cv–00076 (Wd Mich., Aug. 6, 2021), Ecf Doc. 102, P. 2; Lee, 789 F. 3D, at 678. Following Richards'S Lead, the District Court Likewise Focused on the Seventh Amendment. 2021 WL 3508384, *2 (Wd Mich., Aug. 10, 2021) (“[T]He Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial [Does] Not Extend to the Exhaustion Question”). on Appeal in the Sixth Circuit, Richards Continued to Press the Same Seventh Amendment Argument. Brief for Appellant in No. 22–1298, P. 2; See Generally Supplemental Brief for Appellant in No. 22–1289. So, No Surprise, the Sixth Circuit Addressed Only the Seventh Amendment. See 96 F. 4Th, at 923 (“[T]He Seventh Amendment Requires a Jury Trial When the Resolution of the Exhaustion Issue Under the Plra Would Also Resolve a Genuine Dispute of Material Fact Regarding the Merits of the Plaintiff 'S Substantive Case”). in Light of This Procedural History, the Court'S Path Is Perplexing. We Typically Refuse to Consider Arguments That the Parties Failed to Make Before US. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 863, N. 30 (1997). Likewise, “We Normally Decline to Entertain . . . Arguments” That a Party “Failed to Raise . . . in the Courts below.” Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579 U. S. 162, 173 Chosen Interpretation Must Be Plausible—And, As I Explain in the Next Part, the Court'S Interpretation Most Certainly Is Not. Page Proof Pending Publication 486 Perttu v. Richards Barrett, J., Dissenting (2016). and We Regularly Emphasize That “We Are a Court of Review, Not of FRST View,” So We Generally Do Not Address Issues That the Court of Appeals Did Not Analyze FRST. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, N. 7 (2005). (Making Matters Worse, It Is Not Clear That Any Court Has Considered the Statutory Question the Court Resolves today.) Apparently, These Party-Presentation Principles Have No Purchase Here. Without Any Prompting From the Parties, the Court Devises and Embraces a Theory That Richards Himself Never Raised— All, Ironically Enough, to Save His Case From Dismissal for an Alleged Failure to Exhaust. B Nor Does the Court Depart From Party Presentation in Service of a Sound Result. Its Analysis Goes Wrong at Every Turn, Beginning With Its Choice to Venture Beyond Statutory Text Into the Realm of Statutory Silence. As the Court Recognizes, the Plra Is “ `Silent on the Issue' Whether Judges or Juries Should Resolve Factual Disputes Related to exhaustion.” Ante, at 469. Indeed, a Search of the Exhaustion Provision Yields Nothing Remotely Related to a Jury Trial: “No Action Shall Be Brought With Respect to Prison Conditions Under [42 U. S. C. § 1983], or Any Other Federal Law, by a Prisoner Confned in Any Jail, Prison, or Other Correctional Facility Until Such Administrative Remedies As Are Available Are exhausted.” § 1997E(A). Notwithstanding This Silence, the Court Says That the Plra Guarantees the Plaintiff “A Right to a Jury Trial on Plra Exhaustion When That Issue Is Intertwined With the Merits of a Claim That Falls Under the Seventh Amendment.” Ante, at 468. According to the Court, This “Intertwinement” Rule Is So Well Established That Congress Expected Courts to Apply It Even When the Statute Says Nothing About It. Ibid. Supposedly, the Rule Is a “ `Common-Law Adjudicatory Principl[E]' ” Against Which Congress Legislates. Ibid. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 487 Barrett, J., Dissenting It Is True That Congress Sometimes Legislates Against the Backdrop of a Well-Established Principle. for Example, Relying on the “Strength of the Traditional Rule” That Criminal Offenses Require Mens Rea, We Interpret Statutes to Incorporate That Requirement “ `Even Where the Statutory Defnition Did Not in Terms Include it.' ” Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 605–606 (1994) (Quoting United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250, 251–252 (1922)). Section 1997E(A), However, Implicates No Such “Traditional rule.” (Note That While the Court Treats the “Intertwinement” Rule As Bedrock, It Is Apparently Not Confdent Enough in the Rule'S Historical Roots to Call It Constitutionally required.) Even Beyond That, However, the Court Does Not Cite Precedent Applying This Supposed Rule—Or Anything Like It—As a Background Principle of Statutory Interpretation. and So Far As I Can Tell, There Is No Such Precedent. on the Contrary, When We Have Considered Whether a Statute Confers the Right to a Jury Trial, We Have Understood Silence to Mean What You Would Expect—That Congress Did Not Affirmatively Confer Such a Right. Consider Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412 (1987). There, We Considered Whether a Civil Action Under the Clean Water Act Required the Jury'S Involvement. We Asked the Same Question That the Court Asks Today: Was a “ `Construction of the Statute . . . Fairly Possible by Which the [Seventh Amendment] Question May Be Avoided' ”? Id., at 417, N. 3. No, We Said: “Nothing in the Language of the Clean Water Act or Its Legislative History Implies Any Congressional Intent to Grant Defendants the Right to a Jury trial.” Ibid. “Given This Statutory Silence,” There Was No Statutory Basis for a Jury-Trial Right. Ibid. (Emphasis Added). That Was So Even Though the Traditional Role of the Jury in This Context Meant That the Seventh Amendment Required One. Id., at 418–419. Our Decision in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. Is Similar. 523 U. S. 340 (1998). Faced With the Question Whether a Copyright Owner Was Entitled to a Jury Trial Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication 488 Perttu v. Richards Barrett, J., Dissenting in a Suit for Damages, We Observed That the Statute Was “Silent on the point.” Id., at 342. the “Entire Statutory Provision” Made “No Mention of a Right to a Jury Trial or, for That Matter, to Juries at all.” Id., at 346. As in Tull, That Silence Was Dispositive: We “Discern[Ed] No Statutory Right to a Jury trial.” 523 U. S., at 347. and Again, That Was So Even Though the Seventh Amendment Demanded a Jury. Id., at 348–355. Finally, in Monterey, We Held That § 1983 “Does Not Itself Confer the Jury right.” 526 U. S., at 707. This Was True, We Explained, Even Though § 1983 Authorizes a Party to Proceed Through an “ `Action at law.' ” Ibid. We Declined to Interpret the Phrase As a “Term of Art Implying a Right to a Jury Trial,” and, As a Result, We Declined “To FND a Statutory Jury Right Under § 1983.” Id., at 707–708. This Should Have Been an Easier Case Than Tull, Feltner, or Monterey. in Each of Those Cases, the Statute Invoked Terms Traditionally Associated With the Jury-Trial Right. See Monterey, 526 U. S., at 707 (“ `Action[S] at Law' ”); Feltner, 523 U. S., at 352–353 (“Statutory Damages”); Tull, 481 U. S., at 422 (“Civil Penalty”). Indeed, in All Three Cases, We Ultimately Held That the Seventh Amendment Required a Jury Trial. Monterey, 526 U. S., at 720–721; Feltner, 523 U. S., at 355; Tull, 481 U. S., at 427. It Would Have Been Easy to Read Into a Phrase Such As “Action at Law” an Implicit Instruction to Require Jury Trials, But We Did Not Do So; Instead, We Read the Statute to Mean What It Actually Said. Monterey, 526 U. S., at 708. Here, the Statute Contains No Term Traditionally Associated With the Jury-Trial Right, and the Claim to a Statutory Backdrop Is Even Weaker. That Is Perhaps Why Richards Never Attempted to Make the Statutory Argument That the Court Advances Now. C the Court'S Approach to Statutory Interpretation Is Not Only Adventuresome—It Also Rests on an Illusion. Neither History, Nor Logic, Nor Precedent Supports Its “Intertwinement” Rule. Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 489 Barrett, J., Dissenting I Covered the Lack of Historical Support for the Rule in My Discussion of the Seventh Amendment. on, Then, to Logic: the Court'S Proposed Rule Is Both Manifestly Unfair and Inherently Arbitrary. Under the Court'S Approach, Similarly Situated Plaintiffs Are Entitled to a Jury (Or Not) Based on Immaterial Distinctions in the Claims They Choose to Bring. to See Why, Imagine That Another Inmate (Say, Smith) Sues Perttu Based on the Very Same Facts That Richards Alleges Here. Like Richards, Smith Claims That Perttu Sexually Harassed Him. and, Like Richards, Smith Contends That Perttu Destroyed His Grievances, Thus Excusing His Failure to Exhaust His Available Administrative Remedies. But Suppose That, Unlike Richards, Smith Brings Only an Eighth Amendment Claim. Because the Destruction of Grievance Forms Does Not Implicate the Eighth Amendment, Richards'S Proposed Rule Would Not Entitle Smith to a Jury Trial on Exhaustion. As This Example Illustrates, the Court'S Rule Makes Little Sense. There Is No Question That Both Richards and Smith Would Be Entitled to a Jury Trial on the Merits of Their § 1983 Claims. for Both Richards and Smith, an Adverse Ruling on Administrative Exhaustion Would Require Dismissal. for Both Richards and Smith, the Exhaustion Question Would Depend on the Same Set of Facts and Credibility Determinations. and for Both Richards and Smith, an Exhaustion-Related Dismissal Would Not Preclude a Subsequent Suit Once They Have Adequately Exhausted Their Claims. So Why Should Richards Get a Jury Trial, But Not Smith? the Court Does Not Say. Instead, the Court Relies on Three Cases Holding (It Says) That an Issue Triggers the Jury-Trial Right If It Is Intertwined With the Merits, Even If It Could Ordinarily Be Resolved by the Court. None of the Cited Cases Stands for This Proposition. 