Does Section 12112(a) of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protect retirees from disability-based discrimination regarding compensation? Specifically, is a retired employee who neither holds nor desires a job considered a "qualified individual" under the statute's definition in § 12111(8)? The Court must determine if the ADA's protections extend to individuals who are no longer in the workforce at the time of the alleged discrimination.

• Argued that the "qualified individual" requirement is a conditional mandate, meaning it only applies if a plaintiff holds or seeks a job; thus, retirees are automatically qualified because there are no essential functions to perform.
• Contended that interpreting "qualified individual" to exclude retirees would render the reference to "applicant or employee" in § 12112(b)(5)(A) meaningless.
• Asserted that Title I's broad language allowing "any person alleging discrimination" to sue under § 12117(a) makes the specific "qualified individual" definition irrelevant.
• Invoked the ADA's primary purpose of eradicating disability-based discrimination, arguing this goal is best served by extending protections to retirees.

• Argued that § 12112(a) only protects "qualified individuals," and since a retiree neither holds nor desires a job, they cannot meet the definition in § 12111(8).
• Contended that the present-tense verbs used in the statute ("holds," "desires," "can perform") limit the ADA's temporal reach to current employees or applicants.
• Asserted that the types of "reasonable accommodations" defined in § 12111(9), such as "job restructuring," are logically inapplicable to retirees.
• Argued that extending Title I to retirees could create perverse incentives for employers to remove disability-based distinctions from retirement policies entirely to avoid liability.

• Held that to prevail under § 12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove they were a "qualified individual" at the time of the employer's alleged act of disability-based discrimination.
• Defined a "qualified individual" per § 12111(8) as an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, "can perform the essential functions of the employment position that [she] holds or desires."
• Applied a textual analysis to the present-tense verbs ("holds," "desires," "can perform"), concluding they signal protection for current job holders or seekers, not retirees (citing *Carr v. United States*).
• Noted that the definition of "reasonable accommodation" in § 12111(9) (e.g., "job restructuring") and examples of discrimination in § 12112(b) (e.g., "employment tests") focus on current or prospective employees.
• Compared Title I to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, noting that when Title VII links "employee" to present-tense verbs, it refers only to current employees (citing *Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.*).
• Relied on *Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation* for the principle that a plaintiff's assertion that she is "unable to work" may negate an essential element of her ADA case.
• Rejected the "conditional mandate" theory as convoluted and rejected the surplusage argument, noting the canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule (citing *Marx v. General Revenue Corp.*).
• Determined that textual limitations are no less a part of a law's purpose than its substantive authorizations (*Kucana v. Holder*), and legislation does not pursue its stated purpose "at all costs" (*Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.*).