Does the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) expressly preempt a state-law failure-to-warn tort claim? Specifically, does the act preempt a claim alleging that a pesticide label should have included a cancer warning when the EPA approved the label without one? The Court must determine if such a state-law requirement is "in addition to or different from" federal labeling requirements.

• FIFRA's "Uniformity" clause, 7 U.S.C. §136v(b), prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements "in addition to or different from" federal requirements.
• The EPA approved Roundup's label without a cancer warning, and federal law requires Monsanto to use that specific label.
• A state-law failure-to-warn claim effectively mandates a cancer warning, which contradicts the federal requirement to use the EPA-approved label.
• Under *Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.*, federal premarket approval of safety labels preempts contrary state-law safety requirements.

• A Missouri failure-to-warn claim is equivalent to FIFRA's own misbranding prohibition, which requires "adequate" warnings to protect health.
• Under 7 U.S.C. §136a(f)(2), registration is only "prima facie" evidence of compliance and cannot be used as a defense for offenses.
• The EPA's registration process does not create a binding "requirement" that prevents the addition of necessary safety warnings.
• Adding a cancer warning could be considered a "minor modification" under 40 CFR §152.46 that does not require prior EPA approval.

• The Court held that FIFRA expressly preempts the respondent's state-law failure-to-warn claim.
• The Court applied the "Uniformity" clause of 7 U.S.C. §136v(b), which prevents states from imposing labeling requirements "in addition to or different from" those required under FIFRA.
• The Court reasoned that EPA's registration process requires a determination that labels contain all warnings "necessary and... adequate to protect health and the environment" and are not "false or misleading" under 7 U.S.C. §§136a(c)(5)(B) and 136(q)(1)(A), (G).
• Once EPA approves a label, manufacturers are legally required to use it under 40 CFR §§152.44(a) and 156.70(c), and failure to do so can lead to penalties under 7 U.S.C. §§136j(a)(1)(E) and 136l.
• Relying on *Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC*, the Court noted that state tort duties constitute state labeling requirements.
• The Court invoked *Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.*, finding that FDA premarket approval of medical devices—which is nearly identical to EPA's pesticide registration—preempts state-law claims based on additional safety requirements.
• The Court rejected the argument that 7 U.S.C. §136a(f)(2) applies here, stating that the provision bars registration as a defense to EPA enforcement actions, not state tort suits.
• The Court concluded that because federal law requires the use of the EPA-approved label (which lacks a cancer warning), a state claim requiring such a warning is "in addition to" and "different from" federal obligations.