Does a defendant charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §1519—which prohibits knowingly falsifying a document to obstruct a federal investigation—have to be tried in the district where the falsification occurred? Alternatively, can the defendant be tried in the district where the federal investigation was located? This case addresses whether the "contemplated effects" of the falsification can determine venue.

Petitioner sought to dismiss the charge for improper venue. He argued that he could be tried only in the district encompassing Seattle, where the alleged falsification of the invoice occurred. He contended that the Northern District of California was an improper venue because the prohibited conduct did not take place there.

Respondent sought to maintain the conviction in the Northern District of California. The Government argued that §1519 is an "inchoate offense" with an integral relationship to other obstruction-of-justice crimes. Consequently, the Government posited that venue could be based on the transmission of the false invoice to an agent in San Francisco.

The Court held that venue for a §1519 offense is only where the defendant falsified the document. The Court relied on Article III, §2, cl. 3 and the Sixth Amendment, which require trials to be held where the crime was committed. To implement this, the Court applied the test from *United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno* to identify the "essential conduct elements" and the location of those "criminal acts." The Court determined that the only prohibited act under 18 U.S.C. §1519 is the falsification of a record or document. It reasoned that once a person falsifies a document with the requisite intent, the crime is complete regardless of whether the document is transmitted or used. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's view that "contemplated effects" are part of the essential conduct, noting that the statute's concern with effects is confined to the defendant's mens rea. Citing *United States v. Johnson*, the Court noted that a crime is complete where the prohibited act occurs, even if the defendant acted for a purpose involving another state. The Court further rejected the Government's "inchoate offense" theory, citing *Black's Law Dictionary* to define such offenses as steps toward another crime. It concluded that §1519 is a standalone crime because a person can violate it without taking any steps toward another crime. Therefore, because no "conduct constituting the offense" happened in the Northern District of California, venue was improper there.

not stated.