Does the practice of counting absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up to five days later violate federal election-day statutes? Specifically, the Court must determine if the federal statutes setting the day for elections of Representatives, Senators, and the President require ballots to be received by that day. The case focuses on whether Mississippi's law allowing a post-election receipt window is preempted by federal law.

• The federal election-day statutes regulate the timing of the election—the act of voting—rather than the deadline for ballot receipt.
• The ordinary meaning of "election" is the act of choosing a candidate, which occurs when the voter casts the ballot.
• Federal law, specifically the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), presupposes that states retain the authority to set their own ballot-receipt deadlines.
• The U.S. Constitution's requirement for a uniform day for electors to give their votes does not mandate a uniform day for the receipt of those votes.

• The federal election-day statutes use the word "election" to refer to both the casting and the receipt of ballots, meaning both must occur by election day.
• Historical practice, particularly during the Civil War, shows that states requiring absentee voting imposed strict election-day deadlines for ballot receipt.
• The definition of "election" in *Foster v. Love* as the "combined actions of voters and officials" implies that receipt is a necessary component of the election process.
• Allowing post-election-day receipt threatens election integrity and increases the risk of fraud.

• The Court held that federal election-day statutes (3 U.S.C. §1, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7) do not prevent states from counting absentee ballots received after election day.
• Applying the "fundamental canon of statutory construction" from *New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira*, the Court found the ordinary meaning of "election" at the time of enactment was "[t]he act of choosing a person to fill an office" (Webster 1869).
• The Court relied on *United States v. Classic* to define an election as the "expression by qualified electors of their choice of candidates," which occurs when voting is complete, not when ballots are received.
• The Court noted that 3 U.S.C. §21(1) defines "election day" with reference to "voting," indicating that voting is the act governed by the statute.
• The Court found that the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), specifically 52 U.S.C. §20303(b)(3), confirms that state law—not federal law—governs the deadline for ballot receipt.
• The Court reasoned that Art. II, §1, cl. 4 of the Constitution requires a uniform day for electors to "give their Votes" but is silent on the day of receipt, envisioning a system where receipt is divorced from voting.
• The Court rejected the reliance on 19th-century historical practices, citing *United States v. Rahimi* to argue that statutes do not "tra[p] in amber" every contemporary practice.
• The Court clarified that *Foster v. Love* only prohibits an election from being "consummated prior to federal election day" and does not mandate a receipt deadline.