Andrew v. White, Warden
No. 23-6573 · Decided January 21, 2025 · vacated and remanded
Does clearly established federal law provide that the Due Process Clause forbids the introduction of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair? At the time of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' decision, clearly established federal law provided that the Due Process Clause forbids the introduction of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Parties — Petitioner: ANDREW · Respondent: WHITE, WARDEN
Vote & lineupPer Curiam
Who prevailed — Petitioner Brenda Andrew prevailed on the issue of whether there was clearly established federal law governing her claim, resulting in the vacation of the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
The question

Does clearly established federal law provide that the Due Process Clause forbids the introduction of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair? Specifically, does the statement in *Payne v. Tennessee* regarding this mechanism for relief constitute a "holding" for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)? If so, did the Tenth Circuit err by concluding that petitioner failed to identify clearly established federal law governing her claim?

Petitioner's argument
  • The introduction of irrelevant evidence regarding her sex life, extramarital affairs, and provocative attire was so prejudicial as to violate the Federal Due Process Clause.
  • This evidentiary pattern rendered both the guilt and sentencing phases of her trial fundamentally unfair.
  • Clearly established federal law, specifically *Payne v. Tennessee*, provides a mechanism for relief when unduly prejudicial evidence renders a trial fundamentally unfair.
Respondent's argument
  • The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) determined that the admission of irrelevant evidence was harmless given the strength of the evidence against petitioner.
  • Petitioner failed to identify "clearly established federal law" as required by 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
  • The statement in *Payne v. Tennessee* regarding due process was a mere pronouncement or dicta, not a binding holding that could constrain a federal habeas court.
The decision
  • Clearly established federal law provides that the Due Process Clause forbids the introduction of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.
  • Under 28 U. S. C. §§2254(d)(1)–(2), a petitioner must show a state court unreasonably applied the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta," of this Court's decisions (*White v. Woodall*).
  • A legal principle is a "holding" if the Court relies on it to decide a case (*Lockyer v. Andrade*).
  • The principle that the Due Process Clause protects against evidence that "renders [a] trial fundamentally unfair" was indispensable to the decision in *Payne v. Tennessee*, 501 U. S. 808, and is thus a holding for AEDPA purposes.
  • This principle is supported by other precedents, including *Donnelly v. DeChristoforo*, *Caldwell v. Mississippi*, and *Darden v. Wainwright*.
  • General legal principles can constitute clearly established law under AEDPA even if they lack "precise contours" (*Lockyer*) or arise in new factual permutations (*White*).
  • The Tenth Circuit erred by refusing to consider whether the OCCA unreasonably applied these principles because it mistakenly believed *Payne* was limited to its specific facts regarding victim impact evidence.
  • Because the Tenth Circuit's ruling on the existence of clearly established law is reviewed de novo, the case must be remanded for the court to determine if the state court's application of that law was reasonable.
Separate opinions
ALITO, concurring in judgment, joined by nobody
  • Argues that due process rights are violated when properly admitted evidence is overwhelmed by a "flood of irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence" rendering the trial fundamentally unfair.
  • Relies on *Payne v. Tennessee*, *Romano v. Oklahoma*, and *Rideau v. Louisiana*.
THOMAS, dissenting, joined by GORSUCH
  • Argues the Court framed its precedent at too high a level of generality, violating AEDPA rules established in *Lopez v. Smith* and *Brown v. Davenport*.
  • Contends that the due process statement in *Payne* was dicta and that *Estelle v. McGuire* expressly reserved the question of whether receiving irrelevant evidence violates the Due Process Clause.
  • Asserts that a "debatable interpretation" of precedent cannot be "clearly established law" under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
Read the full opinion on supremecourt.gov (PDF) →