Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. et al. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos
No. 23-1141 · Decided June 5, 2025 · reversed and remanded
Whether Mexico's complaint plausibly alleges that American gun manufacturers aided and abetted the unlawful sale of firearms to Mexican traffickers. The Court held that Mexico's complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted unlawful firearm sales, meaning the lawsuit is barred by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).
Vote & lineup9–0 (unanimous) on the judgment. Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court (9). Concurrence(s): Thomas, Jackson.
The question
Whether Mexico's complaint plausibly alleges that American gun manufacturers aided and abetted the unlawful sale of firearms to Mexican traffickers. If so, does this conduct trigger the "predicate exception" under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), 15 U. S. C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)? Consequently, is the lawsuit barred by PLCAA's general prohibition on qualified civil liability actions?
Petitioner's argument
- The suit constitutes a "qualified civil liability action" under 15 U. S. C. § 7903(5)(A) and is therefore barred by 15 U. S. C. § 7902(a).
- Mexico failed to allege specific criminal transactions or the affirmative acts of assistance required to establish aiding and abetting liability.
- The manufacturers' conduct—selling legal products through a multi-tier distribution system—does not constitute a "knowing violation" of any statute under the predicate exception.
Respondent's argument
- The manufacturers aided and abetted illegal sales by continuing to supply retail dealers known to be "bad apple dealers" who sell to Mexican traffickers.
- Defendants failed to implement "commonsense restraints" on their supply chains, such as prohibiting bulk sales or monitoring dealer practices.
- Manufacturers made specific design and marketing decisions—such as producing military-style weapons and guns with Spanish-language names—to stimulate demand from cartels.
The decision
- The Court held that PLCAA bars the lawsuit because Mexico's complaint does not plausibly allege that the manufacturers aided and abetted unlawful firearm sales.
- To aid and abet, a person must take an "affirmative act in furtherance of" an offense and "intend to facilitate its commission," as established in *Rosemond v. United States* and *United States v. Peoni*.
- Relying on *Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh*, the Court noted that aiding and abetting usually requires misfeasance rather than nonfeasance; failures or omissions rarely support liability absent an independent duty to act.
- The Court distinguished this case from *Direct Sales Co. v. United States*, where a pharmacy "actively stimulated" illegal narcotics sales through high-pressure methods and discounts, thereby joining "both mind and hand" with the offender.
- Mexico's claim that manufacturers sold to known rogue dealers was insufficient because it described "indifference" rather than assistance, mirroring the "passive" relationship found in *Twitter*.
- The failure to regulate distribution networks or implement monitoring processes constitutes "passive nonfeasance," which does not meet the threshold for aiding and abetting.
- Design and marketing decisions regarding legal products (e.g., military-style rifles) do not constitute assistance in criminal acts simply because criminals prefer those products.
- The Court concluded that accepting Mexico's theory would "swallow most of the rule" of PLCAA, which Congress intended to protect manufacturers from liability for third-party misuse under 15 U. S. C. § 7901(a)(5).
Separate opinions
Thomas, concurring
- Argues that courts should determine if the term "violation" in 15 U. S. C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii) requires a prior finding of guilt or liability in an adjudication.
- Cites *United States v. Jin Fuey Moy* to argue that statutes should be construed to avoid grave constitutional doubts regarding the litigation of criminal guilt in civil proceedings.
Jackson, concurring
- Argues the complaint's core flaw is the failure to allege specific nonconclusory statutory violations rather than general industry practices.
- Cites H. R. Rep. No. 109–124 and 15 U. S. C. § 7901(a)(8) to argue that PLCAA prevents courts from acting as common-law regulators and preserves the primacy of the political branches in setting gun control terms.