Does the sentencing disparity created by a nonretroactive change to 18 U.S.C. §924(c) constitute an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for a sentence reduction? This question arises under the "compassionate release" provision of 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Specifically, the Court must determine if such a disparity warrants relief despite Congress's decision not to make the amendment retroactive.

• The terms "extraordinary and compelling" are flexible and require a case-by-case inquiry into the totality of the circumstances.
• Because 28 U.S.C. §994(t) only expressly prohibits "rehabilitation of the defendant alone" as a reason, Congress impliedly authorized the consideration of all other relevant information.
• District courts generally possess broad discretion to consider all relevant information when modifying a sentence, as seen in *Concepcion v. United States*.
• The Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement, which recognizes "Unusually Long Sentence" as a valid reason, should be followed.

• Nonretroactive amendments to criminal penalties are the norm and therefore not "extraordinary."
• Congress's deliberate choice to leave sentences intact reflects an interest in finality and avoids burdening courts with litigation.
• Allowing such disparities to trigger release would undermine the legislative judgment that the punishment fits the crime.
• The Sentencing Commission's policy statement is invalid because it conflicts with the statutory text and the will of Congress.

• The Court held that a sentencing disparity resulting from a nonretroactive change to 18 U.S.C. §924(c) cannot serve as an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
• The Court defined "extraordinary" as "most unusual" or "far from common" and "compelling" as "tending to convince or convert by or as if by forcefulness of evidence."
• It reasoned that nonretroactive amendments are the "norm" and "ordinary practice," citing *Dorsey v. United States* and *Hewitt v. United States*.
• The Court found the disparity is not "compelling" because it would undermine Congress's interest in finality and its choice to leave the sentence intact.
• It noted that the "heartland of compassionate release" is defined by a prisoner's personal circumstances (e.g., medical condition, age, family), not legal disparities.
• The Court rejected the "negative implication" argument regarding 28 U.S.C. §994(t), citing *NLRB v. SW General, Inc.* to state that ruling out one item (rehabilitation) does not license all others.
• It clarified that eligibility for compassionate release is a "gatekeeping requirement" distinct from the §3553(a) factors, distinguishing this from *Concepcion v. United States* where eligibility was conceded.
• The Court concluded that allowing such reductions would permit judges to reject mandatory penalties ordained by the legislature, violating the principle in *United States v. Wiltberger*.
• Finally, the Court ruled that the Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement is invalid to the extent it conflicts with the statute, as courts must "independently interpret the statute" per *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*.