The Court addresses whether schools may determine eligibility for women’s and girls’ sports teams based on biological sex. This inquiry is analyzed under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Court considers if states may maintain these teams exclusively for biological females.

Petitioners seek to uphold state laws that prohibit biological males from participating on female sports teams. They argue that limiting these teams to biological females is necessary to promote equal athletic opportunities for women and girls. They contend that such restrictions are justified by the important government interests of athlete safety and competitive fairness.

Respondents seek to participate in girls' and women's sports teams despite being biological males. B. P. J. argues that Title IX requires schools to make exceptions for biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones. Respondents further contend that the biological-sex classification violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to those who have mitigated physical advantages through medical treatment.

The Court held that schools may maintain women’s and girls’ sports teams defined by biological sex. Under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §1681(a), the term “sex” refers to biological sex, as supported by the ordinary meaning at the time of enactment and *Frontiero v. Richardson*. The Court found that 34 CFR §§106.41(b) and (c) permissibly authorize separate teams based on biological sex to ensure "equal athletic opportunity." Such separations are "reasonable" under the Javits Amendment, §844, 88 Stat. 612, because they address inherent physical differences and safety risks. Regarding the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny, requiring that the classification be “substantially related” to an “important” government objective. Relying on *United States v. Skrmetti*, the Court identified safety and competitive fairness as important government interests. The Court concluded that limiting female sports to biological females is substantially related to these interests. It rejected the need for individual-by-individual comparisons, citing *Ward v. Rock Against Racism* to note that validity depends on the "overall problem" rather than individual cases. The Court further determined that the laws classify based on biological sex rather than gender identity, consistent with *Skrmetti*. Consequently, the Court reversed the lower court judgments, allowing West Virginia and Idaho to maintain biological-sex eligibility requirements.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued that the majority's approach ignores the need for a "right fit" under heightened scrutiny. Relying on *Caban v. Mohammed* and *United States v. Virginia*, the dissent contended that a categorical ban is an "extreme" approach of "complete exclusion" that may be overbroad. The dissent asserted that the Court should have allowed further fact-finding to determine if excluding transgender girls who never experienced male puberty actually furthers the State's interests.