1 the Court Leads With Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500 (1959). See Ante, at 471–472. in That Case, the District Court Had Two Actions Before It: (1) an Equitable Action by the Plaintiff (Fox Theatres); and (2) a Countersuit by Page Proof Pending Publication 490 Perttu v. Richards Barrett, J., Dissenting the Defendant (Beacon Theatres) for Damages. See 359 U. S., at 502–503. Both Actions Involved a Common Issue Related to the Reasonableness of the Plaintiff'S Underlying Contracts. But Only the Latter Action—A Suit at Law—Implicated the Right to a Jury Trial. That Teed Up the Question: Which Should the Trial Court Resolve Frst? the Answer, We Held, Is That Courts Ultimately Have “Discretion in Deciding Whether the Legal or Equitable Cause Should Be Tried frst.” Id., at 510. But This Discretion Should, “Wherever Possible, Be Exercised” Such That the Legal Claims Would Be Heard Before the Equitable Ones. Ibid. Resolving the Equitable Claim FRST, We Explained, Might Inadvertently “ `Operate Either by Way of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel' ” So As to Limit the “ `Opportunity Fully to Try to a Jury Every Issue Which Has a Bearing Upon' ” the Legal Claim. Id., at 504 (Quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F. 2D 864, 874 (Ca9 1958)). Beacon Theatres Does Not Hold, However, That the Seventh Amendment Compels Legal-Then-Equitable Sequencing. Nor Does It “Construc[T]” Statutory Silence to Require Such a Rule. Ante, at 468. Instead, As Our Later Cases Confrm, Beacon Theatres “Enunciate[S] No More Than a General Prudential Rule” Governing the Trial Court'S “Discretion in Determining the Sequence of Trial” When Legal and Equitable Claims Are Joined in the Same Action. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 334 (1979). As a Rule of Discretion, It Is Not Hard and Fast: We Have Observed That “There Might Be Situations” in Which a Court May “Resolve the Equitable Claim FRST Even Though the Results Might Be Dispositive of the Issues Involved in the Legal claim.” Katchen v. Landy, 382 U. S. 323, 339–340 (1966). Congress, Too, Has Fexibility: It May Devise “A Specifc Statutory Scheme” That Contemplates “The Prompt Trial of a Disputed Claim Without the Intervention of a jury.” Id., at 339. With That Understanding of Beacon Theatres in Mind, the Differences With This Case Are Hard to Miss. Beacon Thepage Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 491 Barrett, J., Dissenting Atres Involved a Court'S Discretion in Judicial Administration—Discretion That Congress Is Always Free to Override. See Katchen, 382 U. S., at 339–340 (Emphasizing That the Beacon Theatres Rule Can Be Displaced “[T]O Implement Congressional Intent”). the Court'S Analysis Here, by Contrast, Turns on Whether Congress Affirmatively Conferred a Jurytrial Right on Prisoners When It Enacted the Plra. Besides, the Problem That Drove the Court'S Decision in Beacon Theatres Is Absent Here. Recall the Concern: That Fox'S Equitable Claim Would Proceed to Fnal Judgment Before Beacon Theatres'S Legal Claim and Thus Preclusively Resolve “The Issues Involved” in That Claim. Katchen, 382 U. S., at 339–340. Indeed, As We Later Explained in Parklane Hosiery, “[R]Ecognition That an Equitable Determination Could Have Collateral-Estoppel Effect in a Subsequent Legal Action Was the Major Premise” of Beacon Theatres. 439 U. S., at 333 (Emphasis Added). the Holding of Beacon Theatres, We Underscored, Was Specifcally Intended to Avoid Foreclosing, “By Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel,” the “Relitigation” of an “Issue Common to Both Legal and Equitable claims.” 439 U. S., at 334. No Such Concern Is Present in This Case. Both Courts to Have Considered the Issue Have Concluded, Consistent With Principles of Collateral Estoppel, That the Resolution of Facts Relating to Administrative Exhaustion Does Not Bind the Jury in a Subsequent Trial. See Pavey, 544 F. 3D, at 742; Albino, 747 F. 3D, at 1171. This Makes Sense: Because Collateral Estoppel Requires a “Fnal Judgment,” It Should Have No Force When the Resolution of a Threshold Issue (Like Exhaustion) Results in a Without-Prejudice Dismissal. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1980).4 4 While Richards Does Not Dispute That Collateral Estoppel Is Inapplicable Here, the Court Suggests That It May Apply. to Support This Contention, However, the Court Simply Relies on the Hornbook Principle That “Factual Determinations in a FRST Action Can Have Direct Estoppel Effect in a Second Page Proof Pending Publication 492 Perttu v. Richards Barrett, J., Dissenting for Reasons I Do Not Understand, the Court Recasts Beacon Theatres As Having Little to Do With Collateral Estoppel. Without Any Hesitation, It Turns Beacon Theatres'S “Major Premise” Into a Minor Corollary, Announcing That the Case Will Not Be “Artifcially” Limited “To Cases Involving estoppel.” Ante, at 476. But the Reasoning of Beacon Theatres Expressly Turned on Estoppel, and We Have Subsequently Identifed This Principle As the Animating Force Behind Its Holding. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U. S., at 333; Katchen, 382 U. S., at 339–340. and Estoppel Is the One Circumstance Where Intertwinement With the Merits Has Practical Relevance to the Jury-Trial Right. Without Fanfare, Citation, or Explanation, the Court Thus Transforms Our 40-Year Understanding of a Seminal Case on Equity. 2 the Court'S Reliance on Smithers v. Smith and Land v. Dollar Is Even More of a Stretch: Neither Has Anything to Do With the Question Presented Here. Action on the Same claim.” Ante, at 475. to Be Sure, the Resolution of a Threshold Issue Precludes Relitigation of That Same Threshold Issue in a Subsequent Suit. See 18A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4436, P. 143 (3D Ed. 2017). for That Reason, If a Court Rules Against a Plaintiff on Exhaustion and Dismisses Her Case, She Cannot Relitigate Whether She Exhausted Her Administrative Remedies. But If She Prevails on Exhaustion and Proceeds to the Merits, Collateral Estoppel Should Not Preclude Revisiting the Facts That Informed the Court'S Ruling on Exhaustion. Indeed, the Cases Cited by the Majority, See Ante, at 475, N. 3, Are Consistent With This Principle. See Carr v. Tillery, 591 F. 3D 909, 916–917 (Ca7 2010) (A Determination That a Federal Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over a Suit Would Bar a Federal Court From Asserting Jurisdiction in a Subsequent Suit); Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F. 2D 1361, 1364 (Ca9 1987) (A Determination That a Complaint Fails to Allege Fraud With Particularity Could Preclude the Refling of an Identical Complaint). the Law-Of-The-Case Doctrine Would Be Similarly Inapplicable. See 18B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478.5, P. 774 (3D Ed. 2019) (“Reconsideration of a Fact Issue May Be Appropriate . . . If a Change of Procedural Posture Changes the Nature of the Issue”). Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 605 U. S. 460 (2025) 493 Barrett, J., Dissenting Start With Smithers, in Which the Plaintiff Asserted That the Defendants Had Stolen His Land. 204 U. S. 632, 640 (1907). the Land, the Plaintiff Claimed, Was Worth More Than $2,000, the Amount-In-Controversy Requirement Then in Effect. See Id., at 639–641. After Holding a Bench Trial, the District Court Dismissed the Case for Lack of Jurisdiction; According to the Court, Each Defendant Had Taken a Parcel Worth Less Than $2,000, and the Defendants Had Not Acted Jointly. Id., at 641–642. in So Holding, the Court Violated the Black-Letter Rule That a Plaintiff'S Declaration Generally Establishes the Amount in Controversy. Id., at 642. Because It Was “Legally Possible for the Plaintiff to Recover the Full Amount of All the Land and the Full Amount of the Damages Claimed,” We Held That the District Court Had Erred in Dismissing the Case. Id., at 644. in Other Words, the District Court Simply Misapplied Longstanding Jurisdictional Principles. the Plaintiff 'S Pleadings Were Suffcient to Establish Jurisdiction, Notwithstanding Any Factual Disputes That Might Limit the Plaintiff 'S Potential Recovery Down the Line. But These Disputes Implicated the Merits—Damages, in Particular—Not Jurisdiction. Smithers'S Rule Is Therefore Unremarkable. a Trial Court May Not Prematurely Resolve a Merits Question by Framing It As a Jurisdictional Question, Thereby Depriving the Plaintiff of a Jury. Smithers Says Nothing About Whether a Threshold Question Requires a Jury Simply Because of Factual Overlap With the Merits. Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947), Is Even Further Afeld. There, Stockholders Sued Members of the U. S. Maritime Commission to Recover Stock Previously Delivered to the Commission. Id., at 733–734. the District Court Dismissed the Case, Reasoning That Because the Stock Was Federal Property, Sovereign Immunity Barred the Plaintiff'S Suit. Id., at 734–735. That Was an Error, We Held: Ownership of the Stock Implicated the Merits of the Stockholders' Claim, So the Court Should Not Have Decided That Issue at the Outset of the Case. Id., at 739. Page Proof Pending Publication 494 Perttu v. Richards Barrett, J., Dissenting Nothing in Land Turned on the Seventh Amendment; Indeed, the Word “Jury” Does Not Appear in Our Opinion or the Opinion of the Court Below. See Dollar v. Land, 154 F. 2D 307 (Cadc 1946). This May Be Because Land Was a Suit for Injunctive Relief and Mandamus, Not Damages. See 330 U. S., at 740 (Reed, J., Concurring); Dollar, 154 F. 2D, at 308 (“The Complaint Prayed for Relief by Way of Injunction and Mandamus Against the Defendant”). in Fact, in the End “A Lengthy Trial Was Had Before the Court Without a jury.” Dollar v. Land, 184 F. 2D 245, 247 (Cadc 1950). Sensibly, Then, We Have Never Understood Land to Inform the Scope of the Right to a Jury Trial. It Stands for the More Limited Proposition That When There Is “An Identity Between the `Jurisdictional' Issues and Certain Issues on the Merits,” There Is “No Objection to Reserving the Jurisdictional Issues Until a Hearing on the merits.” