Does the Secretary of Homeland Security's decision to revoke a previously approved visa petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1155 constitute a discretionary action? If so, does this decision fall under the jurisdiction-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)? The Court must determine if federal courts have the authority to review such revocations when they are based on a sham-marriage determination.

• Argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c), which prohibits approval of petitions involving sham marriages, creates an ongoing duty for the agency to revoke any petition that should not have been approved.
• Contended that once a Secretary determines a beneficiary entered into a sham marriage, the Secretary has no choice but to revoke the approval, making the action mandatory rather than discretionary.
• Asserted that because the agency consistently revokes approvals upon a sham-marriage determination in practice, the decision is not truly discretionary.
• Argued that there is a general presumption that administrative actions are subject to judicial review.

• Maintained that 8 U.S.C. § 1155 provides a broad, quintessential grant of discretion by allowing the Secretary to revoke approval "at any time" for "good and sufficient cause."
• Argued that judicial review is explicitly barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) for decisions made discretionary by legislation.
• Contended that agency practice does not transform a legislatively discretionary decision into a mandatory one.
• Asserted that the statutory scheme allows for different levels of review depending on whether a sham-marriage determination occurs during initial denial or subsequent revocation.

• The Court held that revocation under 8 U.S.C. § 1155 is a discretionary decision and therefore falls within the jurisdiction-stripping purview of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
• The Court reasoned that the word "may" in § 1155 "clearly connotes discretion," citing *Biden v. Texas* and *Opati v. Republic of Sudan*.
• It found that the broad authority to revoke "at any time" for what the Secretary "deems to be good and sufficient cause" is similar to discretionary grants held to commit decisions to agency discretion in *Webster v. Doe*.
• The Court noted that § 1155 provides even more discretion than the provisions listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), such as 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a) and 1229c(a)(1), because it imposes no "threshold requirements."
• It rejected the argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) mandates revocation, stating that the command "no petition shall be approved" extends only to the point of initial approval and does not create an ongoing duty to revoke.
• The Court ruled that agency practice cannot override statutory language, as 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars review of decisions "made discretionary by legislation," citing *Kucana v. Holder*.
• It distinguished *Patel v. Garland*, noting that unlike the determinations in that case, § 1155 contains no threshold requirements to access the relevant discretion.
• The Court concluded that any presumption of reviewability is overcome by "clear and convincing evidence" of congressional intent to preclude review, citing *Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr* and *Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc.*