Does the 30-day removal deadline established by 28 U. S. C. §1446(b)(1) allow for equitable tolling? Specifically, the Court must determine if the nonjurisdictional nature of the deadline automatically makes it subject to such tolling. The case asks whether the text, structure, and context of the removal statutes rebut any presumption that the deadline can be equitably extended.

• The 30-day deadline in 28 U. S. C. §1446(b)(1) is nonjurisdictional and therefore presumptively subject to equitable tolling.
• Rebutting the presumption of equitable tolling requires a "clearest command" from Congress, as suggested in *Holland v. Florida*.
• The extension provided in 28 U. S. C. §1446(b)(3) is an accrual rule rather than a specific exception that would preclude broader equitable tolling.
• The fact that 28 U. S. C. §1447(c) allows remand at any time for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction suggests that Congress intended to treat untimeliness less harshly.

• No presumption of equitable tolling applies because 28 U. S. C. §1446(b)(1) is not a statute of limitations that extinguishes a claim, but rather a rule governing forum.
• Even if a presumption applies, it is rebutted by the mandatory text, detailed structure, and overall context of the removal scheme.
• The existence of specific, limited exceptions to the deadline indicates that Congress did not intend for open-ended equitable exceptions to exist.

• The Court held that 28 U. S. C. §1446(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling because its text, structure, and context are inconsistent with such a doctrine.
• While the deadline is nonjurisdictional, the Court noted in *Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert* that a lack of jurisdictional force does not automatically make a time limit "malleable in every respect."
• The Court applied the test from *Arellano v. McDonough*, finding the presumption of equitable tolling is rebutted if there is "good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply."
• The text of §1446(b)(1) is mandatory, stating a notice of removal "shall be filed within 30 days," which is consistent with a non-tollable deadline.
• The structure of the statute includes an "explicit listing of exceptions"—such as the "bad faith" exception in §1446(c)(1) and the discovery-like rule in §1446(b)(3)—which *United States v. Brockamp* indicates strongly suggests Congress did not intend other unmentioned equitable exceptions.
• The Court pointed to other statutes that explicitly modify §1446(b)(1) to allow extensions "for cause shown," such as §1441(d) for foreign states, §1454(b)(2) for intellectual property, and §1441(e)(1) for fatal accidents.
• The Court contrasted civil removal with criminal removal under §1455(b)(1), where Congress explicitly granted courts the power to allow late filings "for good cause shown," whereas no such general power exists for civil cases.
• Finally, the Court cited *BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore* and *Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.* to argue that the "obvious concern with efficiency" and the interest in avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold questions preclude equitable tolling.