Does a federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under §3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) have jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims? This question arises when the motion to confirm under §9 or the motion to vacate under §10 does not independently present a basis for federal jurisdiction on its face. The Court must determine if the court retains jurisdiction based on the original claims that were stayed.

• Argued that under *Badgerow v. Walters*, the District Court lacked jurisdiction because the §9 and §10 motions neither presented federal questions nor satisfied diversity jurisdiction requirements.
• Contended that §9 and §10 applications should be treated as "new federal actions" for jurisdictional purposes because §9 and §12 of the FAA require service and notice.
• Asserted that §8 of the FAA demonstrates that Congress knew how to authorize a "jurisdictional anchor" for maritime cases but declined to provide similar authority for §9 or §10.
• Warned that the respondents' position would encourage parties to engage in "useless federal litigation" for the sole purpose of creating a jurisdictional anchor.

• Argued that the District Court maintained jurisdiction because it had original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 over the claims before they were stayed.
• Contended that a court with the power to stay an action under §3 has the further power to confirm or vacate any ensuing arbitration award.
• Asserted that *Badgerow v. Walters* applied only to "freestanding" actions and did not apply to cases that began as federal-question suits.
• Argued that the FAA's structure envisions a "supervisory role" for courts that includes facilitating recovery on an arbitral award.

• The Court held that a federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under §3 of the FAA has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims as prescribed in §9 and §10.
• The Court reasoned that "jurisdiction to decide [a] case includes jurisdiction to decide [a] motion" within that case, citing *Badgerow v. Walters*.
• Unlike the "freestanding" applications in *Vaden v. Discover Bank* and *Badgerow*, the court here does not need to "look through" the motion to an outside controversy because the original claims were already before the court under 28 U.S.C. §1331.
• The Court noted that nothing in the FAA eliminates federal jurisdiction while the parties arbitrate, citing *Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc.*
• The Court invoked *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America* to establish that federal courts have the power to incorporate private settlements into court orders when resolving pending claims.
• The Court relied on *Smith v. Spizzirri* to emphasize that §3 requires a stay rather than dismissal, which comports with the "supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the courts."
• The Court rejected the argument that §9 and §12 service requirements create "new federal actions," noting that §3's mandatory stay is specifically aimed at "avoid[ing] [the] costs and complications" of bringing a new suit.
• The Court dismissed the relevance of §8 of the FAA, finding it applies only to a specific class of admiralty cases involving in rem jurisdiction over a vessel.
• The Court concluded that its rule avoids "wasteful, bifurcated, and possibly inconsistent proceedings" that would occur if parties were forced to launch fresh state-court proceedings to secure confirmation or vacatur.