Hunter v. United States
No. 24-1063 · Decided June 18, 2026 · Vacated and remanded
When is a defendant's agreement not to appeal a criminal sentence unenforceable? An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice, meaning it would leave in place an egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.
Vote & lineup8–1 on the judgment. Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson (8). Dissent(s): Thomas. Concurrence(s): Gorsuch (joined by Sotomayor, Jackson); Kavanaugh (joined by Alito, Barrett); Barrett.
The question
When is a defendant's agreement not to appeal a criminal sentence unenforceable? Does a district court's oral misstatement at sentencing regarding the right to appeal, combined with the government's silence, void a written appeal waiver? Should courts decline to enforce appeal waivers in cases where doing so would result in a "miscarriage of justice"?
Petitioner's argument
- An appeal waiver is unenforceable when the disputed aspect of a sentence violates a fundamental constitutional right.
- The District Court's statement at sentencing that the petitioner had a right to appeal, coupled with the prosecutor's failure to object, voided the written waiver.
- The mandatory-medication condition of supervised release infringed on a fundamental due process liberty interest in being free of unwanted mental health medication.
Respondent's argument
- Knowing and voluntary appeal waivers are always enforceable.
- The petitioner knowingly and voluntarily signed the waiver as part of a plea agreement.
- A sentencing court may demand that a defendant take medication when he has suffered from mental-health problems under 18 U. S. C. §3563(b)(9).
The decision
- An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a "miscarriage of justice," defined as an egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.
- The Court rejected the argument that the District Court's oral misstatement voided the waiver because the plea agreement specifically required any modifications to be in writing and signed by all parties.
- The Government did not waive or forfeit its right to enforce the waiver through silence at sentencing, as the proper time to assert that right is after a notice of appeal is filed, citing *Class v. United States*.
- The Court reasoned that because the judiciary approves and implements appeal waivers, it has an "independent" "institutional interest" in ensuring proceedings "appear fair," citing *Wheat v. United States*.
- The Court noted that some rules are "so fundamental" that waiving them could "irreparably [discredit] the federal courts," citing *United States v. Mezzanatto*.
- The "miscarriage of justice" standard is a "high bar" requiring an obvious error that undermines public confidence, rather than a standard-fare error in applying sentencing law.
- Examples of errors meeting this bar include sentences exceeding the statutory maximum, blatant constitutional errors (such as considering race or religion), or sentences imposed without "some minimum of civilized procedure."
- The Court declined to decide if the mandatory-medication condition specifically met this standard, remanding that determination to the Fifth Circuit.
Separate opinions
Gorsuch, concurring (joined by Sotomayor, Jackson)
- Argues that the "miscarriage of justice" standard should be informed by lower court precedents, such as *United States v. Boudreau*, to include sentences that are substantively unreasonable or lack rationality.
- Questions whether prospective waivers of statutory rights to appeal are valid, citing *Home Ins. Co. v. Morse* and *Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.*
Kavanaugh, concurring (joined by Alito, Barrett)
- Argues that Justice Gorsuch's interpretation of the "miscarriage of justice" exception sets a bar that is too low compared to the majority's "high bar."
Barrett, concurring
- Argues that the decision is based on "procedural common law" and longstanding waiver principles, such as those in *Johnson v. Zerbst* and *Shutte v. Thompson*, rather than the Court's inherent supervisory power.
Thomas, dissenting
- Argues that the right to appeal is a "mere statutory right" under 18 U. S. C. §3742(a) that should be strictly enforced when knowingly and voluntarily waived.
- Contends that the "miscarriage of justice" exception is based on policy concerns rather than a source of law, and that the Court is improperly exercising a non-existent "supervisory power."