Does the phrase "property which was confiscated" in Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act refer only to the specific property interest held by the plaintiff? Alternatively, can it refer to the physical property in which the plaintiff had an interest? Specifically, is a defendant liable for trafficking in physical docks if the plaintiff's time-limited concession to those docks had already expired?

• The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act imposes liability for trafficking in underlying physical property, not just intangible property interests.
• The cruise lines used physical docks that were confiscated by the Cuban Government, which constitutes trafficking under the Act.
• The certified claim from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission provides conclusive proof that the petitioner owns the claim to the confiscated property.

• The Act requires a "one-to-one correspondence" between the specific property interest that was confiscated and the property interest that was trafficked.
• Because the petitioner's usufructuary concession expired in 2004, the cruise lines could not have trafficked in that interest between 2016 and 2019.
• The Cuban Government did not confiscate the physical docks themselves, as it already owned them; it only confiscated the concession.

• The Court held that the cruise lines' use of the docks is sufficient to establish they used "property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government" under 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A).
• The Court reasoned that the plain text of Title III, specifically 22 U.S.C. §6023(12)(A), defines "property" to include both physical things (real, personal, or mixed) and any "interest therein."
• Relying on *Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino*, 376 U.S. 398, the Court noted that "property" ordinarily refers to both physical things and the interests in them.
• The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's "counterfactual analysis," which assumed no confiscation had occurred to determine if the conduct interfered with the petitioner's interest.
• The Court observed that "using" property—a form of trafficking under 22 U.S.C. §6023(13)(A)(i)—typically involves physical objects rather than intangible property interests.
• Under 22 U.S.C. §6023(4)(A), "confiscation" includes the seizure of "control of property"; the Court found the Cuban Government seized control of the docks when armed agents physically occupied them in 1960.
• Because the docks were "tainted" by this confiscation, any entity that knowingly and intentionally uses them without authorization is liable to the United States national who owns the claim.