The case asks when an alien seeking to enter the United States from Mexico "arrives in the United States" under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1). Specifically, the Court must determine if this occurs while the alien is standing in Mexico at the border or only after the alien crosses the border. This determination dictates whether the Government is required to inspect the alien and allow them to apply for asylum.

• The phrase "arrives in the United States" carries its ordinary meaning, which requires a person to actually enter the geographic location.
• The absence of "attempted entry" language in §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1), unlike in other INA provisions, indicates that Congress did not intend to cover those who fail to enter.
• The presumption against extraterritoriality suggests that the statutes should not be interpreted to require the Government to perform inspections or process asylum claims while the alien is still in Mexico.
• The metering policy merely delayed entry to ensure safe and orderly processing and did not violate international obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

• The canon against surplusage requires that "arrives in the United States" be given a meaning distinct from "physically present in the United States," meaning it must apply to those not yet geographically present.
• The Government's interpretation creates perverse incentives for aliens to enter the country illegally rather than waiting at a port of entry.
• The metering policy violates the Nation's obligations under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees by effectively returning refugees to territories where they face persecution.
• The phrase "arrives in" should be understood in context to include those who are in the process of arriving and are at the threshold of a port of entry.

• The Court held that an alien "arrives in the United States" only when he crosses the border, not when he is standing in Mexico.
• The Court applied the ordinary meaning of the text, noting that "arrive" means to "reach a destination" and "in" means "within the limits, bounds, or area of" a place.
• The Court reasoned that the absence of "attempted entry" language in §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1)—which does appear in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(1), 1326(a)(2)(B), and 1357(a)(2)—signals an intentional exclusion of unsuccessful attempts to enter, citing *Keene Corp. v. United States*.
• The Court noted that Congress used different language in § 1103(a)(10) ("near a land border") and in the 1994 version of § 1158(a) ("at a land border or port of entry"), suggesting the current "arrives in" language is more restrictive.
• The Court rejected the anti-surplusage argument, stating the canon is not an "iron rule" (*Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership*) and that the redundancy is a partial, understandable result of the 1996 IIRIRA amendments linking arrival to expedited removal.
• The Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality (*Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.*, *RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community*, *Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc.*), finding no "unmistakable" congressional intent to require inspections while aliens are outside U.S. territory.
• The Court concluded that the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees does not apply to aliens outside U.S. territory, relying on *Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.*.