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co. 419 U. S. 186, 203, N. 19 (1974). This Rule Is Just a Principle of Judicial Administration—Addressing Circumstances in Which It Makes Sense to Defer Ruling on a Potentially Jurisdictional Issue Until the Merits—And Not a Holding on the Jury-Trial Right. * * * the Court Reads the Plra to Say What It Does Not. It Does So for Reasons That the Parties Did Not Brief; That Have No Basis in Our Doctrine; and That Are Contrary to Wellestablished Principles of Statutory Interpretation. in So Doing, the Court Creates a Regime Under Which an Exhaustion Requirement Designed to “Reduce the Quantity and Improve the Quality of Prisoner Suits” Just Generates More Litigation of Its Own. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U. S. 516, 524 (2002). Now, Any Prisoner Can Potentially Obtain Full Jury Review of the Very Threshold Question That Was Designed to Streamline Prisoner Litigation. All He Has to Do Is FND a Way to Transform His Inability to Use the Prison System Into a Claim for Relief. Congress Did Not Devise Such a Rule, and We Have Never Adopted One. I Respectfully Dissent. Page Proof Pending Publication Page Proof Pending Publication Reporter’S Note the Attached Opinion Has Been Revised to Refect the Usual Publication and Citation Style of the United States Reports. the Revised Pagination Makes Available the Offcial United States Reports Citation in Advance of Publication. the Syllabus Has Been Prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the Convenience of the Reader and Constitutes No Part of the Opinion of the Court. a List of Counsel Who Argued or Fled Briefs in This Case, and Who Were Members of the Bar of This Court at the Time This Case Was Argued, Has Been Inserted Following the Syllabus. Other Revisions May Include Adjustments to Formatting, Captions, Citation Form, and Any Errant Punctuation. the Following Additional Edits Were Made: P. 464, Line 2 From Bottom: “94 Stat. 352” Is Changed to “110 Stat. 1321–71, As Amended,”

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Preliminary Print Volume 608 U. S. Part 1 Pages 346–379 Official Reports of the Supreme Court May 26, 2026 Rebecca A. Womeldorf Reporter of Decisions Page Proof Pending Publication Notice: This Preliminary Print Is Subject to Formal Revision Before the Bound Volume Is Published. Users Are Requested to Notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of Any Typographical or Other Formal Errors. 346 October Term, 2025 Decree Texas v. New Mexico, et al. on Receipt of the Fourth Interim Report of the Special Master No. 141, Orig. Final Decree Entered May 26, 2026 Opinions Reported: 583 U. S. 407, 602 U. S. 943. the Proposed Fnal Decree, Appendix a to the Fourth Interim Report of the Special Master, Entitled “Consent Decree Supporting the Rio Grande Compact (With Appendices 1 and 2)” Is Entered. the Honorable D. Brooks Smith, of Duncansville, Pennsylvania, the Special Master in This Case, Is Hereby Discharged With the Thanks of the Court. Decree Based Upon the Recommendation of the Special Master, With the Agreement of the Compacting States of Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado, the Court Decrees As Follows: the Texas-New Mexico Compact Dispute Among the Compacting States of Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado Regarding Compact Apportionment Is Resolved Pursuant to the Decree Terms Described Herein. I. Definitions When Used in This Decree and the Attachments and Appendices Hereto, the Following Defnitions Apply. the Terms Defned Below Shall Be Construed As Consistent With the Terms Defned in the Rio Grande Compact. “Accrued Index Departure” Means the Sum of All Annual Index Departures As Defned in More Detail in Appendix 1. This May Result in an Accrued Negative Departure or an Accrued Positive Departure. “Annual Index Departure” Means the Difference Between the Index Delivery and the Index Obligation in Any Calendar Year As Described in Appendix 1. This May Result in an Annual Negative Departure (Under-Delivery) or an Annual Positive Departure (Over-Delivery). Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 347 Decree “Bureau of Reclamation” or “Reclamation” Means the Bureau of Reclamation Within the United States Department of the Interior. “Caballo Release” Means the Offcial Fow Record As Measured at the Rio Grande Below Caballo Dam Stream Gage (Usgs 08362500) Used in Calculating the Index Obligation. “Compact” Means the Rio Grande Compact, Approved by Congress in the Act of May 31, 1939, CH. 155, 53 Stat. 785. “Convention of 1906” Means the Convention Between the United States and Mexico Providing for the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, May 21, 1906, U. S.-Mex., 34 Stat. 2954. “D2 Period” Means the Period January 1, 1951, Through December 31, 1978. “Depletion of Index Supply” Means the Annual Volumetric Reduction of Project Supply in New Mexico and Texas, in Acre-Feet, Resulting Directly or Indirectly From Surface Water Use and Groundwater Use. “Effective El Paso Index” or “Eepi” or “Index” Means the Index-Based Methodology for Assessing Compliance With This Decree Described in Appendix 1. “El Paso Gage” Means the Rio Grande at El Paso, Texas Stream Gage (Usgs 08364000). “Excess Flow” Means Rio Grande Streamfow at the El Paso Gage, Excluding the Delivery to Mexico, That Is Excluded From the Index Delivery As Defned in Appendix 1. “Index Accounting” Means the Determination of the Annual Index Obligation, Annual Index Delivery, and Annual and Accrued Index Departures As Described in Appendix 1. “Index Delivery” Means the Sum of: (I) the Annual Streamfow at the El Paso Gage, After Subtracting Delivery to Mexico and Excess Flow; and (Ii) the Estimated Depletion of Index Supply Caused by Groundwater and Surface Water Use in the Texas Mesilla, As Determined by the Methodology in Appendix 1. Page Proof Pending Publication 348 Texas v. New Mexico Decree “Index Departure” or “Departure” Means the Difference Between the Index Delivery and the Index Obligation; When the Index Delivery Is Greater Than the Index Obligation It Is a “Positive Departure,” When the Index Delivery Is Less Than the Index Obligation It Is a “Negative Departure.” “Index Obligation” Means the Volume of Water Calculated to Be Delivered to Texas As Quantifed Using the Eepi, and Subject to Index Departures and Other Provisions in This Decree. “Mesilla Basin” Means the Part of the Rio Grande Basin That Contains the Mesilla Valley. the Mesilla Basin Is Located in Both New Mexico and Texas, As Depicted in Appendix 2. “Project Carryover Water” Means the Quantity of Water Allocated Each Water Year by Reclamation for Delivery to the Irrigation Districts in New Mexico and Texas That Remains at the End of Each Calendar Year. “Index Supply” Means the Water Supply for the Rio Grande Project As Defned and Administered by Applicable State Law. Index Supply Generally Consists of Usable Water, As Defned in Article I(L) of the Compact, Which Excludes Rio Grande Credit Water and Imported Waters Such As San Juan Chama Project Water; Usable Water Released From Caballo Reservoir in Accordance With Irrigation Demands, Including Deliveries to Mexico; and Infows and Project Return Fows That Reach the Bed of the Rio Grande or Project Conveyances, But Excluding Fows From Imported Water. “Rincon Basin” Means the Part of the Rio Grande Basin That Contains the Rincon Valley in New Mexico, As Depicted in Appendix 2. “Rio Grande Project” or “Project” Means the Federal Reclamation Project, Authorized in the Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 390 and the Rio Grande Project Act of February 25, 1905, 33 Stat. 814, Operated by the United Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 349 Decree States Through the Bureau of Reclamation and Irrigation Districts Located in New Mexico and Texas. “Texas Mesilla” Means the Land in the State of Texas That Overlies the Mesilla Basin, As Depicted in Appendix 2. “Transfers” Means the Transfer of Project Allocation Between the Rio Grande Project Irrigation District in New Mexico and the Rio Grande Project Irrigation District in Texas in Accordance With This Decree. Ii. Injunction A. General Provisions: 1. the Rio Grande Compact Effects an Equitable Apportionment of the Waters of the Rio Grande Above Fort Quitman, Texas, Among the States of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. the Compacting States Must Comply With the Compact. 2. Pursuant to Article Iv of the Compact and the Unanimous Resolution of the Rio Grande Compact Commission Adopted February 14-16, 1948, New Mexico Is Obligated to Deliver Rio Grande Water As Measured at Elephant Butte Reservoir in Amounts That Are Based on Fows Measured at the Stream Gaging Station Located at Otowi Bridge Near San Ildefonso. 3. Elephant Butte Reservoir Is the Major Storage Reservoir for the Rio Grande Project. 