Montgomery v. Caribe Transport Ii, LLC, et al.
No. 24-1238 · Decided May 14, 2026 · reversed and remanded
Does the safety exception of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) permit negligent-hiring claims against brokers who coordinate shipments in the transportation industry? A claim that a broker negligently hired a motor carrier to transport goods is not preempted by the FAAAA because it falls within the safety regulatory authority of a State "with respect to motor vehicles" under 49 U. S. C. §14501(c)(2)(A).
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR · Argued March 4, 2026
Parties — Petitioner: MONTGOMERY · Respondent: CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC, ET AL.
Vote & lineup9–0 (unanimous) on the judgment. Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court (9). Concurrence(s): Kavanaugh (joined by Alito).
Who prevailed — The petitioner, Shawn Montgomery, prevailed on the issue of whether his negligent-hiring claim against C.H. Robinson was preempted by the FAAAA.
The question

Does the safety exception of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) permit negligent-hiring claims against brokers who coordinate shipments in the transportation industry? Specifically, the Court must determine if such claims fall within the scope of state safety regulatory authority "with respect to motor vehicles." The case asks whether the FAAAA's preemption of state laws related to the "price, route, or service" of brokers is overridden by the Act's safety exception.

Petitioner's argument
  • The negligent-hiring claim is saved from preemption by the FAAAA's safety exception.
  • State common-law duties and standards of care constitute a form of state authority to regulate safety.
  • A claim regarding the negligent selection of a motor carrier "concerns" motor vehicles and thus falls under the safety exception.
Respondent's argument
  • Interpreting the safety exception to cover brokers would "swallow" the FAAAA's express preemption provision.
  • Such an interpretation creates surplusage regarding other statutory carveouts for route controls and vehicle weight.
  • It creates a legal anomaly because subsection (b) of the FAAAA preempts state regulation of brokers' intrastate services without providing a safety exception.
The decision
  • The Court held that a claim that one company negligently hired another to transport goods is not preempted by the FAAAA.
  • The Court relied on the safety exception in 49 U. S. C. §14501(c)(2)(A), which states that preemption "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles."
  • The Court noted that common-law duties and standards of care are part of a State's authority to regulate safety, citing *Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.*
  • To define the phrase "with respect to," the Court used the ordinary meaning of "concerns," following its previous interpretation of the same phrase in *Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey*.
  • The Court applied the definition of "motor vehicle" found in 49 U. S. C. §13102(16) as a vehicle "used on a highway in transportation."
  • The Court reasoned that requiring a broker to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier "concerns" the trucks used for transport, thus placing the claim within the safety exception.
  • The Court rejected the "surplusage" argument, noting that route controls may be based on factors other than safety, such as highway wear and tear.
  • The Court concluded that the text of §14501(c)(2)(A) controls even if it creates an anomaly with the intrastate preemption rules of 49 U. S. C. §14501(b)(1).
Separate opinions
Kavanaugh, concurring (joined by Alito)
  • Argues that while the case is close due to the "elastic" nature of phrases like "with respect to" (citing *United States v. Miller* and *Dubin v. United States*), the overall structure of the FAAAA suggests it pursued economic, not safety, deregulation.
  • Notes that the lack of meaningful federal safety regulation for brokers' selection of carriers suggests Congress did not intend to create a "black hole" of safety liability.
  • Discusses the tension between the insurance mandates of 49 U. S. C. §§13906(a)(1), (b)(2)(A) and the permitted tort suits.