Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al. v. Texas et al.
No. 23-1300 · Decided June 18, 2025 · reversed and remanded
Whether the State of Texas and a private business, Fasken Land and Minerals, qualify as "parties aggrieved" under the Hobbs Act to obtain judicial review of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing decision. Texas and Fasken lack standing for judicial review of the NRC's licensing decision because they were not admitted as parties to the proceeding under the Atomic Energy Act and the Hobbs Act.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT · Argued March 5, 2025
Parties — Petitioner: NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION et al. · Respondent: TEXAS et al.
Vote & lineup6–3 on the judgment. Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, Jackson (6). Dissent(s): Gorsuch (joined by Thomas, Alito).
Who prevailed — The petitioners (Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Interim Storage Partners, LLC) prevailed on the issue of whether the respondents had the right to judicially review the licensing decision.
The question

Whether the State of Texas and a private business, Fasken Land and Minerals, qualify as "parties aggrieved" under the Hobbs Act to obtain judicial review of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing decision. Specifically, the Court must determine if submitting comments on a draft environmental impact statement or attempting to intervene in a proceeding confers party status under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Additionally, the Court addresses whether these entities may challenge the license as an *ultra vires* agency action regardless of their statutory party status.

Petitioner's argument
  • To obtain judicial review under the Hobbs Act, a person must be a "party aggrieved," which requires being either the license applicant or having successfully intervened in the proceeding.
  • Texas and Fasken are not license applicants and did not successfully intervene; therefore, they lack standing to challenge the licensing decision.
  • Fasken's previous attempt to challenge its denial of intervention was already adjudicated by the D. C. Circuit and is now final.
Respondent's argument
  • They qualify as "parties" because they participated in the licensing process by submitting comments on the draft environmental impact statement (EIS).
  • Fasken argues that the NRC erroneously denied its petition to intervene based on regulations that set a higher bar for intervention than the Atomic Energy Act contemplates.
  • Even if they are not statutory parties, they should be permitted to challenge the license as an *ultra vires* action because the NRC lacks the legal authority to license private off-site storage facilities.
The decision
  • The Court held that Texas and Fasken are not entitled to judicial review because they were not "parties" to the licensing proceeding.
  • Under 28 U. S. C. § 2344 (the Hobbs Act), only a "party aggrieved" may seek review, and the Court interpreted "party" as referring specifically to a party before the agency rather than any "person aggrieved."
  • The Court applied 42 U. S. C. § 2239(a)(1)(A) of the Atomic Energy Act, which provides that the Commission "shall admit any such person as a party" only after they request a hearing and are actually admitted; thus, merely submitting comments or attempting to intervene is insufficient.
  • The Court rejected Fasken's attempt to relitigate its intervention denial, noting that the D. C. Circuit had already upheld the denial in *Don't Waste Mich. v. NRC*, making that decision final and precluding a collateral attack via a new Hobbs Act suit.
  • Regarding the *ultra vires* claim, the Court relied on *Leedom v. Kyne* and *Boire v. Greyhound Corp.* to conclude that nonstatutory review is strictly limited to cases where an agency acts "in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition."
  • The Court found the *ultra vires* claim failed because it was essentially a typical statutory-authority argument "dressed up" as an *ultra vires* claim.
  • Nonstatutory review is further unavailable when a statutory review scheme, such as the Hobbs Act, provides aggrieved persons with a meaningful and adequate opportunity for judicial review of intervention denials.
  • The Court declined to rule on whether the NRC actually possessed the authority to license private off-site storage, as the threshold jurisdictional issue precluded such a decision.
Separate opinions
Gorsuch, dissenting (joined by Thomas, Alito)
  • Argues that the NRC lacks statutory authority to license private off-site storage because the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 authorizes interim storage only "at the site of each civilian nuclear reactor" or at "facilities owned by the Federal Government" (42 U. S. C. § 10151(b)) and specifically states that nothing in the act shall be construed to authorize offsite private facilities (42 U. S. C. § 10155(h)).
  • Contends that Texas and Fasken are "parties aggrieved" under the Hobbs Act because they participated in the environmental review process, which is an essential component of the licensing proceeding.
Read the full opinion on supremecourt.gov (PDF) →