Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD., et al.
No. 24-983 · Decided May 21, 2026 · vacated and remanded
Does the phrase "property which was confiscated" in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act refer only to a plaintiff's specific property interest? The use of physical docks is sufficient to establish that defendants used "property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government," and the petitioner is not required to prove that the defendants trafficked in the petitioner's specific property interest.
Vote & lineupThomas delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson (8). Dissent(s): Kagan. Concurrence(s): Sotomayor (joined by Kavanaugh).
⚠ summary flagged: missing/empty section: DISSENT SUMMARY
The question
Does the phrase "property which was confiscated" in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act refer only to a plaintiff's specific property interest? Alternatively, can it refer to the physical property in which that interest existed? This determines whether defendants are liable for using physical assets after a time-limited interest in those assets has expired.
Petitioner's argument
The petitioner argues that the Act imposes liability for trafficking in underlying physical property rather than just intangible interests. It contends that the physical docks themselves were confiscated by the Cuban Government. Therefore, any commercial use of those docks constitutes trafficking regardless of whether a specific concession had expired.
Respondent's argument
The respondents argue that the Act requires a "one-to-one correspondence" between the property interest confiscated and the property interest trafficked. They contend that because the petitioner's usufructuary concession expired in 2004, they could not have trafficked in that interest between 2016 and 2019. Consequently, they argue they are not liable for using the docks after the concession's expiration.
The decision
The Court held that "property which was confiscated" under 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A) can refer to physical property and not just a property interest. The Court relied on the plain text of 22 U.S.C. §6023(12)(A), which defines "property" to include "any property," whether "real, personal, or mixed," as well as any "interest therein." Invoking *Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino*, 376 U.S. 398, the Court noted that "property" ordinarily refers to both physical things and interests in them. The Court reasoned that "trafficking" via "use" under 22 U.S.C. §6023(13)(A)(