Daren K. Margolin, Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review v. National Association of Immigration Judges
No. 25-767 · Decided May 26, 2026
Did the Fourth Circuit violate the principle of party presentation by deciding a case on a novel ground not raised by either party? The Court held that the Fourth Circuit violated the principle of party presentation by deciding the case on a novel ground not raised by the parties.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
Parties — Petitioner: DAREN K. MARGOLIN, DIRECTOR OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW · Respondent: NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES
Vote & lineupPer Curiam
Who prevailed — The petitioner prevailed in that the judgment of the Fourth Circuit was reversed and the case was remanded.
The question

Did the Fourth Circuit violate the principle of party presentation by deciding a case on a novel ground not raised by either party? Specifically, did the court err by *sua sponte* questioning whether the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) was functioning as Congress intended due to the Merit Systems Protection Board's lack of a quorum? Does such an action transform the court into a "roving commission" rather than a passive instrument of government?

Petitioner's argument
  • The Fourth Circuit violated the principle of party presentation by deciding the case on a ground that neither party raised and without requesting supplemental briefing.
  • The court decided a "case different from the one [respondent] advanced."
  • This "drastic" departure from the principle of party presentation constituted an abuse of discretion.
Respondent's argument
  • Respondent argued that its members' First and Fifth Amendment constitutional claims were not the kind of work-related claims that Congress intended to steer out of district court.
  • Respondent accepted that the CSRA channels judicial review of "covered employment actions" to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
  • Respondent did not dispute that the CSRA provides the exclusive avenue for review of "certain employment-related claims."
The decision
  • The Court reversed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit.
  • The Court applied the "principle of party presentation," defined as the "rule that points not argued will not be considered."
  • The Court reasoned that federal courts are "essentially passive instruments of government" and must decide "only the questions presented," citing *United States v. Sineneng-Smith*.
  • The Court noted that this principle distinguishes the U.S. adversarial system of justice from an inquisitorial one, citing *United States v. Burke*.
  • The Court found the Fourth Circuit violated this principle by *sua sponte* addressing whether the CSRA was "functioning as Congress intended" in light of the MSPB's lack of a quorum, an issue neither party raised.
  • The Court held that the Fourth Circuit "transgressed the party-presentation principle" by granting relief based on a claim the parties never asserted and that the other side never had the chance to address, citing *Clark v. Sweeney*.
  • The Court emphasized that federal courts are not "roving commissions," citing *Broadrick v. Oklahoma*, nor are they licensed to "sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right," citing *United States v. Samuels*.
  • The Court concluded that the Fourth Circuit's action constituted an "abuse of discretion."
Separate opinions
THOMAS, concurring, joined by BARRETT
  • Argues the Fourth Circuit was wrong on the merits because the CSRA (5 U.S.C. §1101 et seq.) and *Elgin v. Department of Treasury* require covered employees to proceed exclusively through the statutory review scheme (including 5 U.S.C. §§1214, 7512, 7703 and 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(9)).
  • Contends that the President's removal of officials (*Myers v. United States*) does not change the meaning of the statute, noting that "Conditions may have changed, but the statute has not" (*United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess*) and that statutes change only when Congress changes them (U.S. Const., Art. I, §§1, 7).