Martin, Individually and As Parent and Next Friend of G. W., a Minor, et al. v. United States et al.
No. 24-362 · Decided June 12, 2025 · Vacated and remanded
Does the law enforcement proviso in 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h) override all exceptions in § 2680, including the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a)? The law enforcement proviso in 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h) applies only to the intentional-tort exception and not to other exceptions in § 2680, and the Supremacy Clause does not provide a defense for the United States in FTCA suits.
Vote & lineup9–0 (unanimous) on the judgment. Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court (9). Concurrence(s): Sotomayor (joined by Jackson).
The question
Does the law enforcement proviso in 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h) override all exceptions in § 2680, including the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a)? Does the Supremacy Clause afford the United States a defense to avoid liability in suits brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)? Whether these interpretations determine if the government is immune from damages resulting from a wrong-house raid.
Petitioner's argument
- The law enforcement proviso mirrors the language of § 2680's lead-in clause, suggesting Congress intended it to have the final word regarding all exceptions in that section.
- The first sentence of the proviso contains no limiting language, implying its application extends beyond subsection (h).
- Legislative history, including a committee report on wrong-house raids, indicates Congress intended to ensure such victims could seek damages regardless of other statutory exceptions.
Respondent's argument
- The law enforcement proviso is limited to the intentional-tort exception in § 2680(h) and does not override the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a).
- Not stated.
- Not stated.
The decision
- The law enforcement proviso in 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h) overrides only the intentional-tort exception within that subsection, not the discretionary-function exception or other exceptions throughout § 2680.
- Statutory provisos generally modify only the provisions in which they appear, relying on *McDonald v. United States* and *Alaska v. United States*.
- The proviso is structurally discrete from other subsections; it appears in the same sentence as the intentional-tort exception and addresses the same subject matter (intentional torts), unlike exceptions covering lost mail or combat injuries.
- The definition of "investigative or law enforcement officer" within § 2680(h) is expressly limited to "this subsection."
- The Supremacy Clause does not provide a defense for the United States in FTCA suits because the FTCA is the exclusive remedy and incorporates state law as the liability standard under 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b)(1).
- Because the FTCA subjects the government to liability on the same terms as a "private individual under like circumstances" under 28 U. S. C. § 2674, there is typically no conflict between federal and state law for the Supremacy Clause to resolve.
- The Eleventh Circuit's reliance on *In re Neagle* was misplaced because that case concerned a federal officer's immunity from state criminal prosecution, not civil liability under a statute that expressly subjects the government to state tort law.
Separate opinions
Sotomayor, concurring (joined by Jackson)
- Argues that the discretionary-function exception should be applied using the two-part test from *United States v. Gaubert* and *Berkovitz v. United States*, which requires both an element of judgment and a basis in public policy.
- Contends that negligent conduct—such as failing to check street signs before a raid—does not involve the kind of policy judgments the exception was designed to protect.
- Invokes the "historical backdrop" of the Collinsville raids and S. Rep. No. 93–588 to argue that Congress intended for victims of wrong-house raids to have a cause of action.