Whether the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is entitled to a stay of a Fourth Circuit mandamus order requiring it to resolve a pending application for review within 48 hours. The Court must determine if the FCC meets the criteria for a stay in light of the extraordinary nature of writs of mandamus. It further considers whether the judiciary may compel an agency to act on a specific, expedited timeline.

• A writ of mandamus is a "drastic and extraordinary" remedy that should only be used when there are no other adequate means for relief and the right to the writ is "clear and indisputable."
• The Communications Act requires the Commission to act on applications but does not obligate it to do so within a specific timeframe.
• Forcing a final decision within 48 hours would require the FCC to abandon its ongoing deliberation process, constituting an injury that cannot be remedied after the fact.
• The Fourth Circuit likely lacked statutory jurisdiction to address the underlying challenge because the candidates' application for review was still pending before the Commission.

• A mandamus order requiring a prompt resolution was "the only means to finally move forward with . . . judicial review."
• Only political candidates, rather than joint fundraising committees or political parties, are entitled to the lowest unit charge (LUC) under 47 U. S. C. §315(b)(1)(A).
• Not stated.

• To obtain a stay, the petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that four Justices will grant certiorari, a fair prospect that a majority will reverse the judgment, and a likelihood of irreparable harm, as established in *Hollingsworth v. Perry*, 558 U. S. 183 (2010).
• The Court notes that a writ of mandamus is reserved for "really extraordinary causes" (*Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C.*, 542 U. S. 367; *Ex parte Fahey*, 332 U. S. 258) and is used to correct a clear "usurpation of power" (*Will v. United States*, 389 U. S. 90) or compel a "ministerial or non-discretionary act" where the agency has "no discretion whatever" (*Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance*, 542 U. S. 55).
• The Court finds that while 47 U. S. C. §155(c)(4) requires the Commission to act on every application it receives, the statute does not mandate a specific timeframe for doing so.
• Under *Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 435 U. S. 519 (1978), the Commission maintains the discretion to set its own procedures and schedule for resolving applications.
• The Court reasons that the separation of powers prevents the Judiciary from meddling in "the workings of a coordinate branch of the Government" (*INS v. Legalization Assistance Project of Los Angeles County Federation of Labor*, 510 U. S. 1301).
• The FCC faces irreparable harm because the 48-hour deadline forces it to triage and abandon its deliberative process, an injury that cannot be remedied later.
• Because these factors favor the petitioner, the Court grants the stay of the Fourth Circuit's order.