Does a state-court environmental suit challenging Chevron’s wartime crude-oil production qualify for removal to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1)? Specifically, is such a suit "for or relating to" Chevron's wartime refining of crude oil into aviation gasoline for the U.S. military? The Court must determine if the relationship between the challenged production and the federal refining duties is sufficiently close to satisfy the statute.

• The suit "relates to" its federal duties because crude oil is the essential feedstock for aviation gasoline (avgas).
• The challenged production methods—specifically vertical drilling, the use of canals, and the use of earthen pits—were employed to maximize oil output for the wartime effort.
• The federal government's Petroleum Administration for War (PAW) identified the relevant oil fields as "Critical Fiel[ds] Essential to the War Program."
• The "relating to" language in 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1) should be interpreted broadly to include these closely connected activities.

• The suit does not relate to federal duties because Chevron's refining contract did not specifically direct or specify how to acquire or produce crude oil.
• The government's role in allocating crude oil to refineries acted as an intermediary that severed any legal relation between production and refining.
• The removal statute requires that the petitioner was "acting under" a federal officer while performing the specific actions challenged in the suit.
• The connection between the environmental challenges and the federal refining contract is too attenuated to justify removal.

• The Court held that Chevron satisfied the "relating to" requirement of 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1) by plausibly alleging a close relationship between its crude-oil production and its federal avgas refining duties.
• The Court defined "relating to" as meaning "to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with," citing *Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.*.
• The Court noted that a relationship can be "indirect" (*Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon*), not "specifically designed to affect" the other (*Ingersoll-Rand*), and exist without a "strict causal relationship" (*Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*).
• The Court clarified that the ordinary meaning of "relating to" excludes connections that are "tenuous, remote, or peripheral," citing *Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Assn.*.
• The Court reasoned that the challenged production was closely connected to federal duties because the production methods were used to maximize the supply of essential feedstock for avgas during a wartime "all-hands-on-deck" context.
• The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that a contract must specifically invite the challenged conduct, noting that state laws can "relate to" plans even if not "specifically designed to affect" them (*Ingersoll-Rand*).
• The Court further rejected the "intermediary" argument, citing *Morales* to explain that an act relates to its consequences even when the causal chain includes intermediaries, such as the PAW allocating oil.
• The Court dismissed Louisiana's "acting under" theory, ruling that it impermissibly conflates the "acting under" and "relating to" elements of the statute and would render the "relating to" language redundant, citing *National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife*.