4. the Division of Rio Grande Water Between New Mexico and Texas Below Elephant Butte Reservoir Is Based Upon the Percentage of the Total Authorized Irrigable Acreage of the Rio Grande Project Situated in Each State at the Time of the Compact, Approximately 57% in New Mexico and 43% in Texas. 5. This Decree Specifes Procedures to Ensure the Proper Apportionment of Rio Grande Water Between Texas and New Mexico Below Elephant Butte Reservoir. 6. Compliance With This Decree Represents Compliance With the Compact With Respect to the Division of Rio Grande Water Below Elephant Butte Reservoir. Page Proof Pending Publication 350 Texas v. New Mexico Decree B. Division of Water Below Elephant Butte Reservoir: 1. the Procedures for Calculating the Water to Be Delivered to Texas at the El Paso Gage Are Contained in the Effective El Paso Index Documented in Appendix 1. 2. the Effective El Paso Index: A. New Mexico Shall Manage and Administer Water in a Manner That Is Consistent With This Decree, Including Satisfying the Effective El Paso Index Requirements. B. the Index Is the Calculation of Rio Grande Water That Texas Is Entitled to Receive. New Mexico Is Entitled to Use the Balance of the Rio Grande Water Released From Caballo Dam So Long As Its Use Complies With the Other Provisions of This Decree. C. the Index Was Developed to Ensure Texas and New Mexico Receive the Amounts of Water Each Is Entitled to Under the Compact Below Elephant Butte Reservoir Based Upon Project Operations During the D2 Period. D. the Methodology for Calculating and Determining the Index Delivery and Index Obligation Is Documented in Appendix 1. E. the Index Obligation Is Calculated Annually and Is Based on a Regression Analysis of Caballo Releases and Volumes of Water Reaching the El Paso Gage During the D2 Period, Plus the Historical D2 Period Average Agricultural and Domestic, Commercial, Municipal, and Industrial (Dcmi) Depletions to the Rio Grande Caused by Surface and Ground Water Use in the Texas Mesilla, Upstream of the El Paso Gage, Subtracting Out Deliveries to Mexico. the Index Obligation Is Described in Detail in Appendix 1. F. the Index Delivery Should Equal the Index Obligation. However, River Operations, Hydrologic Conditions, Annual Variations in the Amount and Location of Water Uses (Including Groundwater Pumping) Above the El Paso Gage, the Distance Between the Release of Project Water Below Caballo Dam and the El Paso Gage and Other Factors May Affect the Index Delivery. As a Consequence, This Decree Provides for Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 351 Decree Departures From the Index Obligation, and “Triggers” for Water Management Responses. G. the Rio Grande Below Caballo Dam and El Paso Gages Are Used for Providing the Offcial Daily Fow Record for Use in Calculating the Index Delivery. the Gages Will Continually Meet the Rules and Regulations for Administration of the Rio Grande Compact Regarding Gaging Stations. Colorado Shall Not Be Responsible for the Costs of the Gages and Measurements Needed for Index Accounting. 3. Index Departures: A. As Set Forth in This Decree, an Annual Negative Departure: (I) Will Be Used to Reduce an Accrued Positive Departure at the Beginning of the Year by the Amount of the Annual Negative Departure; or (Ii) Will Be Added to the Accrued Negative Departures at the Beginning of the Year. B. As Set Forth in This Decree, an Annual Positive Departure: (I) Will Be Used to Reduce an Accrued Negative Departure at the Beginning of the Year by the Amount of the Annual Positive Departure; or (Ii) Will Be Added to the Accrued Positive Departures at the Beginning of the Year. C. Transfers Relating to Accrued Negative or Accrued Positive Departures From One Irrigation District to the Other Will Immediately Reduce New Mexico'S Accrued Negative Departures or Texas'S Accrued Positive Departures by the Same Amount of the Transfer. Specifcally, If Such a Transfer Occurs From the Current-Year Allocation for the New Mexico Irrigation District to the Current-Year Allocation for the Texas Irrigation District, Then Simultaneous With the Transfer, the Accrued Negative Departures Will Be Reduced by an Amount Equal to the Transfer. Likewise, If Such a Transfer Occurs From the Current-Year Allocation for the Texas Irrigation District to the Current-Year Allocation for the New Mexico Irrigation District, Then Simultaneous With the Transfer, the Acpage Proof Pending Publication 352 Texas v. New Mexico Decree Crued Positive Index Departure Will Be Reduced by an Amount Equal to the Transfer. C. Index Departure Limits: 1. New Mexico Is in Compliance With This Decree If New Mexico Is Within the Accrued Negative Departure Limits. Exceedance of Accrued Negative Departure Limits Means New Mexico Is in Violation of This Decree. 2. Cap on Annual Positive Departure. the Maximum Annual Positive Departure Is 67,500 Acre-Feet; an Annual Positive Departure in Excess of 67,500 Acre-Feet Shall Be Treated As the Equivalent of 67,500 Acre-Feet for the Purposes of Calculating Accrued Index Departures. 3. Caps on Annual Negative Departure. A. for the FRST Full Fve (5) Calendar Years Following Entry of This Decree, in Calculating the Accrued Index Departures, Annual Negative Departures in Excess of 112,500 Acrefeet Shall Be Treated As the Equivalent of 112,500 Acre-Feet. B. Beginning the Sixth Full Calendar Year After Entry of This Decree, and Thereafter, in Calculating the Accrued Index Departures, Annual Negative Departures in Excess of 90,000 Acre-Feet Shall Be Treated As the Equivalent of 90,000 Acrefeet. 4. Negative Departures: A. Limits: (I) for the FRST Full Fve (5) Calendar Years Following Entry of This Decree, New Mexico May Accrue Negative Departures Up to, But Not in Excess of 150,000 Acre-Feet. (Ii) Beginning the Sixth Full Calendar Year After Entry of This Decree, and Thereafter, New Mexico May Accrue Negative Departures Up to, But Not in Excess of 120,000 Acre-Feet. B. Additional Index Adjustments for Exceedances of the Accrued Negative Departure Limit: (I) in Addition to the Other Provisions of This Decree, If New Mexico Exceeds the Accrued Negative Departure Limit of 150,000/120,000 Acre-Feet in Three (3) Consecutive Years, New Mexico Shall Provide 12,000 Acre-Feet of Water in Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 353 Decree Excess of Its Index Obligation for Each Year That It Exceeds the Accrued Negative Departure Limit. New Mexico Shall Have Three (3) Years to Provide the Full 36,000 Acre-Feet. (Ii) If New Mexico Exceeds the Accrued Negative Departure Limit of 150,000/120,000 Acre-Feet in Four (4) or More Consecutive Years, New Mexico Shall Provide 15,000 Acre-Feet of Water in Excess of Its Index Obligation for Each Additional Year Over the Three (3) Years Addressed in the Above Paragraph That It Exceeds the Accrued Negative Departures Limit. the 15,000 Acre-Feet in Excess of Index Obligation Amounts Shall Be Provided During the Year Immediately Following the Violation of the Accrued Negative Departure Limit. C. in Any Year in Which the Three-Year Rolling Average of the End of Year Project Carryover Water for the Irrigation District in Texas Is Greater Than 180,000 Acre-Feet, All Accrued Negative Departures Shall Be Extinguished. D. Trigger for Water Management Actions: 1. to Avoid Excessive Accrued Index Departures and to Ensure That the Equitable Apportionment Is Achieved, Certain Volumes of Accrued Negative Departures (Trigger) Require the Following Water Management Actions. 2. Negative Departure Trigger. If Accrued Negative Departures Are Greater Than 80,000 Acre-Feet at the End of Any Calendar Year, the Following Provisions Shall Apply: A. New Mexico Shall Take Water Management Actions to Reduce the Accrued Negative Departures to Less Than 16,000 Acre-Feet Within Six (6) Calendar Years Following the Exceedance of the Negative Departure Trigger. New Mexico Shall Have Discretion to Determine What Water Management Actions Are Necessary and Appropriate. E. Additional Index Provisions: 1. Scope of the Index Obligation. in Addition to the Above Specifc Terms and Conditions Related to the Index: A. the Eepi Shall Not Apply in Those Years in Which Annual Caballo Releases Are Less Than 200,000 Acre-Feet. in Page Proof Pending Publication 354 Texas v. New Mexico Decree Those Years, the Annual Index Departure Shall Be Set at Zero (0) Acre-Feet. B. When Annual Caballo Releases Are 790,000 Acre-Feet or Greater, the Index Obligation Shall Be Calculated Using a 790,000 Acre-Foot Release for the Year. 2. If There Is an Accrued Index Departure at the End of the FFTH Year Following Entry of This Decree, or If the Trigger Is Reached Pursuant to Paragraph II.D.2 in the FRST Fve (5) Years, Then the Accrued Index Departures (Either Positive or Negative) Shall Be Reduced by the Amount of the Index Departure Up to, But Not to Exceed, 20,000 Acre-Feet or Until the Index Accounting Refects Zero (0) Index Departures. 3. Aridity Adjustment. the Index Will Be Adjusted Annually for Estimated Change, Since the D2 Period, in Open Water Evaporation and Riparian Evapotranspiration Between the Rio Grande Below Caballo Dam and the El Paso Gages. See Appendix 1. 