Does the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) expressly preempt a state-law failure-to-warn tort claim alleging that a pesticide label should have included a cancer warning? Specifically, the Court must determine if such a claim imposes a labeling requirement "in addition to or different from" those required under federal law. The case involves whether the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) registration and approval of a label without a cancer warning constitutes a federal requirement that displaces state tort duties.

Petitioner sought to overturn the jury verdict by arguing that 7 U.S.C. §136v(b) expressly preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims. Petitioner contended that because the EPA approved Roundup's label without a cancer warning, federal law required the use of that specific label. Consequently, any state tort claim requiring an additional cancer warning would impose a requirement "in addition to or different from" the federal labeling obligations.

Respondent sought to maintain the jury award by arguing that a state failure-to-warn claim is equivalent to, rather than in addition to, FIFRA's misbranding prohibition. Respondent asserted that 7 U.S.C. §136a(f)(2) prevents the mere fact of registration from serving as a complete defense to claims that a label is inadequate. Respondent further claimed that the EPA's registration procedures may exceed its statutory authority and that adding a warning could be a "minor modification" not requiring prior agency approval.

The Court held that FIFRA expressly preempts the respondent's state-law failure-to-warn claim. The Court relied on the "Uniformity" clause of 7 U.S.C. §136v(b), which provides that a "State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter." Applying *Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC*, the Court noted that state tort duties constitute state labeling requirements. The Court reasoned that to register a pesticide, the EPA must determine that the label contains all warnings "necessary and . . . adequate to protect health and the environment" under §§136a(c)(5)(B) and 136(q)(1)(A), (G). Once the EPA approves a label, 40 CFR §§152.44(a) and 156.70(c) legally require manufacturers to use that label unless the EPA approves a change. Because the EPA approved Roundup's label without a cancer warning, federal law required petitioner to sell the product with that specific label. A state tort claim requiring a cancer warning thus imposes a requirement "in addition to" and "different from" these federal obligations. The Court further invoked *Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.*, finding that the preemption clause in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 is "nearly identical" to FIFRA's. Just as FDA premarket approval imposed "requirements" that preempted state safety claims in *Riegel*, the Court concluded that EPA registration and label approval impose federal requirements. Therefore, the state-law requirement to add a cancer warning is expressly preempted to maintain the nationwide uniformity of pesticide labeling.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Gorsuch, argued that the claim is not preempted because it parallels FIFRA's misbranding prohibition. The dissent relied on 7 U.S.C. §136a(f)(2), which states that registration is only "prima facie" evidence of compliance and shall not be "construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter." Justice Jackson contended that the majority's reliance on *Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.* was misplaced because the Medical Device Amendments lack a provision analogous to §136a(f)(2).