Can Cisco Systems, Inc. be held liable for aiding and abetting violations of international law under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)? Can two Cisco executives be held liable for aiding and abetting torture under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA)? Specifically, does the TVPA's language regarding those who "subject" others to torture encompass aiding-and-abetting liability?

• The Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that aiding-and-abetting liability is a viable form of liability under the ATS.
• The TVPA does not expressly provide for aiding-and-abetting liability.
• Creating new causes of action under the ATS would intrude upon the separation of powers and the prerogative of the political branches to direct foreign policy.

• Aiding-and-abetting liability for the alleged international law violations satisfies the first step of the *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain* test because the norms are specific, universal, and obligatory.
• There are no prudential or foreign-policy reasons to decline the claim, as the U.S. political branches already condemn China's persecution of Falun Gong.
• The term "subjects" in the TVPA is broad enough to include those who aid and abet torture.

• The Court held that federal courts may not create new causes of action for violations of international norms under the ATS.
• Relying on *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, the Court reasoned that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that creates no new causes of action.
• The Court found that creating new ATS causes of action inherently risks adverse foreign policy consequences, and courts cannot safely conclude such risks are absent, citing *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.*, *Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC*, and *Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe*.
• The Court reasoned that the power to create causes of action belongs to Congress, noting that Art. I, §8, cl. 10 expressly delegates authority to Congress to "define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations."
• Applying *Egbert v. Boule* and *Ziglar v. Abbasi*, the Court stated that if there is even a "single sound reason" to think Congress might doubt a damages remedy, courts must refrain from creating it; here, the risk of collateral foreign policy consequences is such a reason.
• The Court noted that the TVPA serves as an "alternative remedial structure," which under *Ziglar* precludes the judicial creation of a new cause of action.
• The Court held that the TVPA does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability.
• Following *Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A.*, the Court reasoned that aiding-and-abetting liability requires express statutory mention, which is absent from the TVPA.
• The Court determined that the term "subjects" in the TVPA means "to cause to undergo or submit to" (per Webster’s Third New International Dictionary), implying a causal connection that is narrower than the broad scope of aiding-and-abetting liability described in *Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh*.