Does the Helms-Burton Act abrogate the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities? Alternatively, must a petitioner suing under the Act also satisfy one of the enumerated exceptions to immunity found in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)? The Court must determine if the Act serves as a standalone exception to the FSIA's general presumption of immunity.

Petitioner sought to recover damages for confiscated property by arguing that the Helms-Burton Act waived the sovereign immunity of the Cuban respondents. Petitioner contended that the Act's creation of a cause of action that expressly applies to "any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under 22 U. S. C. §6023(11) constitutes a waiver. Consequently, petitioner argued it should not be required to satisfy additional exceptions under the FSIA to proceed with the suit.

Respondents sought the dismissal of the suit by asserting immunity under the generally applicable Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Respondents argued that the Helms-Burton Act does not explicitly abrogate sovereign immunity and therefore "harmoniously coexists" with the FSIA. They maintained that any suit against them must satisfy one of the FSIA's enumerated exceptions, such as the commercial activity or expropriation exceptions.

The Court held that the Helms-Burton Act abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities, meaning petitioners need not satisfy an FSIA exception. Applying the test from *Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz*, the Court found the waiver "clearly discernible from the sum total" of the statutory scheme. First, the Court noted that 22 U. S. C. §6082(a)(1)(A) and §6023(11) create a cause of action explicitly applying to foreign agencies, which *Kirtz* holds waives immunity. Second, the Court reasoned that requiring FSIA exceptions under 28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(2) or (3) would render the Act "self-defeating" per *Quarles v. United States* because the Act's embargo under 22 U. S. C. §6032(h) bars the necessary commercial nexus. Third, the Court observed that 22 U. S. C. §6082(c)(1) places these suits under the general federal-question jurisdiction of 28 U. S. C. §1331 rather than the FSIA's 28 U. S. C. §1330. Fourth, the Court found that the Presidential suspension authority under 22 U. S. C. §6085(c)(1)(B) reinstates a pre-FSIA regime where the Executive Branch acts as gatekeeper. This grant of "on-off authority" mirrors the logic in *Republic of Iraq v. Beaty*, where the Court allowed the President to suspend FSIA exceptions. The Court rejected the implied-repeal canon, finding the Act is a standalone exception to immunity. It further ruled that Congress does not need to use "magic words" to abrogate immunity, provided the waiver is clearly discernible. Thus, the Court concluded the Act's architecture displaces the FSIA's default immunity regime for these specific defendants.

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, argued that the Helms-Burton Act fails the "stringent" standard for "unmistakably clear" abrogation required by *Kirtz*. Relying on *FDIC v. Meyer*, the dissent asserted that creating a cause of action is analytically distinct from abrogating immunity and does not automatically waive the latter. The dissent further noted that Congress intentionally left the FSIA's jurisdictional-immunity rules intact while amending only execution-immunity provisions under 28 U. S. C. §1611(c).