The Court must determine whether Cisco Systems, Inc. may be held liable for aiding and abetting offenses under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Additionally, the Court must decide if two Cisco executives may be held liable under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) for aiding and abetting torture. These questions arise from allegations that Cisco's surveillance technology enabled the Chinese Government to persecute religious minorities.

Petitioner sought the dismissal of the claims. Petitioner argued that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that aiding-and-abetting liability exists under the ATS for the alleged torts. Petitioner further contended that the TVPA does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability because the statute does not expressly mention such liability.

Respondents sought to hold Cisco and its executives liable for aiding and abetting violations of international law. Respondents argued that the ATS allows for the creation of implied causes of action to enforce universal international norms. Respondents further contended that the term "subjects" within the TVPA is broad enough to encompass aiding-and-abetting liability.

The Court held that courts may not create new causes of action for violations of international norms under the ATS. Relying on *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, the Court affirmed that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action. The Court reasoned that creating such actions risks adverse foreign policy consequences and intrudes on the prerogative of the political branches, citing *Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe* and *Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC*. Furthermore, the Court noted that Art. I, §8, cl. 10 of the Constitution expressly delegates the authority to "define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations" to Congress. Citing *FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd.* and *Egbert v. Boule*, the Court emphasized that judicially created causes of action generally offend the separation of powers. The Court also found that the TVPA serves as an "alternative remedial structure" that precludes the judicial creation of a new ATS cause of action under *Ziglar v. Abbasi*. Regarding the TVPA, the Court held that the statute does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability. Applying the reasoning from *Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A.*, the Court found that the TVPA's silence on "aiding and abetting" is dispositive. The Court determined that the term "subjects" means "to cause to undergo or submit to," signaling a direct causal connection rather than the broader assistance described in *Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh*. Consequently, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment, concluding there is no liability for aiding and abetting under either the ATS or the TVPA.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V, argued that the Court implicitly overruled *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain* without a proper stare decisis analysis. The dissent contended that the ATS should allow implied causes of action for universally recognized norms, citing *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*. Justice Sotomayor further argued that the plain meaning of "subjects" in the TVPA encompasses those who culpably participate in torture to help it succeed.