Does the Constitution guarantee citizenship to children born in the United States of parents who are unlawfully or temporarily present in the country? This question arises from Executive Order No. 14160, which asserts that such children are not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States. The Court must determine if these children qualify for citizenship under the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

The petitioner sought to uphold Executive Order No. 14160, which denies birthright citizenship to children of parents unlawfully or temporarily present. The petitioner argued that "subject to the jurisdiction" requires a greater quantum of allegiance based on domicile rather than mere territorial presence. Consequently, the petitioner contended that children of non-domiciled parents do not satisfy the constitutional requirements for citizenship at birth.

The respondents sought to invalidate the Executive Order and maintain birthright citizenship for their children. They argued that the Executive Order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The respondents contended that any person born on American soil, regardless of their parents' legal status, is "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States.

The Court held that children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present are "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States and are citizens at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. The Court reasoned that the Citizenship Clause must be understood through the lens of English common law, specifically the principle of *jus soli* (right of the soil). Relying on *Calvin’s Case* and *Blackstone's Commentaries*, the Court noted that children born within a sovereign's dominions owe natural allegiance regardless of how "momentary and uncertain" their presence. The Court further stated that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to repudiate the racial blood-based rule established in *Dred Scott v. Sandford*. To define "subject to the jurisdiction," the Court invoked *Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon*, which describes jurisdiction as "the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories." The Court concluded that this power is "susceptible of no limitation not imposed" by the nation itself, except in narrow cases like foreign ministers. The Court cited *United States v. Wong Kim Ark* to confirm that the Fourteenth Amendment is "declaratory" of the fundamental common law rule of citizenship by birth. It noted that *Wong Kim Ark* excludes only those recognized as exempt from jurisdiction, such as children of ambassadors or members of Indian tribes. The Court rejected the argument that citizenship requires domicile, noting that domicile and national citizenship are distinct legal concepts. Finally, the Court found that the succinct language of the Citizenship Clause contains no mention of "lawful" or "temporary" status, and thus such limitations cannot be read into the text.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, argued that citizenship requires both birth and domicile within the United States. The dissent relied on *The Venus* and *Schooner Charming Betsy* to contend that "subject to the jurisdiction" implies a complete jurisdiction that only exists when a person is domiciled. Justice Thomas asserted that children of temporary visitors remain subject to the power of their home nation and thus lack the exclusive allegiance required for American citizenship.