May a district court consider the retributive sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when deciding whether to revoke a defendant's term of supervised release? The case asks whether the omission of this specific factor from the list provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) prohibits its use. Specifically, does this exclusion prevent a court from considering the need for a sentence to "reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense"?

• District courts are prohibited from considering the retributive purpose in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) because Congress explicitly omitted it from the list of factors a court must consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
• The statutory structure indicates that while most sentencing factors apply to revocation, the exclusion of retribution is an intentional choice by Congress.
• Supervised release is intended for rehabilitative ends and post-confinement assistance rather than as a tool for backward-looking punishment.

• The list in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) identifies factors that courts *must* consider, but it does not explicitly forbid the consideration of other non-enumerated factors.
• A total prohibition on retributive considerations is unworkable because considering "the nature and circumstances of the offense" under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) necessarily implies a consideration of the principles in § 3553(a)(2)(A).
• Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), which mandates revocation in certain cases, it would be anomalous if retribution were permitted for mandatory revocations but forbidden for discretionary ones under § 3583(e).

• The Court held that district courts may not consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release.
• The Court applied the canon of statutory interpretation "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," meaning that expressing one item of a group excludes another not mentioned, citing *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal*.
• The Court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) lists eight of the ten factors found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and this specific omission "bespeaks a negative implication" that Congress intended to exclude retribution.
• The Court observed that other sentencing provisions, such as those for probation (18 U.S.C. § 3562(a) and § 3565(a)), fines (§ 3572(a)), and imprisonment (§ 3582(a)), instruct courts to consider all § 3553(a) factors, making the omission in § 3583(e) a "distinction with a difference."
• The Court reasoned that supervised release is not "a punishment in lieu of incarceration" (*United States v. Granderson*) but instead "fulfills rehabilitative ends" (*United States v. Johnson*), meaning courts should focus on forward-looking goals rather than backward-looking retribution.
• The Court relied on precedent from *Tapia v. United States* and *Concepcion v. United States*, which held that the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the imposition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) precludes its consideration.
• The Court rejected the "unworkability" argument, stating that while a court may consider the nature and circumstances of an offense under § 3553(a)(1), it must do so to inform deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation—not retribution.