This case asks whether a preliminary injunction preventing President Trump from removing Lisa Cook from the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors should remain in effect while litigation over her removal proceeds. Cook alleged that her attempted firing was not "for cause" as required by 12 U. S. C. §242 and that the President failed to provide the pretermination process required by that statute (and the Constitution). The specific issue is whether the Government has shown a likelihood of success on the merits sufficient to justify staying the District Court's order.

• The President's determination of "cause" is wholly unreviewable because the statute "commits the determination of cause to" the President alone (Application 20), though it conceded courts may review a removal where the President identifies no cause at all.
• Even if reviewable, "cause" sets a very low bar including any concern about a person's "conduct, ability, fitness, or competence" (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 508 (2d ed. 1910)), which the President easily met by citing concerns about Cook's integrity.
• Federal courts cannot grant a preliminary injunction ordering reinstatement during litigation; a court may only wait and perhaps award backpay later, relying on 2 J. High, Law of Injunctions §1312.
• The statute contains no notice-and-hearing requirement because Congress "knows how to impose notice-and-hearing requirements" expressly and did not do so here; alternatively, Cook in fact received due process through the President's social-media posts.

• Her office is her "property," so the President could not deprive her of it without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.
• The President did not cite legally permissible "cause," which she argued was limited to specific statutory causes (inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, and ineligibility) as of the 1935 reenactment, and her private, pre-office conduct offers no cause at all.
• The term "for cause" is a term of art that includes a right to notice and a hearing before removal.
• She sought to remain in office during litigation, invoking the Declaratory Judgment Act, the All Writs Act, and the District Court's traditional equitable jurisdiction.

• The Court denied the Government's stay application, holding it had not shown likelihood of success on the merits under Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190, and Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434; accepting the Government's position would transform for-cause protection into at-will employment.
• On reviewability, the Court found no textual commitment of the "cause" determination to the President alone; even where a statute "delegates discretionary authority," courts must "independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits" (Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 395), and the common law (State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council of City of Duluth; Bagg's Case) permits review; Reagan v. United States is distinguishable because that statute specified no causes.
• On the meaning of "cause," the Court rejected both parties' positions; Congress legislated "against the backdrop of the common law" (Comcast Corp. v. National Assn. of African American-Owned Media, 589 U. S. 327, 335), and any definition must reflect the Federal Reserve's unique historical status and independence, counseling a "substantial threshold" turning on seriousness of misconduct and nexus to professional duties (In re Nichols).
• On remedy, the Court held equity could protect de facto incumbents "pending a contest as to their title" (2 J. High §1315), distinguishing In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, and White v. Berry, 171 U. S. 366, as barring only final determinations of title, relying on Professor Bray's analysis; a plaintiff may sue in equity without a congressional cause of action (Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.).
• The Court decided on the "narrow ground" that the President failed to afford Cook the procedural protections owed by statute, avoiding the constitutional due process question.
• The "for cause"/fixed-term form of tenure carried a settled interpretation that "notice and hearing are essential" where "the term of office is for a fixed period" (Reagan v. United States, 182 U. S. 419, 425; Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311, 314), requiring at least "the right to support his allegations by argument however brief" (Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 386).
• The Court held the Federal Reserve's removal protection consistent with the Constitution, citing the founding tradition of central bank independence (Hamilton's Report on a National Bank; the First and Second Banks) and declining to leave that "special arrangement sanctioned by history" in doubt (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Assn.); it invoked Rahimi and Noel Canning for reading tradition under modern circumstances.
• The Court rejected the Government's claim that Cook received due process, holding she was entitled to "some explanation of the evidence," "some avenue for a response," and "a deadline" (cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306), so her removal was "erroneous and void" (Bagg's Case).