West Virginia et al. v. B. P. J., by Her Next Friend and Mother, Heather Jackson
No. 24-43 · Decided June 30, 2026 · reversed and remanded
Whether schools may maintain women’s and girls’ sports teams for biological females under Title IX. Schools may maintain women’s and girls’ sports teams for biological females and determine eligibility based on biological sex under both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Vote & lineup6–3 on the judgment. Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Barrett (6). Dissent(s): Sotomayor (joined by Kagan, Jackson); Jackson. Concurrence(s): Thomas, Gorsuch.
The question
Whether schools may maintain women’s and girls’ sports teams for biological females under Title IX. Whether such a policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, may schools determine eligibility for female sports based on biological sex?
Petitioner's argument
- Prohibiting biological males from female sports is necessary to promote equal athletic opportunities for women and girls.
- Limiting female teams to biological females prevents serious physical injuries to female athletes, particularly in contact sports.
- Such limitations preserve competitive fairness because biological males possess inherent physical advantages in strength, speed, and endurance.
- The term "sex" in Title IX and related regulations refers to biological sex, not gender identity.
Respondent's argument
- Schools must make exceptions for biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones to mitigate physical advantages.
- A total ban on transgender girls is not "reasonable" under the Javits Amendment because it excludes individuals who do not possess inherent male advantages.
- The laws violate the Equal Protection Clause as applied to transgender athletes who are similarly situated to biological females.
- Title IX should be interpreted to prohibit discrimination based on gender identity, drawing on the reasoning in Bostock v. Clayton County.
The decision
- Title IX allows schools to provide separate sports teams defined by biological sex, as the term "sex" in 20 U.S.C. §1681(a), the Javits Amendment (§844, 88 Stat. 612), and 34 CFR §§106.41(b), (c) refers to biological sex.
- The Court relied on the ordinary meaning of "sex" at the time of enactment and cited Frontiero v. Richardson to note that sex is an "immutable characteristic."
- The Court found that separate teams are "reasonable" under the Javits Amendment because they address safety risks and competitive fairness arising from inherent physical differences between biological males and females.
- Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, sex-based classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny, requiring the classification to be "substantially related" to an "important" government objective.
- The Court held that safety and competitive fairness are important government interests, and limiting female sports to biological females is substantially related to those interests, citing United States v. Skrmetti and United States v. Virginia.
- The Court rejected the "as-applied" argument, stating that States are not required to conduct individual-by-individual comparisons of athletic capabilities to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, invoking Ward v. Rock Against Racism and Michael M. v. Superior Court.
- The Court determined that the laws classify based on biological sex rather than gender identity or transgender status, per United States v. Skrmetti, and thus satisfy either rational basis review or intermediate scrutiny.
- The Court noted that the Judiciary should be cautious in invalidating laws based on unsettled medical and scientific debates, citing United States v. Skrmetti and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.
Separate opinions
Thomas, concurring
- Argues transgender status is not a suspect class requiring heightened scrutiny because gender dysphoria is a mutable mental state, citing United States v. Skrmetti, Heller v. Doe, and Plyler v. Doe.
- Asserts that sex is a binary, immutable biological characteristic.
Gorsuch, concurring
- Argues Title IX is a Spending Clause exercise and that Congress did not "clearly and unambiguously" prohibit restricting teams to biological women, citing Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed. and Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic.
- Contends that Bostock v. Clayton County is consistent with the result because it addressed employment discrimination, not the legality of single-sex sports teams.
Sotomayor, concurring in part and dissenting in part (joined by Kagan, Jackson)
- Agrees that the Title IX claim fails but dissents on the Equal Protection claim, arguing the Court should have allowed factual development on whether certain transgender girls are similarly situated to cisgender girls.
- Relies on Caban v. Mohammed, Lehr v. Robertson, and United States v. Virginia to argue that categorical exclusions can be unconstitutional if they lack a proper fit for a discrete subclass.
Jackson, concurring in part and dissenting in part
- Joins SOTOMAYOR in full.
- Argues that "sex" in Title IX could be interpreted more broadly than biological sex to protect against gender stereotyping, citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed. and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.