Does an Internet service provider incur contributory copyright liability under the Copyright Act by continuing to provide service to subscribers whose IP addresses are known to be associated with infringement? Specifically, is mere knowledge that a service will be used to infringe sufficient to establish the requisite intent for contributory liability? Furthermore, does the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor imply that providers are otherwise liable for serving known infringers?

• They did not induce infringement; instead, they actively discouraged it by sending warnings, suspending services, and terminating accounts.
• Internet access is a general-purpose service that is clearly "capable of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ noninfringing uses."
• Mere knowledge that some users might infringe is insufficient to establish the intent required for contributory liability under Supreme Court precedent.
• Their warning and suspension system was effective, ending 98% of identified infringement.

• Cox contributed to infringement by continuing to provide Internet service to subscribers whose IP addresses Cox knew were associated with infringement.
• The DMCA safe harbor—which requires the termination of "repeated infringers" under 17 U.S.C. §512(i)(1)(A)—would be meaningless if ISPs were not otherwise liable for serving known infringers.
• Cox's failure to act effectively, evidenced by terminating only 32 subscribers despite receiving 163,148 notices, demonstrates willful infringement.

• The Court held that a service provider is contributorily liable for a user's infringement only if it intended that the provided service be used for infringement.
• Intent can be shown only if the party affirmatively induced the infringement or if the provided service is tailored to that infringement, following *Metro-Goldwyn-Myeong Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.* and *Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*.
• Inducement occurs if a provider "actively encourages infringement through specific acts," such as the promotion and marketing of software as a tool to infringe seen in *Grokster*.
• A service is tailored to infringement if it is "not capable of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ noninfringing uses," a test derived from *Sony*.
• The Court emphasized that "mere knowledge that a service will be used to infringe is insufficient" to establish intent, citing *Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers*, *Sony*, and *Grokster*.
• Cox did not induce infringement because it did not promote it and instead discouraged it through warnings and terminations; similarly, general Internet access is capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
• The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's holding that "supplying a product with knowledge that the recipient will use it to infringe copyrights" is sufficient for contributory infringement.
• Regarding the DMCA, the Court noted that 17 U.S.C. §512(l) specifies that failure to comply with safe-harbor rules "shall not bear adversely upon . . . a defense by the service provider that the service provider’s conduct is not infringing."