Does federal law preempt a state-law tort suit against a military contractor operating in a war zone? Specifically, does such preemption apply even when the contractor's challenged conduct was not ordered or authorized by the Federal Government? The Court addresses whether the "battlefield preemption" doctrine applied by the Fourth Circuit is supported by the Constitution, federal statutes, or precedent.

• Sought to recover damages under South Carolina law for negligent supervision, negligent entrustment of tools, and negligent retention.
• Argued that Fluor's conduct was not authorized by the military and was contrary to federal instructions.
• Contended that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant-activities exception does not apply to suits against private federal contractors.
• Asserted that there is no constitutional or statutory basis to bar a suit based on a contractor's failure to follow military security policies.

• Sought summary judgment to dismiss the suit based on federal preemption.
• Argued that during wartime, all state-law claims against military contractors under military command arising out of combatant activities are preempted.
• Contended that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant-activities exception (28 U.S.C. §2680(j)) reflects a congressional intent to bar tort suits against contractors connected with those activities.
• Asserted that the Constitution's structure implicitly preempts such suits to protect the Federal Government's exclusive war powers.

• The Court held that the Fourth Circuit erred in finding preemption because the Federal Government neither ordered nor authorized the challenged conduct.
• Under the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, cl. 2), state law yields only when it conflicts with the Constitution, a valid federal statute, or a treaty, and no such express preemption exists here.
• The Court clarified that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant-activities exception (28 U.S.C. §2680(j)) does not apply to suits against federal contractors, citing *United States v. Orleans*.
• Applying *Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.*, the Court reasoned that preemption requires a "significant conflict" between state law and an "identifiable federal policy or interest" within a "uniquely federal interest."
• The Court determined *Boyle* only protects a contractor when the Government directed the contractor to do the very thing challenged in the suit; here, Fluor's conduct was allegedly contrary to federal instructions.
• The Court noted that the *Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co.* doctrine only shields contractors when they are sued precisely for accomplishing what the Federal Government requested.
• Regarding constitutional structure, the Court found that the grant of war powers (Art. I, §8, cls. 11–13; Art. II, §2, cl. 1) does not bar all war-related tort suits, citing *Little v. Barreme* and *Mitchell v. Harmony*.
• The Court further held that federal contractors are not federal agencies and thus do not share the Government's implied constitutional immunity from state regulation, citing *Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm’n of Pa.* and *James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula*.