Does the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) violate the First Amendment by restricting a political party’s spending on campaign activities in coordination with candidates? Specifically, the Court addresses whether the limits found in 52 U.S.C. §30116(d) are constitutional. The central issue is whether these limits are necessary to prevent the circumvention of base contribution limits through earmarked contributions.

Petitioners, including candidates and political party committees, seek to invalidate the coordinated-expenditure limits of FECA. They argue that the precedent in *Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm.* (Colorado II) is no longer good law. They contend that modern First Amendment jurisprudence and enhanced tools like disclosure and earmarking laws make these spending limits unnecessary.

Respondents and intervenors seek to uphold the coordinated-expenditure limits as consistent with the First Amendment. They argue that these limits are necessary to prevent donors from circumventing base contribution limits by routing large sums through political parties. They further assert that the Court should adhere to the precedent established in *Colorado II* under the principle of stare decisis.

The Court held that FECA’s political-party coordinated-expenditure limits under 52 U.S.C. §30116(d) violate the First Amendment. The Court applied "closely drawn" scrutiny, a rigorous standard from *McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n* and *Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate*. Under this test, a regulation must be "necessary" and "narrowly tailored" and cannot be "disproportionate" to the Government's asserted goal. The Court recognized only one permissible government objective: preventing "quid pro quo" corruption, defined as "dollars for political favors." The Court found that the limits are not narrowly tailored because the Government has less-restrictive tools to prevent circumvention. Specifically, the Court cited the earmarking rules in 52 U.S.C. §30116(a)(8), which treat directed contributions as direct contributions to the candidate. The Court also relied on the disclosure requirements of 52 U.S.C. §30104(b), noting that modern technology makes transparency a powerful anti-corruption tool. The Court reasoned that the combination of base limits, earmarking rules, and disclosure requirements provides sufficient prophylaxis against corruption. Consequently, the coordinated-expenditure limits constitute a "disproportionate" fourth line of defense that unduly restricts core political party speech. The Court concluded that *Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm.* (Colorado II) is no longer good law and is overruled.

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, argued that the coordinated-expenditure limits are necessary to prevent the circumvention of base contribution limits. The dissent contended that earmarking and disclosure rules are insufficient to stop donors from using parties as "checking accounts" for candidates, particularly through joint fundraising committees. Relying on *Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm.* (Colorado II) and *Buckley v. Valeo*, the dissent argued that removing these caps invites quid pro quo corruption.