Does the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) need to prove that victims of a securities-law violation suffered pecuniary loss as a condition of securing a disgorgement award? This question involves the interpretation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and 78u(d)(7). Specifically, the Court must determine if a showing of financial loss is required to qualify an investor as a "victim" entitled to a wrongdoer's profits.

• Argued that *Liu v. SEC* established a rule requiring the SEC to make a showing of pecuniary loss before securing disgorgement.
• Contended that allowing monetary relief without proof of pecuniary loss is inconsistent with the goal of "restor[ing] the status quo."
• Asserted that without a pecuniary loss requirement, the SEC might use 15 U.S.C. §78u(d)(7) to seek penalties for the Treasury rather than compensation for victims.
• Sought the reversal of the Ninth Circuit's ruling that pecuniary harm is not required.

• Argued that investors can qualify as "victims" under *Liu v. SEC* even if they did not suffer a financial loss.
• Asserted that the evidence in this specific case demonstrated that investors had suffered pecuniary loss "as a result of Sripetch’s wrongdoing."
• Contended that under 15 U.S.C. §78u(d)(7), the SEC may not need to connect unlawful profits to specific victims and may be permitted to keep disgorgement awards for the government.
• Sought the affirmation of the Ninth Circuit's judgment.

• Held that a showing of pecuniary loss to investors is not required before the SEC may obtain a disgorgement award.
• Distinguished the legal remedy of damages, which is measured by the "plaintiff's loss," from the equitable remedy of disgorgement, which is measured by the "defendant's gain."
• Relied on the Restatement (First) of Restitution §1, Comment e, which states that a person seeking restitution does not need to prove they "suffered a corresponding loss or," indeed, "any loss."
• Invoked the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §3, Reporter's Note a, noting that restitution of "wrongful gain" is available when a person "has suffered an interference with protected interests" even with "no measurable loss whatsoever."
• Applied the principle from *Liu v. SEC* that equity seeks to "depriv[e] wrongdoers of their net profits from unlawful activity."
• Cited illustrative cases where defendants were ordered to disgorge profits despite the plaintiff suffering no pecuniary loss, including *Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball*, *Corey v. Struve*, and *Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r*.
• Rejected the "status quo" argument, reasoning that equity prefers restoring the defendant to their prior position by stripping unjust gains over allowing a defendant to benefit from misconduct because the plaintiff's financial position remained unchanged.
• Clarified that while *Liu v. SEC* requires disgorgement to be "awarded for victims," traditional equitable principles do not require pecuniary loss for a person to qualify as a "victim."