Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S. A. (Cuba), et al.
No. 24-699 · Decided June 23, 2026 · reversed and remanded
Does the Helms-Burton Act abrogate the foreign sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities? The Helms-Burton Act abrogates the foreign sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities, and plaintiffs suing under the Act are not required to satisfy an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR · Argued February 23, 2026
Parties — Petitioner: EXXON MOBIL CORP. · Respondent: CORPORACIÓN CIMEX, S. A. (CUBA), ET AL.
Vote & lineup6–3 on the judgment. Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Barrett (6). Dissent(s): Kagan (joined by Sotomayor, Jackson).
Who prevailed — The petitioner (Exxon Mobil Corp.) prevailed on the issue of whether the Helms-Burton Act waives the sovereign immunity of the Cuban government defendants.
The question

Does the Helms-Burton Act abrogate the foreign sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities? Alternatively, must a petitioner suing under the Act also satisfy one of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)? The Court must determine if the Act's specific provisions override the general baseline of immunity provided by the FSIA.

Petitioner's argument
  • Sought to recover damages for confiscated property.
  • Argued that the Helms-Burton Act waived sovereign immunity by creating a cause of action that expressly applies against foreign agencies and instrumentalities.
  • Contended that it is not necessary to satisfy an additional FSIA exception to bring suit under the Act.
Respondent's argument
  • Sought the dismissal of the suit based on sovereign immunity.
  • Argued that they are immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and that the petitioner failed to satisfy any of the FSIA's enumerated exceptions.
  • Asserted that the Helms-Burton Act "harmoniously coexists" with the FSIA rather than displacing it.
  • Argued that the canon against implied repeal prevents the Helms-Burton Act from superseding the FSIA without an irreconcilable conflict.
The decision
  • The Court held that the Helms-Burton Act abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities, meaning petitioners do not need to satisfy FSIA exceptions.
  • The Court applied the test that a congressional waiver must be "clearly discernible from the sum total" of Congress's work, as established in *Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz*.
  • The Court reasoned that a statute creating a cause of action that explicitly applies against a sovereign waives immunity "even without a separate waiver provision," citing *Kirtz* and the Act's definitions of "person" in 22 U. S. C. §6023(11) and the cause of action in §6082(a)(1)(A).
  • The Court found that requiring FSIA exceptions—specifically the commercial activity exception (28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(2)) and expropriation exception (28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(3))—would be "self-defeating" under *Quarles v. United States* because the Act's embargo (22 U. S. C. §6032(h)) bars the very commercial interactions needed to meet those exceptions.
  • The Court noted that the Act places suits under the general federal-question jurisdiction of 28 U. S. C. §1331 rather than the FSIA's 28 U. S. C. §1330, signaling that these are not FSIA actions.
  • The Court observed that the President's plenary power to suspend suits under 22 U. S. C. §6085(c)(1)(B) and §6064(a) reinstates a pre-FSIA regime where the Executive Branch, not the courts, determines immunity.
  • The Court invoked *Republic of Iraq v. Beaty* to support the idea that the President can be granted "on-off authority" over foreign sovereign immunity.
  • The Court rejected the "magic words" requirement for abrogation, citing *Kirtz*, and distinguished jurisdictional immunity from execution immunity, citing *Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.*
Separate opinions
Kagan, dissenting (joined by Sotomayor, Jackson)
  • Argues that a cause of action and the abrogation of immunity are "analytically distinct" under *FDIC v. Meyer* and that the Act fails the "stringent" standard for abrogation.
  • Contends that because Congress amended the FSIA's execution-immunity rule (§1611(c)) but not its jurisdictional-immunity rule, it intentionally left the latter intact, citing *Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.*
  • Argues the cause of action is not "negated" (unlike in *Kirtz*) because it primarily targets private investors and can still be used against sovereigns who meet FSIA exceptions.
Read the full opinion on supremecourt.gov (PDF) →