Does a worker qualify for the exemption from the Federal Arbitration Act under 9 U.S.C. §1 if they never cross state lines? Specifically, does the exemption apply to a worker who does not interact with vehicles that cross state lines? The case asks whether such a worker can still be considered "engaged in... interstate commerce."

• To be "engaged in interstate commerce" for purposes of 9 U.S.C. §1, a worker must either cross state lines or interact with a vehicle that does.
• The Federal Arbitration Act generally requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements, and the §1 exemption should not apply to a worker who only performs intrastate deliveries.
• The respondent does not qualify for the exemption because he picks up and delivers products entirely within the State of Colorado.
• The respondent's status is further affected by the fact that he operates through an independent company and takes title to the goods before selling them.

• The respondent belongs to a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce because his work is a constituent part of a larger interstate journey.
• His intrastate route is a necessary link in the transportation of goods from out-of-state bakeries to their final retail destinations.
• Because he is "engaged in interstate commerce," the court lacks the authority to compel arbitration under the 9 U.S.C. §1 exemption.

• The Court held that a worker transporting goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey can qualify for the 9 U.S.C. §1 exemption without crossing state lines or interacting with vehicles that do.
• The Court relied on the text of 9 U.S.C. §1, which provides that "nothing" in the Act shall be used to compel arbitration in disputes involving "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
• Applying *Black’s Law Dictionary* (3d ed. 1933), the Court defined "engage" as to "take part in," "employ[ed]," or "involve[d]" and "interstate commerce" as transportation "between points in one state and points in another state."
• The Court noted that "a continuous carriage" may be interstate even if "much of the journey" occurs within a single state, citing the *Cyclopedic Law Dictionary* (2d ed. 1922).
• The Court invoked *The Daniel Ball*, 10 Wall. 557 (1871), which found a steamer operating entirely within Michigan was "engaged in commerce between the States" because it transported goods destined for other states.
• The Court cited *Rearick v. Pennsylvania*, 203 U. S. 507, *Rhodes v. Iowa*, 170 U. S. 412, and *Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Pennsylvania*, 136 U. S. 114, to support the principle that intrastate activity can be part of interstate commerce.
• The Court reasoned that while these precedents interpreted the Commerce Clause, they provide probative evidence of how an ordinary person in 1925 would have understood the term "engaged in" at the time the FAA was enacted.
• The Court reaffirmed the requirement from *Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon*, 596 U. S. 450 (2022), and *Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC*, 601 U. S. 246 (2024), that the worker must play a "direct," "necessary," and "active" role in moving goods across borders.