Does the for-cause removal provision for Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioners under 15 U.S.C. §41 violate the separation of powers? Specifically, the Court must determine if Congress can limit the President's authority to remove these officers to only those instances of "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." The central issue is whether such protections are compatible with the executive power vested in the President by the Constitution.

The petitioner argues that the removal of executive officers is an inherent part of the "executive Power" vested in the President by Article II, §1, cl. 1 of the Constitution. He contends that to fulfill the constitutional obligation to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" under Article II, §3, the President must have the authority to remove subordinates at will. Consequently, the petitioner seeks a ruling that the FTC's for-cause removal restriction is unconstitutional and that he may fire Commissioners without specifying a statutory cause.

The respondent argues that the FTC is a multimember expert agency that performs quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, making it an exception to the general rule of at-will removal. She relies on the precedent of *Humphrey’s Executor v. United States* to claim that Congress may reasonably insulate such agencies from partisan political control to ensure impartiality. Therefore, the respondent seeks to be restored to her office, asserting that her removal without a statutory cause was ultra vires and violated the Constitution.

The Court held that the FTC’s for-cause removal provision in 15 U.S.C. §41 is contrary to the separation of powers. The Court reasoned that Article II, §1, cl. 1 and Article II, §3 vest the executive power in a single President who must remain accountable to the people. To ensure this accountability, the President must be able to remove those executing the laws at will, a principle confirmed in *Myers v. United States*. The Court explicitly overruled *Humphrey’s Executor v. United States*, finding its "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" distinctions unworkable and inconsistent with later cases like *Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board* and *Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau*. The Court applied a test based on whether an agency exercises "executive power," noting that the FTC's rulemaking, investigations, and civil litigation are "the very essence of 'execution' of the law" under *Bowsher v. Synar*. Because the FTC unquestionably exercises executive power, its officers must be subject to the President's general administrative control. The Court rejected the respondent's "reasonableness" standard, stating that neither Congress nor the courts may saddle the President with subordinates with whom he cannot work. The Court noted that while some entities like the Federal Reserve might follow a different historical tradition, the FTC does not. Thus, the for-cause removal restriction is invalid. The President may therefore remove FTC Commissioners at will.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissents on the basis of stare decisis and the historical tradition of independent agencies. She argues that *Humphrey’s Executor v. United States* established a workable rule allowing Congress to insulate expert agencies from partisan control to ensure impartiality. The dissent relies on *Marbury v. Madison* and the historical practice of agencies like the Interstate Commerce Commission to assert that the Constitution permits such removal protections.