Does the for-cause removal provision for Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under 15 U.S.C. §41 violate the separation of powers? Specifically, can Congress limit the President's ability to remove FTC Commissioners to only those instances of "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office"? The case asks whether such protections are compatible with the executive power vested in the President by the Constitution.

The petitioner argued that the President possesses the constitutional authority under Article II to remove executive officers at will. He contended that the power to remove subordinates is a necessary corollary to the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Consequently, the petitioner sought to invalidate the statutory restriction that limited removals to specific causes.

The respondent argued that *Humphrey’s Executor v. United States* permits Congress to insulate certain expert agencies from direct presidential control. She contended that Congress may "reasonably" decide that the President should only remove certain duly appointed officers for specific causes. The respondent sought to be restored to her office, claiming her removal was ultra vires and unconstitutional.

The Court held that the FTC's for-cause removal provision violates the separation of powers. Relying on Art. II, §§1 and 3, the Court reasoned that the "executive Power" and the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" require the President to control those executing the laws. The Court invoked the "Decision of 1789," where the First Congress determined that the power of removal is an executive power that the legislature cannot diminish. It reaffirmed *Myers v. United States*, which established that the President generally has the power to remove executive subordinates at will. The Court explicitly overruled *Humphrey’s Executor v. United States*, finding its distinction between "executive power" and "executive functions" to be a "result in search of a rationale." Applying the factors from *Knick v. Township of Scott*, the Court found that *Humphrey's* lacked quality in reasoning, consistency with other cases, and workability. The Court determined that the FTC exercises "executive power" because it promulgates substantive rules, conducts in-house adjudications, and files civil suits. Because the FTC's activities are the "very essence of 'execution' of the law" under *Bowsher v. Synar*, the agency must be controlled by the Chief Executive. The Court rejected the respondent's "reasonableness" test, noting it would allow Congress to "commandeer" nearly every executive department. Thus, the Court concluded that subordinates exercising the President's power must be removable by him at will to ensure accountability to the people.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued that the majority ignored the "deeply rooted tradition" of independent agencies and the doctrine of stare decisis. The dissent relied on *Humphrey’s Executor v. United States* and *Marbury v. Madison* to assert that Congress may protect the impartiality of expert agencies by limiting removal. It further contended that the majority's rule creates a "unitary, total executive control" that risks transforming the President into a monarch.