The question is whether respondents challenging the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for aliens from Syria and Haiti are entitled to orders postponing the terminations during litigation. This involves determining if the judicial-review bar in 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A) precludes challenges to the Secretary's decisions. Additionally, the Court must decide if the termination of Haiti's TPS designation was motivated by race in violation of the constitutional right to equal protection.

Petitioners argue that 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A) provides a broad bar to judicial review of any "determination" regarding the termination of a TPS designation. Regarding the equal protection claim, petitioners contend the Court should apply the deferential standard established in *Trump v. Hawaii*. Petitioners seek to reverse the lower court orders that postponed the termination of TPS for Syria and Haiti.

Respondents argue that the judicial-review bar in 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A) applies only to substantive determinations and not to procedural errors, such as the failure to consult other agencies. Some respondents contend that the term "determination" refers specifically to assessments of country conditions rather than the final decision to terminate. Miot respondents further argue that the termination of Haiti's TPS designation violated the constitutional right to equal protection because it was motivated by race.

The Court held that respondents are not entitled to orders postponing the terminations. The Court reasoned that 8 U. S. C. §1254a(b)(5)(A) bars all non-constitutional claims because it precludes judicial review of any "determination" with respect to the termination of a designation. Defining "determination" as either a discrete decision or the process leading to one, the Court noted that the phrase "with respect to" has a "broadening effect" under *Patel v. Garland*. The Court rejected the argument that the bar applies only to substantive claims, finding that *McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.* and *Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians* involved different statutory wording. It further rejected the "country conditions" limitation, citing *Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation* to emphasize that common terms are given their ordinary meaning. The Court applied the administrative-law principle from *Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co.* that subsidiary decisions merge into final agency action. Regarding the equal protection claim, the Court assumed the application of the *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.* test to see if a "discriminatory purpose [was] a motivating factor." The Court found that the cited statements by the President and Secretary were not overtly racial and could be based on race-neutral justifications. Specifically, the Court noted that the administration's general opposition to the TPS program as implemented in the past provides a strong, race-neutral explanation. Consequently, the Court concluded that Miot respondents are unlikely to prove race was a motivating factor and are not entitled to interim relief.

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, argued that the judicial-review bar does not preclude review of whether the Secretary failed to comply with mandatory procedural steps, such as consulting other agencies. The dissent asserted that the President's statements regarding Haitians evidenced racial animus, which would make the termination a violation of equal protection under *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.* Citing *Nken v. Holder*, the dissent emphasized that respondents would suffer irreparable harm if the terminations were not postponed during litigation.