Does civil RICO categorically bar recovery for business or property losses that derive from a personal injury? Specifically, the Court must determine if 18 U. S. C. § 1964(c) precludes treble damages when the economic loss is a secondary effect of an antecedent personal injury. The central issue is whether the "business or property" requirement limits the cause of the harm or only the type of harm for which a plaintiff can recover.

• Argues that "injured in his business or property" is a term of art meaning the "invasion of a legal right," specifically a business or property tort, citing *Ballentine's Law Dictionary*.
• Contends that an invasion of a personal right never gives rise to a RICO claim and that plaintiffs cannot "recast" a personal-injury tort as a RICO suit.
• Asserts that antitrust precedent requires plaintiffs to allege injuries that track common-law torts.

• Argues that the plain language of 18 U. S. C. § 1964(c) allows recovery for any person "injured in his business or property" regardless of the cause.
• Contends that there is no "antecedent-personal-injury bar" within the text or structure of RICO.
• Asserts that losing employment constitutes being "injured in his business."

• Holds that under 18 U. S. C. § 1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury.
• Applies the ordinary meaning of "injure," defined as to "cause harm or damage to" or to "hurt," citing *American Heritage Dictionary*, *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, and *Ballentine's Law Dictionary*.
• Reasons that while § 1964(c) implicitly excludes recovery for harm to one's person, this limitation applies to the kinds of harm recovered, not the cause of the harm.
• Rejects the "term-of-art" argument because the statute uses "injured" rather than "injury," and *Ballentine's Law Dictionary* defines "injured" only by its ordinary meaning.
• Clarifies that "damages" in § 1964(c) refers to monetary redress, which is distinct from the act of being "injured."
• Invokes precedents where "injury," "harm," and loss are used interchangeably, including *Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co.*, *Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.*, and *Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York*.
• Relies on *Yegiazaryan v. Smagin* to reject an appeal to common-law principles as inconsistent with the "thrust of § 1964(c)."
• Distinguishes antitrust law by noting that the Clayton Act's injury requirements are not interchangeable with those of § 1964(c), citing *RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community*.