Does a worker qualify as being "engaged in... interstate commerce" under 9 U.S.C. §1 if they never cross state lines? Furthermore, does the exemption apply if the worker never interacts with vehicles that cross state lines? The Court must determine if these physical requirements are necessary to trigger the Federal Arbitration Act's exemption from compelled arbitration.

Petitioner sought to compel arbitration of the dispute. Petitioner argued that a bright-line rule should apply, requiring a worker to either cross state lines or interact with a vehicle that does to be "engaged in interstate commerce." Petitioner further suggested that the respondent's status as an independent company owner and his taking of title to goods might disqualify him from the exemption.

Respondent sought to avoid compelled arbitration and litigate his claims in court. Respondent argued that he belonged to a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce under 9 U.S.C. §1. Specifically, respondent contended that his intrastate delivery route formed a constituent part of the interstate journey of the goods from out-of-state bakeries to retail stores.

The Court held that a worker transporting goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey can qualify for the 9 U.S.C. §1 exemption. The Court analyzed the statutory text, noting that 9 U.S.C. §1 applies to workers "engaged in... interstate commerce." Relying on Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court defined "engage" as to "take part in," "employed," or "involved" and "interstate commerce" as transportation "between points in one state and points in another state." The Court noted that a "continuous carriage" may involve intrastate activity within the limits of a single state, as cited in the Cyclopedic Law Dictionary. The Court invoked *The Daniel Ball*, which found a steamer operating entirely within Michigan "engaged in commerce between the States" because it transported goods destined for other states. The Court further cited *Rearick v. Pennsylvania*, *Rhodes v. Iowa*, and *Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Pennsylvania* to support the view that intrastate activity can be part of interstate commerce. While acknowledging these cases interpreted the Constitution's Commerce Clause, the Court found them probative of the ordinary meaning of the FAA's terms in 1925. The Court reaffirmed that the phrase "engaged in" denotes a "direct," "necessary," and "active" role in moving goods across borders, as established in *Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon*. The Court rejected petitioner's "cross-or-tag" rule, finding no statutory support for the requirement that a worker must physically cross a border