Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permit a district court to reopen a case that was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)? The Court must determine if such a dismissal qualifies as a “final judgment, order, or proceeding.” This determination is necessary to decide if a party can seek relief from a voluntary dismissal based on mistake or other grounds.

• A voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a) constitutes a “final proceeding” within the meaning of Rule 60(b).
• Such a dismissal may also qualify as a “judgment” for the purposes of seeking relief.
• The District Court correctly found that petitioner committed a “careless mistake” under Rule 60(b)(1) by dismissing the case instead of seeking a stay pending arbitration.

• A voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not count as a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” and thus falls outside the reach of Rule 60(b).
• The term “final” should be construed consistently with appellate jurisdictional statutes like 28 U. S. C. § 1291, meaning it must terminate the litigation on the merits.
• The term “proceeding” should be read in the context of its neighboring terms, “judgment” and “order,” requiring that it involve a judicial determination of rights.
• Based on *Badgerow v. Walters* and *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America*, the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the motion to vacate the arbitration award.

• The Court held that a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal without prejudice qualifies as a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b).
• Regarding "finality," the Court relied on Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933) and Ballentine's Law Dictionary (1930), which define "final" as definitive, terminating, or conclusive; a voluntary dismissal is final because it terminates the action itself.
• The Court invoked the Advisory Committee's 1946 Note on subd. (b) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60, noting that “final” was added to exclude interlocutory judgments—which courts can revise inherently under *John Simmons Co. v. Grier Brothers Co.*—thereby making Rule 60(b) the appropriate avenue once a case is terminated.
• The Court rejected respondent's attempt to import the "finality" concept from 28 U. S. C. § 1291 and *Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff*, reasoning that appellate finality prevents interlocutory appeals from impairing trial resolution (*Cobbledick v. United States*; *Segurola v. United States*), whereas Rule 60(b) is discretionary rather than a statutory right (*Arizona v. Manypenny*) and does not pose the same risk to efficiency.
• Regarding "proceeding," the Court cited Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933, 12th ed. 2024), Ballentine's Law Dictionary, and Webster's New International Dictionary (1927) to conclude that a “proceeding” encompasses all steps in an action from commencement to execution of judgment.
• The Court noted that other rules, such as Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(iv) and Rule 41(d)(2), treat "proceedings" as encompassing all further actions or docket filings in a case.
• The Court rejected the argument that “proceeding” must involve a judicial determination (citing *Fischer v. United States* and *United States v. Williams*), arguing that such a reading would make the term redundant with “order”; instead, the Court found Rule 60(b) uses an ascending order of generality from "judgment" to "order" to "proceeding."
• The Court relied on historical context, noting Rule 60(b) was modeled after California Code of Civil Procedure § 473, which the California Supreme Court in *Palace Hardware Co. v. Smith* interpreted to extend to voluntary dismissals regardless of prejudice.