What does the statutory command to “take due account” of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1) require the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to do? Specifically, does this requirement mandate a de novo review of the entire record to determine if evidence is in “approximate balance”? Or is such a determination predominantly factual and subject to clear-error review under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)?

• The statutory command in 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1) to “take due account” requires the Veterans Court to review the entire record de novo and decide for itself whether evidence is in approximate balance.
• If not a strictly de novo standard, the provision establishes an "APA-plus" standard of review.
• The VA's approximate-balance determination is analogous to a court's probable-cause determination, which is a mixed-question inquiry subject to de novo review under *Ornelas v. United States*.

• The determination that evidence is not in approximate balance is a factual finding or a predominantly factual mixed question of law and fact.
• Such determinations should be reviewed for clear error pursuant to the standards set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a).
• The phrase “take due account” does not impose a new standard of review but rather directs the court to give appropriate attention to the VA's work within the existing framework of § 7261(a).

• The Court held that the VA's determination that evidence is in “approximate balance” under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.
• Under the plain text of 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), the Veterans Court must “take due account” of the VA's application of the rule “[i]n making the determinations under subsection (a),” meaning the standards in § 7261(a) govern.
• The Court identified a two-step process: first, assigning weight to evidence (a fact-finding inquiry reviewed for clear error), and second, determining if that evidence is in approximate balance.
• This second step is a mixed question because it involves both marshaling/weighing evidence (factual) and deciding if the evidence satisfies a legal standard (legal).
• Applying the test from *U.S. Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC*, the Court reasoned that the appropriate standard for a mixed question depends on whether it entails primarily legal or factual work.
• The Court concluded that approximate-balance determinations are “about as factual sounding” as any question because they require case-specific review of medical opinions and credibility judgments.
• The Court distinguished this from probable-cause determinations in *Ornelas v. United States* because the benefit-of-the-doubt rule is a creature of statute, not the Constitution, and lacks a comparable objective legal component that would require uniform precedent.
• Regarding the canon against surplusage, the Court cited *Marx v. General Revenue Corp.* to state that the canon does not apply when petitioners fail to identify a competing interpretation that avoids redundancy.