Does an individual who knowingly or intentionally causes bodily injury or death by failing to take action "use physical force" within the meaning of the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)? Specifically, does this principle apply when a predicate offense, such as New York second-degree murder, can be committed through an omission of a legal duty? The Court must determine if the "use" of force encompasses deliberate inaction that results in physical harm.

• A VICAR offense predicated on New York second-degree murder is not a crime of violence because homicide under New York law can be committed by omission, defined as the failure to perform a legal duty.
• Crimes of omission do not involve the "use of force" required by § 924(c)(3)(A).
• There cannot be an automatic connection between injury and violent force because even a small degree of force might injure an "eggshell" victim.

• The knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force, regardless of whether it occurs via act or omission.
• This interpretation is supported by the Court's reasoning in *United States v. Castleman*.
• Intentional murder is a prototypical "crime of violence" and has long been understood to incorporate liability for both acts and omissions.

• The Court held that the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).
• Relying on *United States v. Castleman*, the Court reasoned that it is impossible to deliberately cause physical harm without applying force, and the knowing or intentional application of force constitutes a "use" of force.
• The Court noted that while § 924(c) requires "violent force" rather than the battery-level force discussed in *Castleman*, this distinction is immaterial because any force actually causing injury or death qualifies as violent force under *Stokeling v. United States*.
• Applying the test for actual causality from *Burrage v. United States*, the Court found that harm occurs "but for" the defendant's conduct, meaning an omission (e.g., refusing to feed a child) is no less a cause of death than an affirmative act (e.g., poisoning).
• The Court determined that "use" in ordinary language includes deliberate inaction, such as using the poisonous properties of bleach by declining to intervene when a child drinks it.
• Regarding the phrase “against the person or property of another,” the Court cited *Borden v. United States* to conclude this requires only that the victim be the “conscious object” of the force.
• The Court looked to the ordinary meaning of "crime of violence," noting that intentional murder is a prototypical example and was understood in 1986 (when the statute was enacted) to include omissions, as evidenced by statutes in at least 33 States and leading criminal-law treatises.
• The Court concluded that if the elements clause did not encompass deliberate inaction, it would lack a reasonable relationship to the term "crime of violence" it defines.