How should a court determine if a debtor's failure to disclose a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding was "inadvertent or mistaken" for the purpose of applying judicial estoppel? Specifically, is the Fifth Circuit's test—which limits the inquiry to the debtor's knowledge of underlying facts and potential motive to conceal—legally sufficient? Does the doctrine of judicial estoppel require a more holistic, case-by-case analysis under principles of equity?

• The omission of the personal-injury claim from the bankruptcy schedules was inadvertent.
• He believed he had done everything necessary after informing his bankruptcy counsel of the claim.
• He received no monetary or other benefit from the nondisclosure.
• Judicial estoppel is inappropriate because the omission was an honest mistake rather than a deliberate attempt to deceive the court.

• Keathley's failure to disclose the claim in an open bankruptcy proceeding constitutes an "implicit representation" that the claim did not exist.
• Under Fifth Circuit precedent, the omission cannot be inadvertent because Keathley knew the facts underlying the claim.
• Keathley had a hypothetical motive to conceal the claim to avoid paying interest on his debts.
• Judicial estoppel should bar the lawsuit to protect the integrity of the judicial process and prevent inconsistent positions.

• The Court held that courts must look to the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding an omission to determine if it was inadvertent or mistaken for judicial estoppel purposes.
• The Court reasoned that judicial estoppel is an "equitable doctrine" intended to "protect the integrity of the judicial process" (*New Hampshire v. Maine*).
• Because equity "eschews mechanical rules" and "depends on flexibility" (*Holmberg v. Armbrecht*), equitable inquiries must be conducted on a "case-by-case basis" (*Holland v. Florida*).
• The Fifth Circuit's rule was too rigid because it prohibited courts from considering any evidence of inadvertence beyond knowledge of facts and motive to conceal.
• The Fifth Circuit's rule was too broad because knowledge of facts and hypothetical motive to conceal are "almost always" present, making the test nearly dispositive.
• The Court found that a "one-size-fits-all test" is incompatible with a fair inquiry into whether an omission is actually the result of inadvertence or mistake.
• The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with a holistic analysis.