Did the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably apply *Batson v. Kentucky* and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) by concluding that the petitioner waived his objection to the use of race-based peremptory strikes? Specifically, did the petitioner waive his right to argue that the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons were pretextual when the trial court failed to conduct the third step of the *Batson* inquiry? Whether the state court's determination of waiver was an unreasonable application of federal law or an unreasonable unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

• The trial court failed to conduct the essential third step of the *Batson* inquiry by not allowing the defense to rebut the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons as pretextual.
• The trial court explicitly assured defense counsel that the *Batson* objection was preserved, stating: "I think you already made those, and they are clear in the record."
• The Mississippi Supreme Court's finding of waiver was unreasonable because the trial court "thwarted" the attempt to argue pretext.
• The prosecutor's reasons were pretextual because the State deselected black people from the jury panel who had the same familial, living, social or marital circumstances as whites who were not deselected.

• The petitioner preserved the general *Batson* objection but specifically waived the "Batson pretext argument" by failing to argue it at the trial level.
• The Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver finding was reasonable under state preservation rules.
• The record does not show that the trial court prevented the defense from making a step-three argument.
• Not stated.

• The Court held that the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied *Batson* precedents and unreasonably determined that the petitioner waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.
• The Court relied on *Batson v. Kentucky*, which establishes that the Equal Protection Clause bars prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges based on race.
• The Court applied the three-step *Batson* test: (1) a prima facie showing that a strike was based on race, (2) the prosecutor's provision of a race-neutral reason, and (3) the defendant's opportunity to rebut those reasons as pretextual.
• The Court found that the trial court "full-stop ended its Batson analysis" at step two and never proceeded to step three, failing to determine if reasons were pretextual "in light of all evidence with a bearing on it" as required by *Miller-El v. Dretke*.
• The Court rejected the State's distinction between a "Batson objection" and a "Batson pretext argument," reasoning that after the prosecutor asserts race-neutral reasons, the objection necessarily becomes a pretext argument.
• The Court found the waiver conclusion unreasonable because the trial court explicitly told counsel the objection was preserved: "I think you already made those, and they are clear in the record."
• The Court applied the AEDPA standard under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2), noting that while the standard is deferential, "deference does not mean abdication" and "deference does not by definition preclude relief" under *Miller-El v. Dretke*.
• The Court cited *Ford v. Georgia* to acknowledge the general principle that objections must be raised at trial to be preserved, but found that the petitioner did not waive the argument in this specific instance.