Does the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) require a border officer to possess clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before treating that resident as an applicant for admission? Specifically, the Court must determine if the evidentiary burden applied at a removal hearing also applies to officers at the border. The case further asks whether a lawful permanent resident can be regarded as seeking admission based on the commission of a crime before a formal conviction occurs.

• The INA does not explicitly impose a "clear and convincing" evidence burden on border officers when determining if a lawful permanent resident is an applicant for admission.
• Border officers are entrusted with making "quick judgments on the spot" and should not be held to the same evidentiary standards as an immigration judge at a formal hearing.
• Under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(13)(C)(v), the Government may regard a resident as seeking admission as soon as they have "committed" a crime, regardless of whether a conviction has yet occurred.
• The burden of proof established by the Board of Immigration Appeals applies only at the time of the removal hearing, not at the border.

• The Government must have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime at the time of reentry before divesting them of their already-admitted status.
• The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard used by the Board of Immigration Appeals during removal proceedings should also apply to border officers.
• A lawful permanent resident should only be regarded as seeking admission after they have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, as suggested by dictum in *Vartelas v. Holder*.
• Treating a resident as an applicant for admission based on a mere charge, rather than a conviction, improperly shifts the burden of proof in subsequent removal proceedings.

• The Court held that the INA does not require border officers to have clear and convincing evidence of a crime before deeming a lawful permanent resident an applicant for admission.
• The Court applied a two-step test for removing a lawful permanent resident on inadmissibility grounds: step one requires only the "commission" of the crime to regard the alien as seeking admission, while step two requires "conviction or admission" to prove inadmissibility, citing *Barton v. Barr*.
• The Court reasoned that while 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c) imposes various burdens of proof in other contexts, the statute is silent on the burden for establishing that an alien is an applicant for admission.
• The Court found that the Second Circuit relied on inapposite Board of Immigration Appeals precedent; specifically, *Matter of Valenzuela-Felix* imposes a burden "at the time of the removal hearing," not at the border.
• The Court declined to read a heightened evidentiary burden into the INA for border officers, noting in *Luz Munoz v. Holder* that such officers must make "quick judgments on the spot."
• Regarding the timing of conviction, the Court held that 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) allows the Government to regard a resident as seeking admission as soon as they "committed" a crime, even if the conviction occurs later.
• The Court rejected the argument that 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) requires a conviction, noting that one does not "commit a conviction" and that the provision incorporates the crimes in §1182(a)(2) but not the requirement of conviction.
• The Court concluded that Lau's guilty plea provided the necessary clear and convincing evidence at the removal hearing to satisfy the Government's burden.