Does the Federal Election Campaign Act’s (FECA) restriction on a political party’s spending in coordination with candidates violate the First Amendment? Specifically, are these coordinated-expenditure limits necessary to prevent the circumvention of base contribution limits? Finally, does the precedent established in *Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm.* (2001) remain good law in light of subsequent jurisprudence?

• The limits on coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment right of political parties to spend money on political advertising and campaign activities.
• The 2001 decision in *Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm.* (*Colorado II*) is no longer good law due to significant changes in the Court's First Amendment campaign finance jurisprudence.
• The Government now possesses more effective and less restrictive tools to prevent the circumvention of contribution limits, specifically earmarking and disclosure laws.
• The relative power of political parties has diminished compared to outside groups over the last 25 years, undermining a key premise of *Colorado II*.

• The Court should adhere to the precedent established in *Colorado II* as a matter of stare decisis.
• The coordinated-expenditure limits are necessary to prevent donors from circumventing base contribution limits by routing large contributions through political parties to support a specific candidate.
• Earmarking and disclosure rules are insufficient on their own to prevent the circumvention of base limits.
• The limits are narrowly tailored to protect the integrity of the representative government by preventing quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.

• The Court held that FECA’s political-party coordinated-expenditure limits under 52 U. S. C. §30116(d) violate the First Amendment.
• The Court applied "closely drawn" scrutiny, determining that a regulation must not be "disproportionate" and must be "necessary" and "narrowly tailored" to its goal, citing *McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n* and *Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate*.
• The Court reasoned that the only constitutionally permissible interest for restricting campaign finances is preventing "quid pro quo" corruption—defined as a direct exchange of an official act for money—rather than general "undue influence" or "access," relying on *McCutcheon*.
• The Court found the limits are not necessary because the Government can prevent circumvention through a combination of base contribution limits, earmarking rules, and disclosure requirements.
• Specifically, the Court cited the earmarking rules under 52 U. S. C. §30116(a)(8) and disclosure requirements under 52 U. S. C. §30104(b) as targeted, constitutionally permissible, and less restrictive tools.
• The Court noted that experience in the States, where many allow coordinated expenditures without evidence of resulting quid pro quo corruption, suggests the federal concern is too speculative to justify the restriction.
• The Court concluded that *Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm.* (*Colorado II*) is "egregiously wrong" and "no longer good law," and is therefore overruled.
• The Court determined that the limits are "disproportionate" to the Government's interest given the severe restriction they place on core political party speech.