4. in Any Year in Which an Actual or Hypothetical Spill Occurs, As Determined by the Rio Grande Compact Commission, All Accrued Index Departures, Both Positive and Negative Departures, Shall Be Extinguished. F. Index Accounting: 1. the Compacting States Shall Cooperate in Providing Necessary Data to Support Calculation of the Index Obligation and the Index Accounting As Described in the Attached Appendix 1. A. the Data Required for Calculating the Initial Index Accounting for the Prior Year Shall Be Reported to the Engineer Advisors for the Compacting States Following the Compact Accounting Schedules in the “Schedule for Review and Approval of Rio Grande Compact Accounting Records for the Previous Year.” B. the Initial Index Accounting for the Prior Year Shall Be Annually Prepared Using the Methodologies Contained in Appendix 1 and Provided in the “Schedule for Review and Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 355 Decree Approval of Rio Grande Compact Accounting Records for the Previous Year.” C. the Engineer Advisors Shall Review the Initial Index Accounting, and Include the Fnal Index Accounting for the Prior Year in Their Annual Report to the Rio Grande Compact Commission. D. the Rio Grande Compact Commission Shall Review the Engineer Advisors' Report and Act As Provided for in Article Xii of the Compact. Iii. Construction of the Decree A. Nothing in This Decree As a Whole, Nor Any Part Hereof, Modifes or Otherwise Requires Modifcation of the Compact. This Decree Clarifes But Does Not Alter the Compact Rights and Obligations of the Signatory States. B. Nothing in This Decree Shall Be Construed As Affecting the Obligations of the United States of America to Mexico Under Existing Treaties, or to the Indian Tribes, or As Impairing the Rights of the Indian Tribes. C. the Following Appendices Are Attached: “Appendix 1” Is the Index Appendix; and “Appendix 2” Is a Map Showing the Mesilla Basin, the Rincon Basin, and the Texas Mesilla Area. to the Extent Any Confict Exists Between the Language of This Decree and the Appendices, or Any Ambiguity Is Created by the Language of the Appendices, the Language in This Decree Controls. the Compact and Decree Govern the Legal Rights and Obligations of the Compacting States. the Technical Appendices Provide Procedures and Methodologies for Ensuring Proper Implementation of This Decree. D. This Decree Creates No Third-Party Benefciaries, Express or Implied. Iv. Modification of Appendices to the Decree Appendices May Be Modified Only by Unanimous Agreement of the Compacting States or Subsequent Order of This Court. Page Proof Pending Publication 356 Texas v. New Mexico Appendix 1 to Decree v. Retention of Jurisdiction Any of the Compacting States May Fle a Motion With the Court for Amendment of the Decree or for Further Relief. the Court Retains Jurisdiction of This Suit for the Purpose of Any Order, Direction, or Modifcation of the Decree, or Any Supplementary Decree, That May at Any Time Be Deemed Proper in Relation to This Decree or an Action by the Compacting States for the Enforcement of the Decree. Appendix 1 Effective El Paso Index Consent Decree Supporting the Rio Grande Compact Section 1: Introduction the Effective El Paso Index (Eepi) Is an Index-Based Methodology Used to Assess Compliance With the Consent Decree Supporting the Rio Grande Compact (Consent Decree or Decree). the Eepi Was Developed for the Purpose of Quantifying and Assessing the Division of Rio Grande Water Below Elephant Butte Reservoir. This Document Provides a Summary of the Eepi Methodology and Describes the Procedures for Calculating the Elements Included Within the Eepi. Defned Terms in the Consent Decree Have the Same Meaning in This Appendix. to the Extent This Appendix Presents Any Inconsistencies With the Consent Decree, the Consent Decree Controls. the Eepi Includes Provisions for Calculating the Annual Calendar Year Volume of Water Obligated to Texas (Index Obligation), the Annual Volume of Water Delivered to Texas (Index Delivery), and the Difference Between the Delivery and Obligation, Both on an Annual and Accrued Basis (Annual Index Departure and Accrued Index Departure). the Eepi Methodology Consists of the Following: • Index Obligation Described in Section 2. • Index Delivery Described in Section 3. • Annual Index Departure Described in Section 4. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 357 Appendix 1 to Decree • Accrued Index Departure Described in Section 5. • Data for Eepi Calculations Described in Section 6. • Consent Decree Accounting Provisions Described in Section 7. • Review and Revision Described in Section 8. the Effective El Paso Index Supply (Index Supply) Represents the Texas Apportionment of the Rio Grande Below Caballo Dam (See Section 2.1). It Is Comprised of the Rio Grande Fows Delivered at the El Paso Gage Plus the Depletions to the Rio Grande Resulting From Agricultural and Domestic, Commercial, Municipal and Industrial (Dcmi) Water Uses in the Texas Mesilla1 Upstream of the El Paso Gage2, Adjusted for Excess Flows3 and Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre4 As Follows: Index Supply = + Streamfow at the El Paso Gage + Texas Mesilla Agricultural Depletions + Texas Mesilla Dcmi Depletions - Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre - Excess Flow Section 2: Index Obligation 2.1 Defnition of the Index Obligation the Index Obligation Is the Annual Target Volume of Water Calculated for Delivery to Texas, Subject to Adjustment for 1 Texas Mesilla Means the Land in the State of Texas That Overlies the Mesilla Basin. 2 El Paso Gage Means the Rio Grande at El Paso, Texas Stream Gage (Usgs08364000). 3 Excess Flow Defned in Section 3.6. 4 Acequia Madre Is the Canal Through Which Deliveries of Rio Grande Water Are Made to Mexico Under the Provisions of the Convention of 1906 Between the United States and Mexico. the “Convention of 1906” Means the Convention Between the United States and Mexico Providing for the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, May 21, 1906, U. S.-Mex, 34 Stat. 2954. Page Proof Pending Publication 358 Texas v. New Mexico Appendix 1 to Decree Changes in Open Water Evaporation and Riparian Evapotranspiration (Aridity Adjustment) and Other Provisions. the Index Obligation Is Based on a Two-Year Regression Analysis Relating Annual Caballo Release5 in the Current and Previous Years to the Annual Index Supply During the 19511978 Period (D2 Period). 2.2 Calculation of the Index Obligation the Following Equation (Equation 1) Will Be Used to Compute the Index Obligation, in Units of Acre-Feet, Following the End of Each Calendar Year: Equation 1 Index Obligation [Y] = 0.485886 · Minimum (Qcaballo [Y]; 790,000 Acre-Feet) + 0.113382 · Minimum (Qcaballo [Y-1]; 790,000 Acre-Feet) - 90,149 + 26,860 (Average Texas Mesilla Agricultural Depletions, in Acrefeet) + 12,224 (Average Texas Mesilla Dcmi Depletions, in Acre-Feet Where, • 0.485886, 0.113382, and 90,149 Are Regression Coeffcients. • Qcaballo Is the Annual Caballo Release for a Given Calendar Year in Acre-Feet. • [Y] Indicates the Year (E. G., Qcaballo [1970] Is the Annual Caballo Release for 1970). the Annual Calculation of the Index Obligation Is Subject to the Following Conditions: • in Extreme Wet Years, or When Qcaballo Is Greater Than 790,000 Acre-Feet Per Year, the Index Obligation Will Be 5 Caballo Release Means the Offcial Fow Record As Measured at the Rio Grande Below Caballo Dam Stream Gage (Usgs 08362500). Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 359 Appendix 1 to Decree Determined Using Equation 1, But the Value for Qcaballo Will Be Set to 790,000 Acre-Feet. Data for Qcaballo Will Be Obtained From the Rio Grande Below Caballo Dam Stream Gage, Which Is Operated and Maintained by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation). Furthermore, the Index Obligation Will Be Adjusted to Account for Any Estimated Change, Since the D2 Period, in Open Water Evaporation and Riparian Evapotranspiration Between the Rio Grande Below Caballo Dam Stream Gage and the El Paso Gage Using the Following Equation (Equation 2): Equation 2 a [Y] = 47,137 · (1.0 – (Eto [Y] / Eto [D2])) · (67/155) Where, • 47,137 Is the Average Open Water Evaporation and Riparian Evapotranspiration During the D2 Period, in Acrefeet. • a [Y] Is the Calculated Aridity Adjustment to the Index Obligation for Each Calendar Year in Acre-Feet. • Eto [Y] Is the Fve-Year Running Average of Annual Calendar Year Reference Evapotranspiration (Eto) for the Fveyear Period Ending in Year [Y] in Inches Per Year, Computed Using the Original Blaney-Criddle Method and Climate Data (See Section 6) From the Leyendecker Ii PSRC Weather Station, Located at the New Mexico State University Leyendecker Plant Science Research Center. If Climate Data From Leyendecker Ii PSRC Weather Station Is Unavailable, the Best Available Data Should Be Used. • Eto [D2] Is the Average Annual Calendar Year Reference Evapotranspiration (Eto) Over the D2 Period in Inches Per Year, Computed Using the Original Blaney-Criddle Method, Equal to 53.0 Inches Per Year. • 67/155 Is the Adjustment Factor That Represents the Texas Portion of the Aridity Adjustment. Page Proof Pending Publication 360 Texas v. New Mexico Appendix 1 to Decree • [Y] Indicates the Year (E. G., Eto [1970] Refers to Annual Reference Evapotranspiration in 1970). the Calculated Annual Open Water Evaporation and Riparian Evapotranspiration Adjustment Value (A[Y]), Whether Negative or Positive, Will Be Added to the Index Obligation. a One-Inch Difference in the Eto [Y] As Compared to the Eto [D2] Represents an Adjustment of About 384 Acre-Feet Per Year. Section 3: Index Delivery 3.1 Defnition and Calculation of the Index Delivery the Index Delivery Is the Sum of: • the Annual Streamfow at the El Paso Gage, After Subtracting Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre and Excess Flow; and • the Estimated Depletion of Index Supply Caused by Groundwater and Surface Water Use in the Texas Mesilla. the Following Equation (Equation 3) Will Be Used to Compute the Index Delivery, in Units of Acre-Feet, Following the End of Each Calendar Year: Equation 3 Index Delivery [Y] = Streamfow at the El Paso Gage + Texas Mesilla Agricultural Depletions [Y] + Texas Mesilla Dcmi Depletions [Y] - Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre [Y] - Excess Flow [Y] Where, • Streamfow at the El Paso Gage As Described in Section 3.2. • Texas Mesilla Agricultural Depletions As Described in Section 3.3. