Cc/Devas (Mauritius) LTD. et al. v. Antrix Corp. LTD. et al.
No. 23-1201 · Decided June 5, 2025 · Reversed and remanded
Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) require a "minimum contacts" analysis to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign state? Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state exists under the FSIA if an immunity exception applies and service of process is proper, without requiring a separate "minimum contacts" analysis.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT · Argued March 3, 2025
Parties — Petitioner: CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. et al. · Respondent: ANTRIX CORP. LTD. et al.
Vote & lineup9–0 (unanimous) on the judgment. Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court (9).
Who prevailed — Petitioner prevailed on the issue of whether the FSIA requires a minimum-contacts analysis for personal jurisdiction.
The question

Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) require a "minimum contacts" analysis to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign state? Specifically, is such an analysis required in addition to the application of an immunity exception and proper service of process? This question arises from whether the standards set forth in *International Shoe Co. v. Washington* apply independently to suits against foreign sovereigns under the FSIA.

Petitioner's argument
  • The plain text of 28 U. S. C. § 1330(b) makes personal jurisdiction automatic once an immunity exception applies and service is effectuated.
  • The FSIA was intended to "clarify the governing standards" for suits against foreign states, and adding a minimum-contacts requirement would contradict this purpose.
  • Any necessary contacts are already addressed within the specific requirements of the FSIA's various immunity exceptions.
Respondent's argument
  • Personal jurisdiction under the FSIA requires a traditional "minimum contacts" analysis as established in *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*.
  • The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause independently requires a showing of minimum contacts before a federal court can exercise jurisdiction over a company owned by a foreign sovereign.
  • The claims at issue do not fall within the FSIA's arbitration exception, and the suit should be dismissed based on *forum non conveniens*.
The decision
  • Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper; no additional "minimum contacts" proof is required.
  • The Court relied on 28 U. S. C. § 1330(b), which states personal jurisdiction "shall exist" if subject-matter jurisdiction exists under subsection (a) and service is made under section 1608.
  • The Court noted that the word "shall" creates an obligation "impervious to judicial discretion," citing *Smith v. Spizzirri*.
  • Following *Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria*, the Court refused to add a "minimum contacts" requirement that Congress omitted from the statutory text.
  • The Court reasoned that the FSIA "comprehensively regulat[es] the amenability of foreign nations to suit in the United States," citing *Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.*
  • Adding an external test would weaken the link between immunity and jurisdiction and create a gap in the Act's "comprehensive framework," as discussed in *Republic of Austria v. Altmann*.
  • The Court clarified that while some immunity exceptions (such as 28 U. S. C. §§ 1605(a)(2)–(4)) require domestic nexus, this is a feature of those specific exceptions and not a secret incorporation of *International Shoe* into § 1330(b).
  • The Court found that the legislative history (H. R. Rep. No. 94–1487) confirms that due process requirements are embodied within the immunity provisions and service rules themselves.