Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al. v. Doe et al.
No. 25-1083 · Decided June 25, 2026 · Reversed and remanded
Whether respondents challenging the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Syria and Haiti are entitled to orders postponing those terminations during litigation. The Court held that the TPS statute bars judicial review of non-constitutional claims and that the equal protection claim regarding the termination of Haiti's TPS designation is unlikely to succeed.
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES · Argued April 29, 2026
Parties — Petitioner: MULLIN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. · Respondent: DOE ET AL.
Vote & lineup6–3 on the judgment. Alito announced the judgment of the Court, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, Barrett (6). Dissent(s): Kagan (joined by Sotomayor, Jackson). Concurrence(s): Thomas.
Who prevailed — The petitioners prevailed on the request to reverse the lower courts' orders that had postponed the termination of TPS designations for Syria and Haiti.
The question

Whether respondents challenging the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Syria and Haiti are entitled to orders postponing those terminations during litigation. The case requires determining if the judicial-review bar in the TPS statute precludes non-constitutional claims. It also addresses whether the termination of Haiti's TPS designation violated the constitutional right to equal protection.

Petitioner's argument
  • The judicial-review bar in 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A) precludes all non-constitutional challenges to the Secretary's TPS determinations.
  • The term "determination" encompasses both the final decision and the entire process leading up to that decision.
  • The equal protection claim regarding Haiti's termination is unlikely to succeed because the administration's actions are based on a race-neutral opposition to the TPS program as previously implemented.
  • The Executive Branch possesses broad authority over the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals, which should inform the standard of review.
Respondent's argument
  • The judicial-review bar in 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A) applies only to substantive determinations and does not preclude review of procedural errors, such as the failure to consult other agencies.
  • The statutory term "determination" should be interpreted narrowly to refer only to assessments of country conditions.
  • The termination of Haiti's TPS designation was motivated by racial animus, thereby violating the constitutional right to equal protection.
  • They seek interim relief to postpone the terminations to avoid irreparable harm while the litigation proceeds.
The decision
  • The Court held that 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A) bars judicial review of all non-constitutional claims regarding the "designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state."
  • The Court reasoned that "determination" can mean either an individual decision or the process leading to a decision, and the phrase "with respect to" has a "broadening effect" per *Patel v. Garland*.
  • The Court rejected the "substance-only" interpretation, noting that *McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.* and *Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians* turned on the specific wording of different provisions and did not establish a broad principle limiting "determination" to substantive matters.
  • The Court declined to give "determination" a technical meaning limited to country conditions, adhering to the principle of ordinary meaning as seen in *Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation*.
  • The Court applied the administrative-law principle from *Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co.* that subsidiary decisions merge into final agency action, meaning subsidiary determinations are unreviewable if the final action is barred.
  • Regarding the equal protection claim, the Court assumed the *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.* test, which asks if a "discriminatory purpose [was] a motivating factor in the decision."
  • The Court found that the cited statements by the President and Secretary were not overtly racial and expressed policy views that could rest on race-neutral justifications.
  • The Court noted that the administration's consistent termination of every TPS designation coming up for renewal (13 in total) provides a strong, race-neutral explanation for the action.
Separate opinions
Thomas, concurring
  • Argues that the equal protection claim is also barred by the plain text of 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A) because it challenges the process leading to the termination.
  • Contends that aliens have no equal protection rights against the Federal Government, arguing that *Bolling v. Sharpe* was wrong to read an equal protection component into the Fifth Amendment.
  • Asserts that TPS is a government-created privilege, not a core private right protected by the Due Process Clause.
Kagan, dissenting (joined by Sotomayor, Jackson)
  • Argues that "determination" refers to the final decision and not the mandatory procedural steps, such as the consultation required by 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(3)(A).
  • Contends that the Secretary failed to properly consult with appropriate agencies, as the communications were about "foreign policy concerns" rather than country conditions.
  • Argues that the President's statements regarding Haitians (e.g., "poisoning the blood") demonstrate a racially discriminatory purpose under *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.*
Read the full opinion on supremecourt.gov (PDF) →