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 361 Appendix 1 to Decree • Texas Mesilla Dcmi Depletions As Described in Section 3.4. • Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre As Described in Section 3.5. 3.2 Excess Flow As Described in Section 3.6. Streamfow at the El Paso Gage the Annual Calendar Year Streamfow at the El Paso Gage Component of Equation 3 Will Be Based on the Offcial Daily Fow Record for the El Paso Gage, in Units of Acre-Feet. the El Paso Gage Is Operated and Maintained by the U. S. Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission (Us-Ibwc) and the Offcial Record of Daily Fow Is Maintained by Us-Ibwc. 3.3 Texas Mesilla Agricultural Depletions the Texas Mesilla Agricultural Depletions Component of the Index Delivery Represents the Annual Calendar Year Volume of Rio Grande Water Depleted (Consumed) by Irrigation Use of Groundwater and Surface Water in the Texas Mesilla, As Shown in the Inset of Appendix 2, or in Texas East of the Boundary of the Texas Mesilla Supplied by Groundwater From Hydrologically Connected Aquifers, in Units of Acre-Feet. the Following Equation (Equation 4) Will Be Used to Compute Texas Mesilla Agricultural Depletions: Equation 4 Texas Mesilla Agricultural Depletions [Y] = Acres [Y] · Cir[Y] Where, • Acres Is the Total Irrigated Area in the Texas Mesilla in a Given Year, Including Acreage Irrigated for Crop Production As Well As Non-Crop Irrigated Acreage (E. G., Lawns, Parks, Golf Courses, etc.), in Units of Acres. • Cir Is the Average Consumptive Use of Irrigation Water Per Acre for the Texas Mesilla, Equal to 2.8 Acre-Feet Per Page Proof Pending Publication 362 Texas v. New Mexico Appendix 1 to Decree Acre Per Year (Subject to Periodic Review Under the Technical Review Terms in Section 8). • [Y] Indicates the Year (E. G., Acres [1970] Refers to the Total Irrigated Acreage in the Texas Mesilla for 1970). the Annual Irrigated Acreage in the Texas Mesilla Will Be Determined Based on the Sum of the Acreage Inside and Outside of the Texas District Boundary. • Texas Will Provide the Annual Irrigated Acreage in the Texas Mesilla for Use in Calculating the Index Delivery, Including Documentation of the Data and Methods Used to Determine Irrigated Acreages. 3.4 Texas Mesilla Dcmi Depletions the Texas Mesilla Dcmi Depletions Component of the Index Delivery Represents Depletions to the Rio Grande Above the El Paso Gage Caused by Groundwater Pumping in the Texas Mesilla As Shown in the Inset of Appendix 2, or in Texas East of the Boundary of the Texas Mesilla From Hydrologically Connected Aquifers, for Dcmi Uses in a Calendar Year. There Are No Surface Water Diversions for Dcmi Use in the Texas Mesilla. If Surface Water Diversions Are Constructed in the Future, Then the Texas Mesilla Dcmi Depletions Calculation Will Be Reviewed Pursuant to Section 8. Texas Mesilla Dcmi Depletions Include: • Depletions Caused by Groundwater Pumping From the City of El Paso'S Canutillo Well Field (Tx Mesilla Dcmi Cwf). • Depletions Caused by Groundwater Pumping From All Other Dcmi Wells in the Texas Mesilla, Including Municipalities, Self-Supplied Domestics, Mutual Domestics, Schools, Commercial Businesses, Industrial Facilities, and Any Other Non-Agricultural Uses (Tx Mesilla Dcmi Other). the Sum of the Following Two Equations (Equation 5 and Equation 6) Will Be Used to Compute Total Texas Mesilla Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 363 Appendix 1 to Decree Dcmi Depletions6, As Presented in Equation 7, in Units of Acre-Feet: Equation 5 TX Mesilla Dcmi CWF [Y] = (Pcwf [Y] · Fd) Where, • PCWF [Y] Is the Total (Gross) Volume of Water Pumped From All Wells in the Canutillo Well Field During a Given Calendar Year, in Acre-Feet. • FD Is a Depletion Factor That Represents the Fraction of Total (Gross) Pumping That Depletes the Rio Grande and Project Conveyances, Equal to 0.95. • [Y] Indicates the Year (E. G., PCWF [1970] Refers to the Volume of Groundwater Pumped in 1970). Equation 6 TX Mesilla Dcmi Other [Y] = (Pother [Y] · Fd) - (Pother [Y] · Fr) Where, • Pother [Y] Is the Total (Gross) Volume of Water Pumped From All Dcmi Wells in the Texas Mesilla, Excluding Wells in the Canutillo Well Field, in a Given Calendar Year, in Acre-Feet. • FD Is a Depletion Factor That Represents the Fraction of Total (Gross) Pumping That Depletes the Rio Grande and Project Conveyances, Equal to 0.95. • FR Is a Return Fow Factor That Represents the Fraction of Total (Gross) Pumping for by Dcmi Wells in the Texas Mesilla, Excluding Wells in the Canutillo Well Field, Which Returns to the Rio Grande Above the El Paso Gage in the Texas Mesilla, Equal to 0.33. • [Y] Indicates the Year (E. G., Pother [1970] Refers to the Volume of Groundwater Pumping in 1970). 6 Canutillo Return Fows Associated With El Paso'S Wastewater Treatement Plants Are Not Included in the Calculation, As the Wastewater Discharge Returns to the Rio Grande Below the El Paso Gage. Page Proof Pending Publication 364 Texas v. New Mexico Appendix 1 to Decree Equation 7 TX Mesilla Dcmi Depletions [Y] = Texas Mesilla Dcmi CWF [Y] + TX Mesilla Dcmi Other [Y] Data Required to Calculate the Texas Mesilla Dcmi Depletions Portion of the Index Delivery Will Be Obtained As Follows: • Pumping From the Canutillo Well Field Is Metered and Will Be Obtained by Texas From El Paso Water (The Municipal Water Utility for the City of El Paso). • Pumping From Other Dcmi Wells in the Texas Mesilla (I. E., Dcmi Wells Outside of Canutillo Well Field) Is Either Not Metered or, If Metered, Records Are Generally Not Available. Pumping From These Wells Is Currently Estimated at 2,611 Acre-Feet Per Calendar Year Based on an Average of 2007-2016 Records and Estimates. Texas Will Provide the Estimated Annual Pumping Each Calendar Year and Document the Methods Used to Develop the Estimate. 3.5 Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre the Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre Component of the Index Delivery Represents the Annual Calendar Year Volume of Rio Grande Water Delivered by the United States to Mexico Pursuant to the Convention of 1906. Deliveries to Mexico Are Included Within the Fows Measured at the El Paso Gage and Are Therefore Subtracted From the Index Delivery Calculation in Equation 3. the Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre Will Be Based on the Offcial Daily Fow Record of Deliveries to Mexico As Determined by Us-Ibwc, in Units of Acre-Feet. 3.6 Excess Flow the Excess Flow Component of the Index Delivery Represents a Portion of the Annual Volume of Streamfow During Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 365 Appendix 1 to Decree the Calendar Year, in Acre-Feet, at the El Paso Gage, Which, Like the Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre, Is Subtracted From the Index Delivery Calculation in Equation 3. It Represents Water That Cannot Be Put to Benefcial Use in Texas. Excess Flow Is Determined Based on Three Criteria: • Operational Capacity Criteria As Further Described in Section 3.6.1 • Excess Release Criteria As Further Described in Section 3.6.2 • Extraordinary Circumstances Criteria As Further Described in Section 3.6.3 Any Rio Grande Water That Is Put to Benefcial Use in Texas Upstream of FT. Quitman, Texas, Is Not Considered Excess Flow. Compact Spills, Whether Actual or Hypothetical, Are Determined by the Rio Grande Compact Commission (Rgcc) and Are Not Controlled by the Determination of Excess Flow. 3.6.1 Operational Capacity Criteria the Operational Capacity Criteria for Excess Flow Quantifes Streamfow at the El Paso Gage, Excluding Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre, That Cannot Be Diverted and Used in Texas Due to the Operational Capacity of the American Canal and the Texas District Distribution System in the El Paso Valley, Which Is Currently Approximately 1,000 Cubic Feet Per Second (Cfs). the Annual Volume, in Acre-Feet, of Excess Flow Based on This Criterion Is Computed Using Equation 8 and Equation 9. Equation 8 Excess Flow [Y] = Sum [Qexcess [D] · (60 · 60 · 24 / 43560)] Where, • Excess Flow [Y] Is the Annual Volume of Excess Fow in Acre-Feet for a Given Calendar Year [Y]. Page Proof Pending Publication 366 Texas v. New Mexico Appendix 1 to Decree • Qexcess [D] Is the Excess Flow in Cubic Feet Per Second (Cfs) on a Given Day [D], As Determined by Equation 9. Equation 9 If: Qrgep [D] – QMX > 1,000 CFS Then: Qexcess [D] = (Qrgep [D] – QMX [D]) – 1,000 Otherwise: Qexcess [D] = 0.0 Where, • Qrgep [D] Is the Daily Average Fow Rate of Streamfow at the El Paso Gage in Cubic Feet Per Second on a Given Day [D]. • QMX [D] Is the Daily Average Fow Rate of Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre in Cubic Feet Per Second on a Given Day [D]. 