Does the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers seeking review and rejection of state-court judgments rendered before district court proceedings commenced? Specifically, does this bar apply even if the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings? Or does the doctrine apply only to final judgments rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had?

• Rooker-Feldman should apply only to "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had," as defined in 28 U. S. C. §1257(a).
• The suit constitutes a freestanding federal-question cause of action that invokes the district court's original jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1331, rather than an attempt at appellate review.
• The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has caused confusion in lower courts and is frequently overused as a "docket-clearing mechanism."
• Existing abstention and preclusion doctrines are sufficient to prevent premature federal interference in state proceedings, rendering a broad application of Rooker-Feldman unnecessary.

• The petitioner's request for the District Court to declare a state-court consent order "unconstitutional, unenforceable, and void ab initio" is a paradigm example of seeking "review and rejection" of a state judgment.
• The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not require that the state-court judgment be a final judgment from the highest court of the State.
• The case is too similar to the facts of *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.* to justify a different jurisdictional outcome.
• Not stated.

• The Court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers seeking review and rejection of state-court judgments, regardless of whether the judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings.
• The Court reasoned that federal district courts generally lack "any power to review directly cases from state courts," citing *Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers*.
• Under 28 U. S. C. §1257(a), the power to review state-court judgments is lodged exclusively in the Supreme Court, meaning any attempt by a district court to "reverse or modify" such a judgment is an impermissible exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
• Relying on *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, the Court noted that district court jurisdiction is "strictly original," and seeking to declare a state judgment "null and void" exceeds that authority.
• The Court invoked *District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman* to explicitly reject the notion that district courts have jurisdiction to review state judgments simply because those judgments are not yet within the Supreme Court's §1257 jurisdiction.
• The Court applied a functional view of jurisdiction, stating that Rooker-Feldman bars suits that "see[k] what in substance would be appellate review of [a] state judgment," as seen in *Johnson v. De Grandy*.
• The Court reasoned that allowing federal review while state appeals are pending would undermine the "[c]ooperation and comity" described in *Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.*
• The Court found that adopting the petitioner's rule would create anomalous results by encouraging parties to file in federal court prematurely to avoid the Rooker-Feldman bar.
• The Court concluded that abstention and preclusion doctrines are insufficient because they may not apply when a plaintiff complains of injuries stemming directly from the state-court judgment itself.