Does the government's prosecution of an individual under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) for being an "unlawful user" of a controlled substance violate the Second Amendment? Specifically, is the automatic ban on firearm possession for regular marijuana users consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation? This case asks whether the application of this statute to respondent Ali Hemani is constitutional.

• The "unlawful user" provision of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) is consistent with the historical tradition of regulating "habitual drunkards."
• Historical vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws are "relevantly similar" to the modern statute because they targeted individuals who regularly used intoxicants.
• These historical regulations served the same purpose as §922(g)(3): protecting the public from "unusually dangerous" individuals prone to committing violent crimes.
• The modern statute operates similarly to historical laws by temporarily disarming individuals to ensure public safety.

• The government's effort to enforce 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) against him violates the Second Amendment.
• The statute's automatic ban on firearm possession for unlawful drug users is not consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.
• Not stated.
• Not stated.

• The Court held that the government's prosecution of respondent under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.
• Applying the test from *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*, the Court found that the conduct is presumptively protected, shifting the burden to the government to show the regulation is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.
• The Court rejected the government's analogy to "habitual drunkard" laws, finding they differ in both "why" (purpose) and "how" (operation).
• Regarding purpose, the Court noted that historical laws targeted those "practically incapacitated and incapable of managing their affairs" (*In re Tracy*; *Ark. Rev. Stat., ch. 78, §1*; *Minn. Terr. Rev. Stat., ch. 67, §12*), whereas §922(g)(3) automatically disarms any regular user regardless of incapacitation.
• The Court found that historical vagrancy laws sought to promote productivity (*Quigley*), civil-commitment laws protected families from financial ruin (*1827 Mich. Terr. Laws*), and surety laws protected against "scandals" (*5 N. Dane*), rather than protecting the public from "unusually dangerous" violent criminals.
• Regarding operation, the Court observed that historical laws required pre-deprivation process (such as convictions or probate proceedings), while §922(g)(3) divests the right to bear arms automatically without such process.
• The Court doubted that §922(g)(3) even serves the government's claimed purpose of disarming dangerous persons, noting that the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §801(2)) focuses on "health and general welfare" and that the government's own rescheduling of marijuana contradicts the claim that such users are "categorically and unusually dangerous."
• The Court emphasized that granting the government broad power to designate any group as dangerous would risk "quickly swallow[ing]" the Second Amendment (*Kanter v. Barr*).