The Court addresses when an alien seeking entry from Mexico "arrives in the United States" under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1). Specifically, it considers whether this occurs while the alien is standing in Mexico at the border or only after crossing the border. This determination dictates whether the Government must inspect the alien and allow them to apply for asylum.

The petitioner sought to reverse the Ninth Circuit's ruling to permit the "metering" of arriving aliens. They argued that the phrase "arrives in the United States" carries its ordinary meaning, requiring physical entry into the country. They contended that an alien standing in Mexico has not yet arrived in the United States and is therefore not entitled to inspection or asylum processing.

The respondents sought a declaration that the metering policy unlawfully withheld inspection and asylum processing. They argued that "arrives in" includes aliens who are at the threshold of the border but are blocked from entry by officials. They further asserted that interpreting the phrase to require physical presence would render the "arrives in" clause redundant to the "physically present" clause in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).

The Court held that an alien "arrives in the United States" only when he crosses the border. Relying on the American Heritage Dictionary, the Court reasoned that "arrive" means to "reach a destination" and "in" means "within the limits, bounds, or area of" a place. The Court noted that other INA provisions, such as 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(1), 1326(a)(2)(B), and 1357(a)(2), explicitly mention "attempted" entry, whereas §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) do not, signaling an intentional exclusion of unsuccessful attempts per *Keene Corp. v. United States*. It observed that Congress used different language in 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) to describe aliens arriving "near a land border," which it did not use in the provisions at issue. The Court found that the 1996 amendment replacing "at a land border or port of entry" with "arrives in the United States" suggests a substantive change requiring physical presence, citing *Van Buren v. United States*. Addressing the canon against surplusage, the Court cited *Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership* to state that the canon is not an iron rule and that some redundancy is acceptable. It explained that the "arrives in" language was likely included to correspond with the event triggering expedited removal under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. The Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality, citing *Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.* and *Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc.*, to conclude that the statutes do not manifest an unmistakable intent to require inspection outside U.S. territory. It further held that the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees does not govern actions toward aliens outside U.S. territory, citing *Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.*. Consequently, the Court concluded that the INA neither entitles an alien standing in Mexico to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect him.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued that "arrives in" encompasses noncitizens in the process of arriving at the threshold of a port of entry. She relied on the "cardinal principle" against surplusage from *TRW Inc. v. Andrews* and argued that the majority's reading renders the "arrives in" clause a mere subset of those "physically present." The dissent further invoked the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Refugee Act of 1980 to argue that Congress intended to protect those at the border.