Whether alleging that a foreign sovereign commingled proceeds from expropriated property with general funds satisfies the commercial nexus requirement of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Specifically, the Court addresses whether such allegations are sufficient under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) to allow a suit against a foreign state for property taken in violation of international law. The issue is whether this "commingling theory" allows plaintiffs to avoid the need to trace specific funds to the United States.

• Respondents must produce evidence tracing specific property in the United States, or property possessed by MÁV, back to the property expropriated during World War II.
• The "commingling theory" ignores the plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), which requires that the specific property or property exchanged for it be present in the U.S.
• Accepting such a broad theory would expand the circumstances under which foreign sovereigns can be sued for public acts, potentially inviting retaliatory actions against the United States in foreign courts.

• Because money is fungible, requiring plaintiffs to trace specific funds from liquidated property would render the expropriation exception a "nullity" for almost all claims involving liquidation.
• The phrase "any property exchanged for such property" in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) is intended to cover circumstances where stolen property is converted into cash and mixed with other funds.
• Concerns raised in *Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino* regarding the difficulty of tracing fungible goods support a more flexible approach to establishing a commercial nexus.

• The Court held that alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
• The plain text of the expropriation exception requires plaintiffs to trace either the specific expropriated property or "any property exchanged for such property" to the United States.
• The Court reasoned that the statute treats tangible and fungible property alike, meaning plaintiffs must plausibly allege facts enabling the reasonable tracing of proceeds to the U.S., regardless of whether those proceeds are cash.
• Under the ordinary meaning of "exchanged for," a plaintiff must identify the specific proceeds received in return for the original property; commingling these proceeds does not transform an entire account into property "exchanged for" the expropriated asset.
• The Court noted that the geographic requirement that property be "present in the United States" reinforces the necessity of tracing specific assets, as Congress imposed this constraint on "any" property, including money.
• This interpretation adheres to the FSIA's general codification of the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity, which shields foreign states from suits based on public acts rather than commercial ones, a principle discussed in *Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp*.
• The Court emphasized that the expropriation exception is not intended to be a "radical departure" from restrictive immunity principles (*Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp*).
• To avoid international friction and reciprocal actions against the U.S., the Court interpreted the FSIA to conform closely with international law, citing *Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co.*
• The Court distinguished this case from *Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino*, noting that in *Sabbatino* the proceeds were traceable to a segregated New York account.