3.6.2 Excess Release Criteria the Excess Release Criteria for Excess Flow Quantifes Streamfow at the El Paso Gage, Excluding Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre, Resulting From an Excess Release From Caballo Dam, and Which Is Not Put to Benefcial Use in Texas. These Criteria May Apply to Fows Less Than the Operational Capacity Criteria of 1,000 CFS. Excess Releases From Caballo Dam Consist of Water Released for Food Control Purposes, As Necessary to Accommodate Operations and Maintenance Activities, or for Purposes Other Than to Meet Water Orders by the Irrigation District in New Mexico, the Irrigation District in Texas, and Mexico. in the Event of an Excess Release From Caballo Dam, Available Data and Information Will Be Used to Determine the Timing, Duration, and Volume of Excess Flow Resulting From Any Excess Release7. Available Data and Information May Include But Are Not Limited to: Discussion With Staff From Reclama7 in the Case That These Criteria Result in an Adjustment to the Index Delivery in Any Given Calendar Year, the Caballo Release From That Year Must Be Adjusted Accordingly. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 367 Appendix 1 to Decree Tion, the New Mexico District, the Texas District, and Us-Ibwc; Incident Reports; Emergency Declarations; Project Water Orders; and Metered or Estimated Fows in the Us-Ibwc, the Texas District, or Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclamation District Distribution Systems. Available Data and Information May Differ Between Occurrences of Excess Releases. the Excess Release Criteria for Excess Flow Will Be Determined by the RGCC Upon Recommendation of the Engineer Advisers of Colorado, New Mexico and Texas. 3.6.3 Extraordinary Circumstances Criteria the Extraordinary Circumstances Criteria for Excess Flow Will Be Determined by the RGCC Upon Recommendation of the Engineer Advisers of Colorado, New Mexico and Texas. Extraordinary Circumstances May Occur, for Example, If Rio Grande Water Quality Above the American Dam Were Hazardous. Available Data, Information, and Methods Will Be Used to Determine the Occurrence of Extraordinary Circumstances and to Quantify the Timing, Duration, and Quantity of Excess Flow Resulting From Such Circumstances. Available Data and Information May Differ Between Occurrences of Extraordinary Circumstances. Section 4: Annual Index Departure 4.1 Definition and Calculation of the Annual Index Departure the Annual Index Departure Is Calculated Annually, on a Calendar Year Basis, by Subtracting the Index Obligation From the Index Delivery. the Calculation May Result in an: • Annual Negative Departure (Under-Delivery), When Index Delivery < Index Obligation • Annual Positive Departure (Over-Delivery), When Index Delivery > Index Obligation the Annual Index Departure Is Subject to the Provisions Described in Sections 4.2 Through 4.4. Page Proof Pending Publication 368 Texas v. New Mexico Appendix 1 to Decree 4.2 Cap on Annual Positive Departures an Annual Positive Departure in Excess of 67,500 Acre-Feet Shall Be Treated As the Equivalent of 67,500 Acre-Feet for the Purposes of Calculating the Accrued Index Departure8. 4.3 Cap on Annual Negative Departures an Annual Negative Departure in Excess of 112,500 Acrefeet During the FRST Full Fve Calendar Years Following Entry of the Consent Decree Shall Be Treated As the Equivalent of 112,500 Acre-Feet for the Purposes of Calculating the Accrued Index Departure. an Annual Negative Departure in Excess of 90,000 Acrefeet Beginning the Sixth Full Calendar Year After Entry of the Consent Decree Shall Be Treated As the Equivalent of 90,000 Acre-Feet for the Purposes of Calculating Accrued Index Departure. 4.4 Suspension of Annual Index Departures in Any Year in Which the Caballo Release Is Less Than 200,000 Acre-Feet, the Annual Index Departure Will Be Set to Zero Acre-Feet for the Purposes of Calculating the Accrued Index Departure. in Any Year in Which the Rio Grande Compact Commission Determines That There Is an Actual or Hypothetical Spill Under the Compact the Annual Index Departure Will Be Set to Zero Acre-Feet and All Accrued Index Departures Will Be Extinguished As Described Below in Section 5.2. Section 5: Accrued Index Departure 5.1 Definition and Calculation of the Accrued Index Departure the Accrued Index Departure Is Calculated Annually, on a Calendar Year Basis, As a Running Sum the Annual Index Departures. the Calculation May Result in an: • Accrued Negative Departure (Representing an Accrued Net Under-Delivery by New Mexico Through Time). 8 Defned in Section 5 Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 369 Appendix 1 to Decree • Accrued Positive Index Departure (Representing an Accrued Net Over-Delivery by New Mexico Through Time). an Annual Negative Departure Will Be: • Used to Reduce an Accrued Positive Departure at the Beginning of the Calendar Year by the Amount of the Annual Negative Departure; or • Added to the Accrued Negative Departure at the Beginning of the Calendar Year by the Amount of the Annual Negative Departure. an Annual Positive Departure Will Be: • Used to Reduce an Accrued Negative Departure at the Beginning of the Calendar Year by the Amount of the Annual Positive Departure; or • Added to the Accrued Positive Departure at the Beginning of the Calendar Year by the Amount of the Annual Positive Departure. the Calculation of the Accrued Index Departure Is Subject to the Provisions Described in Sections 4 and 5. 5.2 Extinguishment of Accrued Index Departures in Any Year in Which the RGCC Determines That There Is an Actual or Hypothetical Spill Under the Compact, the Accrued Index Departure at the Beginning of That Year, Whether Positive (Accrued Over-Delivery) or Negative (Accrued Under-Delivery), Will Be Extinguished. Additionally, As Described in Section 4.4, the Annual Index Departure Will Also Be Set to Zero for That Year. Therefore, the Accrued Index Departure at the End of the Year in Which the Spill Occurs Will Be Equal to Zero Acre-Feet. 5.3 Cancellation of Accrued Negative Departures for Texas District Carryover the Texas District'S Project Carryover Water for a Given Year Is the Part of the Texas District'S Total Allocation That Remains Unused at the End of the Calendar Year. Page Proof Pending Publication 370 Texas v. New Mexico Appendix 1 to Decree in Any Calendar Year in Which the Average of the Texas District'S Project Carryover Water for the Current Year and the Two Prior Years (Three-Year Lagged Moving Average), Is Greater Than 180,000 Acre-Feet, and the Accrued Index Departure at the End of the Current Year Is Negative, the Accrued Negative Departure at the End of the Current Year Will Be Extinguished. Therefore, the Accrued Index Departure for the Following Year Will Be Equal to Zero Plus the Annual Index Departure That Will Be Calculated During That Following Year. in Determining the Three-Year Rolling Average of the Texas District'S Project Carryover Water, the Current Year'S Allocation Transfer Amount (See Section 5.6) Will Be Subtracted in the Calculation of the Three-Year Rolling Average Project Carryover Water Balance If the Average of the Texas District'S Project Carryover Water for the Two Prior Years Exceeds 180,000 Acre-Feet. This Provision Is Intended to Prevent the Current Year'S Allocation Transfer From Causing an Exceedance of the 180,000 Acre-Feet Threshold. 5.4 Accrued Negative Departure Limits 5.4.1 Accrued Negative Departure Limits During the FRST Full Fve Calendar Years Following Entry of the Consent Decree, New Mexico May Have Accrued Negative Departures Up to, But Not in Excess of 150,000 Acre-Feet. Beginning the Sixth Full Calendar Year Following Entry of the Consent Decree, New Mexico May Have Accrued Negative Departures Up to, But Not in Excess of 120,000 Acre-Feet. These Limitations Are Known As the Accrued Negative Departure Limits. 5.4.2 Index Adjustments for Exceedances of the Accrued Negative Departure Limit If New Mexico Exceeds the Accrued Negative Departure Limit of 150,000/120,000 Acre-Feet in Three Consecutive Years, New Mexico Will Provide 12,000 Acre-Feet of Water in Excess of Its Index Obligation for Each Year That It Exceeds the Acpage Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 371 Appendix 1 to Decree Crued Negative Departure Limit. New Mexico Will Have Three Years to Provide the Full 36,000 Acre-Feet, Excluding Years in Which the Caballo Release Is Less Than 200,000 Acre-Feet. If New Mexico Exceeds the Accrued Negative Departure Limit of 150,000/120,000 Acre-Feet in Four or More Consecutive Years, New Mexico Will Provide 15,000 Acre-Feet of Water in Excess of Its Index Obligation for Each Additional Year Over the Four Years That It Exceeds the Accrued Negative Departure Limit. the 15,000 Acre-Feet in Excess of New Mexico'S Index Obligation Will Be Provided During the Year Immediately Following the Violation of the Accrued Negative Departure Limit, Excluding Years in Which the Caballo Release Is Less Than 200,000 Acre-Feet. the Additional Amounts Required Under These Exceedance Provisions Are Known As Index Adjustments. Index Adjustments Shall Be Accounted for Separately From Accrued Negative Departures. Provided New Mexico Meets Its Index Obligation, New Mexico Shall Classify Annual Positive Departures As Either Index Adjustments or Reduction in Accrued Negative Departures. 