Whether a voluntary-departure deadline under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day. Additionally, whether a petition for judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 requires the petitioner to challenge their "removability" to secure jurisdiction over other legal questions arising from a final order of removal. The case specifically addresses whether the term "days" in the statutory deadline refers to calendar days or follows specialized legal counting rules.

• Argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) operates to extend any deadline falling on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day.
• Contended that the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 because he sought review of a "question of law" regarding the terms of his final order of removal.
• Asserted that the meaning of "60 days" in his order should be interpreted consistently with longstanding immigration regulatory practices.

• Argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) requires a petitioner to include a challenge to their "removability" to secure judicial review of a final order of removal.
• Contended that the term "days" in 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) refers to calendar days, meaning no extension is granted for deadlines falling on weekends or holidays.
• Asserted a distinction between "procedural" deadlines (such as filing motions), which might be extended, and "substantive" duties (such as departing the country), which should not be.

• The Court held that the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction because 8 U.S.C. § 1252 allows review of "final order[s] of removal" and "all questions of law" arising from them, without requiring a challenge to removability.
• Relying on *Nasrallah v. Barr*, the Court found that a dispute over the meaning of a term in a final order of removal is a reviewable question of law.
• On the merits, the Court held that under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline falling on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.
• The Court applied the presumption that when Congress adopts new law against a "longstanding administrative construction," the provision works in harmony with existing practice, citing *Haig v. Agee*.
• It noted that since the 1950s, immigration regulations (such as 8 CFR § 1.1(a)(6)) have excluded Sundays, legal holidays, and later Saturdays when calculating deadlines for "taking [of] any action."
• The Court invoked the principle from *Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.* that identical words within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.
• It observed that other deadlines in § 304 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), specifically those for motions to reopen or reconsider under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(6)(B) and (c)(7)(C)(i), are subject to this extension rule.
• The Court rejected the government's "procedural" versus "substantive" distinction, finding that neither the text of § 304 nor the regulatory background supports such a divide.