Does the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) require a border officer to possess clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming that resident an applicant for admission? Specifically, the Court addresses whether such a burden must be met at the border or if it can be satisfied later during removal proceedings. The case involves the interpretation of the exception to the general rule that lawful permanent residents are regarded as already admitted under 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(13)(C).

The petitioner argues that the border officer correctly classified the respondent as an applicant for admission because he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude prior to reentry. The petitioner contends that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard mentioned in Board of Immigration Appeals precedent applies only at the removal hearing, not at the border. Consequently, the petitioner seeks to uphold the removal order based on the respondent's subsequent conviction.

The respondent argues that border officers must have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime before they can be regarded as seeking admission. He further contends that a lawful permanent resident may only be regarded as seeking admission after being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, citing *Vartelas v. Holder*. The respondent seeks to be treated as already admitted, which would preclude removal on inadmissibility grounds.

The Court held that the Government properly charged the respondent with inadmissibility. The Court applied a two-step test for removing a lawful permanent resident on inadmissibility grounds. At step one, the Government must show the alien "has