Whether the U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a state court judgment when that judgment relies on a procedural bar whose application depends on an antecedent ruling of federal law. Whether the prosecution violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by knowingly failing to correct false testimony provided by a key witness. Whether such a violation, if established, entitles the petitioner to a new trial.

• The prosecution violated *Napue v. Illinois* by allowing Justin Sneed to falsely testify that he had never seen a psychiatrist and was given lithium for a cold, when he was actually treating bipolar disorder.
• This false testimony was material because Sneed was the only direct evidence of guilt, and his mental health diagnosis undermined the State's portrayal of him as a "puppet" under Glossip's control.
• The prosecution committed further misconduct by violating the rule of sequestration, destroying key physical evidence, and withholding witness statements.
• Petitioner sought a new trial based on these constitutional violations and newly discovered evidence.

• The Court lacks jurisdiction because the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) relied on the Post-Conviction Procedures Act (PCPA), which constitutes an independent and adequate state ground.
• There was no *Napue* violation because the defense was already aware, or should have been aware, that Sneed was taking lithium at the time of trial.
• The false testimony regarding the reason for the lithium prescription was not material and would not have affected the outcome of the trial.
• Respondent sought affirmation of the OCCA's judgment denying post-conviction relief.

• The Court has jurisdiction because the OCCA's application of the PCPA depended on its rejection of the attorney general's confession of a *Napue* error, making the procedural bar dependent on federal law under *Michigan v. Long*.
• Under *Napue v. Illinois*, a conviction violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause if it is knowingly obtained through the use of false evidence.
• To establish a *Napue* violation, a defendant must show the prosecution knowingly solicited or allowed false testimony to go uncorrected; a new trial is warranted if there is a "reasonable likelihood" the false testimony affected the jury's judgment (*Giglio v. United States*).
• The Court found Sneed falsely testified that he had never seen a psychiatrist and took lithium for a cold, while evidence showed he was treated for bipolar disorder by Dr. Trombka.
• The prosecution knew this testimony was false based on medical files and notes mentioning "Dr. Trumpet" (Trombka), the only jail professional authorized to prescribe lithium.
• The testimony was material because Sneed's credibility was determinative as the sole direct evidence of guilt, and his bipolar disorder contradicted the State's theory that he was a harmless "puppet."
• Additional misconduct—including violating the rule of sequestration and destroying evidence—further undermined confidence in the verdict.
• Following *Ake v. Oklahoma*, the Court determined that because the OCCA incorrectly adjudged federal rights, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial.