Does the Sentencing Reform Act authorize a rule that automatically extends a defendant's term of supervised release when the defendant absconds? Specifically, does such abscondment "toll" the clock of a judicially ordered term of supervised release? This determines whether crimes committed after the original expiration date but before recapture can be treated as supervised release violations.

• The district court lacked authority to treat the January 2022 drug offense as a supervised release violation.
• The offense occurred after her pre-existing term of federal supervised release expired in June 2021.
• Abscondment does not automatically extend the term of supervised release beyond the court-ordered expiration date.

• Supervision requires "observation and direction" under 18 U. S. C. §§3601, 3603(2), (3), and 3624(e), meaning a defendant who absconds should receive no "credit" for that period.
• Common-law principles suggest that time spent on the run from prison does not count toward the discharge of a sentence.
• Precedents such as *Mont v. United States* and *Anderson v. Corall* support the idea that the clock should stop when a defendant is not actually under supervision.
• The warrant-or-summons requirement in 18 U. S. C. §3583(i) may leave courts powerless if probation officers do not realize a defendant is absent in time.

• The Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize a rule automatically extending a defendant’s term of supervised release when the defendant absconds.
• The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's "tolling" terminology, noting that the rule actually extends the period beyond what a judge ordered.
• Under 18 U. S. C. §3624(e) and §3583(b), the Act defines when release starts and sets maximum lengths, neither of which suggests an automatic extension rule.
• The Court noted that 18 U. S. C. §3583(e)(2) only allows extensions after a hearing, within statutory maximums, and before the term expires.
• The Court highlighted 18 U. S. C. §3583(i), which limits post-expiration revocation to "matters arising before its expiration" and only if a "warrant or summons has been issued" during the term.
• The Court identified 18 U. S. C. §3624(e) as the only "true tolling rule," which suspends the term only during imprisonment of 30 consecutive days or more.
• The Court distinguished the common-law rule for escaped prisoners, stating that unlike prisoners, absconding supervisees remain bound by release terms and can be punished under existing SRA tools.
• The Court declined to rewrite 18 U. S. C. §3583(i) to solve the government's policy concerns, stating that the Court is not free to rewrite directions provided by Congress.