The Court addresses whether federal election-day statutes prevent a state from counting absentee ballots received after election day. Specifically, it considers if Mississippi's law allowing ballots postmarked by election day to be received up to five days later is preempted by federal law. The central issue is whether the term "election" in federal statutes encompasses both the casting and the receipt of ballots.

Petitioner, the Mississippi Secretary of State, sought to uphold the state's practice of counting absentee ballots received up to five days after the election. Petitioner argued that the federal election-day statutes regulate the timing of the vote casting rather than the deadline for ballot receipt. Petitioner further contended that the authority to set receipt deadlines remains with the states under the Constitution's Elections Clause and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA).

Respondents, including the Republican National Committee, sought to invalidate Mississippi's law as being preempted by federal law. They argued that the word "election" refers to both ballot casting and ballot receipt, meaning federal law sets a nationwide deadline for both. Respondents relied on 19th-century historical practices and the definition of "election" in *Foster v. Love* to claim that ballots must be received by election day.

The Court held that the federal election-day statutes do not prevent Mississippi from counting absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up to five days later. The Court reasoned that the defining element of an "election" is the electorate’s choice of candidate, which occurs when voting is complete rather than when ballots are received. Relying on a "fundamental canon of statutory construction," the Court used dictionaries such as *N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language* to define "election" as "[t]he act of choosing a person to fill an office." The Court cited *United States v. Classic* to emphasize that an election is "no more and no less than the expression by qualified electors of their choice of candidates." The Court noted that 3 U. S. C. §21(1) defines "election day" with reference to "voting," indicating that voting is the act governed by the statute. The Court further invoked the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), specifically 52 U. S. C. §20303(b)(3), which references "the deadline for receipt of [that] ballot under State law." This reference to state-law deadlines suggests that federal law does not establish a nationwide ballot-receipt deadline. The Court also pointed to Art. II, §1, cl. 4 of the Constitution, which requires a uniform day for electors to "give their Votes" but is silent on the day for receipt. Regarding *Foster v. Love*, the Court found the case irrelevant to ballot receipt because it only held that an election "may not be consummated prior to federal election day." Finally, the Court rejected policy arguments regarding election integrity, citing *SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu* to state that such concerns are for legislatures, not courts.

Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch (and Justice Kavanaugh in part), argued that an election is not authoritatively expressed until the collection of ballots is completed. The dissent relied on 19th-century legal dictionaries and the Montana case *Maddox v. Board of State Canvassers* to assert that "election" encompasses both casting and receiving ballots. Justice Alito further contended that the majority's ruling creates risks of voter fraud and undermines public confidence in election integrity.