5.4.3 Impacts of the Texas District'S Project Carryover Water on Index Departure Limits If the Accrued Negative Departure Exceeds the Accrued Negative Departure Limit of 150,000/120,000 Acre-Feet, the Impact, If Any, of the Texas District'S Project Carryover Water on the Accrued Negative Departure Will Be Considered. Consideration of That Impact Will Include the Evaluation of the Difference Between the Index Obligation and the Index Delivery That Would Have Occurred If the Current Balance in the Texas District'S Project Carryover Water Account Had Been Released the Previous Year. When Determining Whether New Mexico Is in Violation of the Accrued Negative Departure Limit, or Whether the Addipage Proof Pending Publication 372 Texas v. New Mexico Appendix 1 to Decree Tional Index Adjustments for Exceedances of the Accrued Negative Departure Limit (See Section 5.4.2) Apply, the Impact of the Texas District'S Project Carryover Water Will Be Added to the Current Accrued Negative Departure, Thus Reducing the Apparent Accrued Negative Departure for That Year. This Apparent Accrued Negative Departure Will Then Be Used to Determine Only Whether New Mexico Is in Violation of the Accrued Negative Departure Limit for That Year and Whether Index Adjustments Should Apply. the Current Value of the Accrued Negative Departure Will Remain Unchanged. 5.5 End of 5Th Year Adjustment to Accrued Index Departures If There Is an Accrued Index Departure at the End of the FFTH Year Following the Entry of the Consent Decree, or If a Negative Trigger Is Reached Pursuant to Paragraph II.D.2 of the Consent Decree in the FRST Fve Years, the Accrued Index Departure (Positive or Negative), Will Be Reduced by the Amount of the Accrued Index Departure Up to, But Not to Exceed, 20,000 Acre-Feet or Until the Accounting for the Accrued Index Departure Refects Zero Acre-Feet. 5.6 Allocation Transfers 5.6.1 Defnition of Allocation Transfers Allocation Transfers Are Used to Move Current-Year Allocation From One District (Either Texas or New Mexico) to the Current-Year Allocation of Another District (Either Texas or New Mexico). Allocation Transfers From One District to the Other Will Immediately Reduce New Mexico'S Accrued Negative Departure or Texas'S Accrued Positive Departure by the Same Amount As the Allocation Transfer. More Specifcally: • If an Allocation Transfer Occurs From the Current-Year Allocation for the New Mexico District to the Currentyear Allocation for the Texas District, Then, Simultanepage Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 373 Appendix 1 to Decree Ously With the Transfer, the Accrued Negative Departure Will Be Reduced by an Amount Equal to the Transfer. • If an Allocation Transfer Occurs From the Current-Year Allocation for the Texas District to the Current-Year Allocation for the New Mexico District, Then, Simultaneously With the Transfer, the Accrued Positive Departure Will Be Reduced by an Amount Equal to the Transfer. 5.6.2 Accrued Positive Departure Trigger If There Is an Accrued Positive Departure That Exceeds 50,000 Acre-Feet for One Year (Also Known As the Accrued Positive Departure Trigger), the Texas District Will Provide Allocation Transfers to the New Mexico District, Equal in Total to the Amount of the Accrued Positive Departure That Is Greater Than 16,000 Acre-Feet, and Will Do So Over the Subsequent Three Calendar Years. 5.6.3 Accrued Negative Departure Trigger If There Is an Accrued Negative Departure That Exceeds 80,000 Acre-Feet at the End of Any Calendar Year (Also Known As the Accrued Negative Departure Trigger), New Mexico Will Take Water Management Actions to Reduce the Accrued Negative Departures to Less Than 16,000 Acre-Feet Within Six Calendar Years Following the Exceedance of the Accrued Negative Departure Trigger. These Management Actions Are Solely Within New Mexico'S Discretion and May Include Allocation Transfers. Section 6: Data for Eepi Calculations the Data Required for the Annual Eepi Calculations Shall Be Reported to the Engineer Advisers for the Compacting States Following the Compact Accounting Schedules in the “Schedule for Review and Approval of Rio Grande Compact Accounting Records for the Previous Year”. More Specifcally, the Following Data Will Be Required Annually, on a Calendar Year, for Eepi Calculations: Page Proof Pending Publication 374 Texas v. New Mexico Appendix 1 to Decree • Daily Offcial Stream Fow Data From the Rio Grande at El Paso, Texas, (Usgs 08364000). • Data Source: Us-Ibwc • Daily Offcial Fow Data From the Rio Grande Below Caballo Dam, New Mexico Stream Gage, (Usgs 08365000). • Data Source: Reclamation. • Offcial Daily Fow Records of Delivery to Mexico at the Acequia Madre. • Data Source: Us-Ibwc. • Pumping Records for the Canutillo Well Field, Texas. • Data Source: Texas. • Pumping Estimates for Any Other Dcmi Use in Texas Mesilla • Data Source: Texas • Irrigated Acreage Estimates Within the Texas Mesilla. • Data Source: Texas. • Temperature Data From the Leyendecker Ii PSRC Weather Station. • Data Source: New Mexico. • Annual Project Carryover Water for New Mexico District and Texas District • Data Source: Reclamation. Section 7: Consent Decree Accounting Provisions the Following List Includes the Accounting-Related Provisions in the Consent Decree: • Index Obligation, PG. 6, Paragraph Ii(B)(Ii)(E) • Index Delivery, PG. 7, Paragraph Ii(B)(Ii)(F) • Streamfow Gages, PG. 7, Paragraph Ii(B)(Ii)(G) • Annual Negative Departure, PG. 7, Paragraph Ii(B) (Iii)(A) • Annual Positive Departure, PG. 8, Paragraph Ii(B)(Iii)(B) Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 375 Appendix 1 to Decree • Accrued Index Departures, PG. 7, Paragraph Ii(B)(Iii)(A) and PG. 8, Paragraph Ii(B)(Iii)(B) • Allocation Transfers, PG. 8, Paragraph Ii(B)(Iii)(C) • Cap on Annual Positive Departures, PG. 9, Paragraph Ii(C)(2) • Cap on Annual Negative Departures (Frst 5 Years), PG. 9, Paragraph Ii(C)(3)(A)(Ii) • Cap on Annual Negative Departures (Starting Year 6), PG. 10, Paragraph Ii(C)(3)(A)(Iv) • Exceedances of Accrued Negative Departure Limits (3 Consecutive Years), PG. 10, Paragraph Ii(C)(3)(B)(I) • Exceedances of Accrued Negative Departure Limits (4 or More Consecutive Years), PG. 10, Paragraph Ii(C)(3)(B)(Ii) • Index Adjustments, PG. 10, Paragraph Ii(C)(3)(B)(I) and Paragraph Ii(C)(3)(B)(Ii) • Project Carryover Water, PG. 11, Paragraph Ii(C)(3)(C) • Caballo Release Less Than 200,000 Acre-Feet, PG. 12, Paragraph Ii(E)(1)(A) • Caballo Release Greater Than 790,000 Acre-Feet, PG. 12, Paragraph Ii(E)(1)(B) • End of 5Th Year Adjustment to Accrued Index Departure, PG. 12, Paragraph Ii(E)(2) • Aridity Adjustment, PG. 12, Paragraph Ii(E)(3) • Actual or Hypothetical Spill Under the Compact, PG. 12, Paragraph Ii(E)(4) • Index Accounting, PG. 13, Paragraph Ii(F)(2) Section 8: Review and Revision the Following Procedure Will Be Used to Review and Revise, If Needed, the Data Sources and Methods Used to Determine Inputs to the Calculation of the Eepi: Page Proof Pending Publication 376 Texas v. New Mexico Appendix 1 to Decree • Request for Review If Any Compacting State Identifes a Signifcant Error, Bias, Discrepancy, or Other Issue With the Data Sources And/Or Method Used to Determine Any Input to the Eepi, That Compact State May Request That the RGCC Initiate a Review of the Data Sources And/Or Method in Question. in Making a Request for Review, the Compacting State Making the Request Must Provide Documentation and Technical Evidence Substantiating the Suspected Error, Bias, Discrepancy, or Other Issues. • Evaluation of Request for Review the RGCC Will Evaluate the Request for Review and Supporting Documentation and Evidence. • Initiation of Review If the RGCC Determines That a Review Is Warranted, the RGCC Will Convene a Technical Committee to Conduct the Review. the RGCC Will Instruct the Technical Committee As to the Scope of the Review. • Technical Review the Technical Committee Will Carry Out the Review As Directed by the RGCC and Will Report Their Fndings to the RGCC. If the Technical Committee Recommends That the Data Sources And/Or Methods in Question Should Be Revised, the Technical Committee Will Recommend Appropriate Revisions. If Warranted, the Technical Committee May Recommend That Previously Approved Annual and Accrued Index Departures Be Corrected Retroactively; If Correction Is Recommended, the Technical Committee Will Identify a Specifed Period Over Which the Correction Is Recommended. If the Technical Committee Fails to Achieve Consensus Regarding Recommended Revisions or Corrections, the Opinion of Committee Members From Each Party Will Be Reported to the RGCC. Page Proof Pending Publication Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 377 Appendix 1 to Decree • Implementation of Revisions the RGCC Will Determine Whether to Accept and Implement Any Revisions or Corrections Recommended by the Technical Committee. Page Proof Pending Publication 378 Texas v. New Mexico Appendix 2 to Decree Appendix 2 Page Proof Pending Publication Location Map—Rio Grande Basin—Elephant Butte Reservoir to Fort Quitman Cite As: 608 U. S. 346 (2026) 379 Appendix 2 to Decree Appendix 2 Page Proof Pending Publication Inset of the Texas Portion of Mesilla Groundwater Basin (Texas Mesilla) Page Proof Pending Publication Reporter’S Note the Attached Has Been Revised to Refect the Usual Publication and Citation Style of the United States Reports. the Revised Pagination Makes Available the Offcial United States Reports Citation in Advance of Publication. Other Revisions May Include Adjustments to Formatting, Captions, Citation Form, and Any Errant Punctuation. the Following Additional Edits Were Made: None

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