What is the standard of proof an employer must satisfy to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)? Specifically, does the "preponderance-of-the-evidence" standard apply or is a heightened "clear-and-convincing-evidence" standard required? The Court must determine if statutory silence on this issue implies the default civil standard or necessitates a higher burden of proof.

• The District Court erred by applying the "clear and convincing evidence" standard instead of the less stringent "preponderance-of-the-evidence" standard.
• The preponderance standard is the established default in American civil litigation.
• There is no statutory or constitutional requirement for a heightened standard of proof regarding FLSA exemptions.

• A heightened "clear and convincing evidence" standard should apply because the FLSA protects the public interest in a fair economy where workers are guaranteed a fair wage.
• Rights under the FLSA are nonwaivable, which distinguishes them from other rights subject to the preponderance standard.
• The employer controls most of the relevant evidence and the plaintiffs may have low incomes, necessitating a higher burden on the employer.

• The Court held that the "preponderance-of-the-evidence" standard applies when an employer seeks to show an employee is exempt from FLSA minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions.
• The Court reasoned that preponderance of the evidence is the default standard in American civil litigation, allowing parties to "share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion," citing *Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston*.
• It identified only three circumstances for deviating from this default: when a statute requires it (e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 218c(b)(1)), the Constitution mandates it (*New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*), or in rare cases of "unusual coercive action" by the government (*Nishikawa v. Dulles*).
• Because the FLSA is silent regarding a standard of proof for exemptions, the Court applied the default preponderance standard, noting that statutory silence is generally "inconsistent with the view that Congress intended to require a special, heightened standard of proof," citing *Grogan v. Garner*.
• The Court found no constitutional rights or unusual government coercion involved in this case, comparing FLSA claims to Title VII employment-discrimination cases where the preponderance standard applies under *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*.
• Regarding policy arguments, the Court noted that other workplace protections serving important public interests, such as those in Title VII, still use the preponderance standard.
• The Court clarified that the "waivability (or lack thereof) of a right does not dictate the applicable standard of proof," citing *NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.* to show nonwaivable rights can still be subject to a preponderance standard.
• Finally, the Court rejected the argument regarding employer control of evidence and plaintiff income, noting that similar conditions exist in Title VII cases where the preponderance standard is used, citing *Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC*.